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Abstract 
PHILOSOPHY OF M. N. ROY 
- A CRITICAL STUDY 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the contribution of M.N. Roy 
in the field of philosophy. Much work has been done on Roy as a 
socio-political thinker and little as a philosopher. His 
philosophical explorations, moreover, need to be studied both in 
the context of Indian and Western philosophical traditions. 
The present work comprises following six chapters: 
1. Introduction 
2. Philosophy of Materialism 
3. Theory of Human Nature 
4. From Humanism to Radical Humanism 
5. A New History of Philosophy and 
6. Conclusion 
The first chapter begins by defining philosophy in a general 
way. Philosophy is ultimately a way of life and every way of life 
implies some philosophy. Philosophy is an effort to think clearly, 
critically, rationally and effectively. It is about all that matters to 
us. 
Roy attempts to give a scientific exposition of philosophy. 
Unlike some other Indian thinkers of 20"" century, Roy 
distinguished philosophy from religion and said that no 
philosophical advancement is possible in the presence of religious 
beliefs and theological dogmas. 
Roy also makes a distinction between philosophy and 
metaphysics. According to him, metaphysics, like philosophy, 
discovers unity behind the diversity. But it leaves the ground of 
philosophy in quest of a noumenon above and beyond nature. 
Roy, on the other hand, would like all problems of 
philosophy-cosmological, ontological or epistemological-to be 
solved in the light of scientific knowledge. Because the function 
of philosophy is to explain existence as a whole. It requires 
knowledge about the different facets of reality which is gathered 
by the various branches of science. 
Roy started as a nationalist but soon after he became 
Marxist. He criticized nationalism and favoured cosmopolitanism. 
His study of western philosophy led him to a sympathetic 
consideration of renaissance humanism and socialism. This was 
his beginning as a thinker or philosopher. 
In his later phase Roy became a great critique of Marxism 
and propounded his own philosophy of radical humanism. He 
criticized Marxism by saying that it is a totalitarian ideology like 
that of nationalism and fascism. It is totally unsuitable to ensure 
the ideals of freedom and justice. 
Although Roy's philosophy is a form of materialistic 
monism, it depends upon reason and morality on the one hand and 
does not exclude the pluralistic phenomena of the world on the 
other hand. Moreover, it is an important achievement of Roy's 
materialism that it gives importance to ideas in his materialistic 
philosophy. Roy discovers an autonomous process of interaction 
and emergence in the historical growth of ideas. 
In the end of Introduction, a comparison of Roy's position 
with that of Rabindranath Tagore has been attempted. It is seen 
that although their systems of ideas are different from each other, 
they share some common and core values like that of humanism 
and cosmopolitanism. 
The second chapter deals with M. N. Roy's philosophy of 
materialism. After giving a brief survey of materialism in general, 
the position of Roy on the issue has been outlined. It has been 
discussed how Roy tried to restate the materialist philosophy 
keeping in view both Indian and Western kinds of materialism. 
According to Roy, materialism is the only possible 
philosophy. It represents the knowledge of world as it really 
exists. Origin of all existence is due to matter and nothing exists 
but the matter. All other appearances are the transformations of 
matter. Materialist philosophy, moreover, is not based on 
metaphysical speculations. It represents a scientific approach to 
life. Roy tries to establish a monistic view of the universe. He 
accepts matter as the ultimate basis of everything - body, mind 
and soul. All these, according to him, are physical entities. 
Roy's materialism admits practical idealism without 
admitting idealist philosophy. 'Practical idealism' is derived from 
the word ' ideal ' while 'idealist philosophy' is derived from the 
word 'idea". Idealist philosophy is identified with the virtue of 
dedicating life to ' ideas ' , whereas practical idealism is idealistic 
practice in life. The ideals, thinks Roy, cannot be separated from 
the life of a materialist. 
Roy criticizes the spiritualist philosophies of India. If the 
world is material and only material things can produce material 
objects then it is not possible that material object has an 
immaterial cause. In this context, he appreciates the quasi-
materialist philosophies of Buddhists, Jainas and Sankhya while 
rejecting the metaphysical speculations such as we find in 
Upanishads. 
Roy's materialism is based on scientific theory of 
knowledge. Roy traces a causal connection between mind and 
matter. Ideas are representatives of reality even as they are 
derived from experience. These are the product of interaction 
between mind and matter. 
Finally, in this chapter, it is seen that Roy re-states 
materialism in terms of physical realism. The philosophical 
consequences that this description leads to are also discussed. 
The third chapter is related to M. N. Roy's theory of human 
nature. After giving a brief account of human nature in general, it 
is observed that Roy studied human nature from different angles -
biological, anthropological and psychological. Roy accepted two 
factors behind the production of human event. First was the fact of 
man's emergence as the highest product of evolutionary process. 
Since this process is mechanical, man, too, is a part of law-
governed universe. Second, Roy accepted animal ancestry of man. 
His view of human nature admits reason, freedom and truth, and 
morality as its basic traits. 
Roy argued that it is essential to human nature to inquire 
about the reality of things. It does not believe in anything without 
a rational or scientific inquiry. Therefore, the religious concept of 
faith has been discarded. Roy also believes that though there is 
something permanent and stable in human nature, it is still not 
untrue to say that "to change is human nature". The same argument 
has been given by Roy in the context of the history of civilization 
as an evolutionary process. 
In the end of this chapter, it is seen how Roy criticized Marx 
in regarded to his theory of man. According to Roy, Marxian 
dialectical materialism dehumanized man by subordinating its 
entire history to the tyranny of economic forces. Marx also merged 
the individuals into the collective ego. Roy would like to place the 
individual above everything else. 
Chapter Four of the present thesis is concerned with Roy's 
philosophy of radical humanism. After giving a brief statement of 
humanism in general, its three versions-religious, scientific and 
Marxist - have been briefly discussed. 
Roy's humanism is variously called New, Scientific, Radical 
and Integral Humanism. He argues that his humanism is 'New' 
because it is enriched and reinforced by scientific knowledge and 
social experience gained by modern civilization. It is 'scientific' 
because it conceives human reality as a byproduct - the highest 
one though - of the mechanistic process of nature. It can also be 
called 'Radical ' because it goes to the root of the problem of the 
origin of the human being. Again, Roy says that since its newness 
is derived from modern scientific knowledge, the more appropriate 
name is 'Scientific Humanism'. 
There are three basic values in radical humanism. These are 
freedom, rationality and morality. These values arise from certain 
mental attributes acquired by man in the course of physico-
biological evolution. Freedom is the most fundamental value. It is 
the supreme value from which all human values are ratiortJ^V 
derived. The urge for freedom is indeed the essence of human 
existence. 
Rationality is the basis of moral development of man. 
Rationality frees man from blind faith and makes him self-reliant. 
It is the main instrument of human progress. As an inherent part of 
human nature reason, though, remains a biological property. Roy's 
humanism also rests its ethics on the rationality of man. If a man 
is conscious about his innate rationality, he, as man, can be moral. 
Radical humanism is a post-Marxian philosophy. According 
to Roy, Marx sacrificed individuals for the sake of society. 
Marxism therefore cannot be a humanistic philosophy. Humanism 
must needs be all about man in so far as man is higher than 
anything else. 
Roy's radical humanism is cosmopolitan. The solution of the 
world crisis cannot be found within the boundaries of national 
states. Roy observed the whole world as a single state because 
man will not be limited by the boundaries of national states. Roy 
opposes the philosophy of nationalism for its being based on 
vested interests. He supports internationalism which merges into 
cosmopolitanism. 
In Chapter Five, Roy's philosophy of history is discussed in 
detail. Roy believed that history is an evolutionary process and 
man is the maker of his history. He argued that Marx also regarded 
history as an evolutionary process, but he gave an economic 
interpretation of it. Roy accepts the creative and critical role of 
ideas in shaping the process of history. While Roy claims that 
Marx regarded ideas as a mere reflection of matter having no 
creativity of their own. 
Again, Roy criticizes Marxism by saying that in Marxism 
there in no value of freedom of individual. It becomes the freedom 
of class. Morality, too, loses its meaning except as the 
economically determined behavior of the group. 
Roy regards the history as the history of man's struggle for 
freedom in which environment and ideas acted on each other. 
Roy's historiology, therefore, makes a comprehensive theory of 
social change in which both economic forces and dynamics of 
ideas find their recognition. In Roy's eyes, dialectical process of 
history can never be independent of the dynamics of thought. 
Roy casts doubt on the sociology of class-struggle. There 
have been different social classes in history. But besides the force 
of social tension and struggle there has also been operative a 
cohesive bond. Marx, according to Roy, has also been proved to be 
a false prophet in his statement regarding the disappearance of 
middle class. 
Roy criticizes the Marxist view of the dictatorship of 
proletariat that would happen at the end of capitalist system. The 
present scenario is absolutely opposite. The power of labor class is 
nothing before the capitalists. Moreover, the power of the labor 
class will not ensure the freedom and personal dignity of man. 
Proletariat class may also be tyrannical like the capitalist class. 
Roy argues that the society cannot be classless as Marx wanted to 
make it. 
In Conclusion, it is seen that Roy, in spite of having 
borrowed his philosophy from renaissance humanism, Marxism 
and anti-Marxism, is rightly considered as an important and 
influential philosopher in a proper and academic sense. He was by 
no means a mere socio-political thinker and a commentator on 
Indian and Western philosophies. 
Roy is a monist, humanist, rationalist and moralist 
philosopher. He stood for the ideals of freedom, rationality and 
morality. Roy's ethical, social and rational principles are to be 
seen in broader perspective. These contain humanistic, practical or 
pragmatic and cosmopolitan elements that have undoubtedly great 
relevance to the modern situations. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I M. N. Roy's Conception of Philosophy 
Philosophy may be defined as the critical and systematic attempt 
to understand human existence at its fundamental level. It means 
philosophy deals vviih essential questions concerning the meaning 
of life. Ii stretches the human intellect to its limits and 
comprehends the general character of the world and man's place in 
the total scheme of things. 
Philosophy attempts to give a comprehensive theory of 
reality as a whole.'^ It is the rational investigation of certain 
fundamental problems about the nature of man and the world he 
lives in."' 
Philosophers have tried to provide not only a vision of the 
world, but standards for individual and social actions as well. 
There are some normative concerns of philosophers searching for 
wisdom. They are the principles of right and wrong, the ideals of 
associative life, the meaning of the good life etc.'* 
Philosophy has, therefore, appeal for everybody. It is 
ultimately a way of life and every way of life implies some 
philosophy. After all, philosophy is nothing more or less than the 
effort to think clearly, critically, rationally, rigorously, coherently 
and effectively. U is about all that matters to us. When we fail to 
do this, we fail as philosophers." 
M.N.Roy (1887-1954) attempts to give a scientific 
exposition of philosophy. He tries to find out how far philosophy 
can help us to solve the social and political problems of the time. 
Unlike some other Indian thinkers of the twentieth century, Roy 
tries to make a distinction between philosophy and religion in his 
thought. According to him, no philosophical advancement is 
possible unless we get rid of orthodox religious ideas and 
theological dogmas. He envisages philosophy and science to be 
rather always together. He thus says: 
Philosophy is contemplation, study and knowledge of 
nature. Its function is to know things as they are, and to 
find common origin of the diverse phenomena of nature, 
in nature itself.'' 
According to Roy, philosophy begins when man's spiritual 
needs are no longer satisfied by primitive natural religion. Natural 
religion imagines and worships a variety of gods as 
personifications of the diverse phenomena of nature. The grown up 
man discredits the nursery-tales with which he was impressed in 
his spiritual childhood. Roy insists that intellectual growth impels 
and encourages man to seek in nature itself the causes of all 
natural phenomena. It is to find in nature a unity behind its 
diversitv. ' 
Roy defines philosophy as "the theory of life." The function 
of philosophy, in the words of Roy, "is to solve the riddle of the 
universe."^ Elaborating on his definition of philosophy, he says: 
Philosophy is the theory of life, because it was born of 
the efforts of man to explain nature and to understand his 
own being in relation to his surrounding; to solve the 
actual problems of life in the light of past experience, so 
that the solution will give him an encouraging glimpse 
into the future.^ 
So far as philosophy and metaphysics are concerned, Roy 
has made a distinction between the two. According to him, 
metaphysics, like philosophy, begins with the desire to discover 
unity behind the diversity. But metaphysics leaves the ground of 
philosophy in quest of a noumenon above and beyond nature. 
Sometimes it is distinct from the phenomena. Thus, it abandons 
the inquiry into the v/ilderness of speculation. It is absurd to say 
that intangible is the condition for the knowledge of the tangible. 
It is what metaphysics does. '" 
It is thus obvious that Roy is opposed to speculative 
philosophy. The metaphysics sets impossible task for itself. 
Because it inquires into the transcendental being above and behind 
the physical universe, to acquire the knowledge of reality beyond 
the appearance. For Roy this whole approach is unacceptable. He 
thus writes: 
Speculative philosophy is ihe attempt to explain the 
concrete realities of existence in the light of a 
hypothetical absolute. It is the way not to truth, but to 
dream; not to knowledge but to illusion. Instead of trying 
to understand the world, the only reality given to man, 
speculative philosophy ends in denying the existence of 
the only reality and declaring it to be a figment of man's 
imagination. An enquiry which denies the very existence 
of the object to be enquired, is bound to end in idle 
dreams and hopeless confusion." 
Roy is opposed not only to speculative philosophy but also 
to the identification of philosophy with theology and religion. 
According to him, v/ord 'philosophy' has a very vague meaning for 
the average educated man. For that man particularly, it also has a 
sweeping application. It stands not only for speculative thought 
but also for poetic fancy. In India, especially, this vague sense is 
generally prevalent. He says that in India 
Philosophy is not distinguished from religion and 
theology. Indeed, what is believed to be the distinctive 
feature of Indian philosophy is that it has not broken 
away from the medieval tradition, as modern Western 
philosophy did in the seventeenth century.'^ 
According to Roy, faith in super-natural does not permit the 
search for the causes of natural phenomena in nature itself. 
Therefore, orthodox religious ideas and theological dogmas should 
be rejected. This is. in a way, the necessary condition for 
philosophy. 
He argues that there is no room for faith in philosophy. If it 
is believed that the phenomena of nature are determined by the 
will of supernatural beings, philosophy must make the room for 
faith. But supernatural is always beyond the understanding of man. 
Because man himself is a product of nature even as he is limited 
by the laws of nature.'" Roy is of the view that the religion is 
bound to be removed by science. Because scientific knowledge 
enables mankind to solve different problems of religions which 
assume the presence of supernatural forces or agencies behind 
human beings. Hence, Roy argues that we should start from the 
reality of physical world. And in order to perform its function, 
philosophy must break away from religion. 
Roy regards rejection of orthodox religious ideas and 
theological dogmas as an essential condition of philosophy. He 
envisage a very intimate relationship between philosophy and 
science. In fact, according to Roy, the philosophical significance 
of modern scientific theory is to render the old division between 
science and philosophy untenable. He says: 
Science is stepping over the old boundary line. Digging 
deeper and deeper into the secrets of nature, science has 
come up against problems, the solution of which was 
previously left to philosophy. Scientific enquiry has 
pushed into what is traditionally regarded as the 
'"metaphysical" realm.'"* 
According (o Roy, vA\ the problems of philosophy, whether 
cosmologica!, oniological or epistemological, can be solved in the 
light of scientific knowledge. He argues that the function of 
philosophy is to explain existence as a whole. An explanation of 
the existence requires knowledge about the different phases of 
existence. This is gathered by the various branches of science. 
Therefore, the function of philosophy is to coordinate the entire 
body of scientific knowledge into a comprehensive theory of 
nature and life. Therefore Roy calls philosophy as the science of 
sciences.'" 
Since philosophy has yielded its earlier position to science, 
it can now exist only as the science of sciences. It is a systematic 
coordination and a synthesis of all positive knowledge. It readjusts 
itself to the progressive expansion of the store of human 
knowledge. Roy claims that such a philosophy has nothing in 
common with what is traditionally known, particularly in India, as 
philosophy. A mystic-metaphysical conception of the world is no 
longer to be accorded the designation of philosophy.'^' 
II Development of Roy's Philosophy 
Roy started as a nationalist thinker and activist but soon gravitated 
towards Marxism. His critique of nationalist theory and initiation 
into Marxism was his beginning as a philosopher and a social 
thinker. 
Even though Roy was influenced by Marxism, his was not a 
blind faith in it. He had never been an orthodox Marxist. He began 
with an attempt at fundamental revision of Marxism and finally he 
abandoned it in favour of his own philosophy of radical humanism. 
For instance, Marx presented the philosophy of dialectical 
materialism. But Roy did not agree with dialectics and developed a 
theory of materialism of his own. Therefore, it could be said that 
R.oy adopted only those features of Marxism which he thought 
important. 
So far as the evolution of philosophical, social, political and 
economic ideas of Roy is concerned, ii occurred in two stages. 
First, when he became a Marxist in 1916 and second, when he 
replaced it by his radical humanism in 1946. It was his 
understanding of liie socio-economic conditions of Mexico a1 the 
time of the First World War that brought about a basic change in 
his mind. It was not a mutation in his political evolution. It was 
rather a sudden jump from nationalism to communism." 
Roy was primarily a revolutionary thinker during his 
struggle for freedom in India. Even as the first impact on him was 
that of nationalism, communism as anti-imperialism also appealed 
to him at this stage. Later on, he visualised that national 
independence was not enough. It could not cure the evils of any 
country. There should be a social revolution to emancipate nation. 
Therefore, mere poliiica! and national revolutions were not 
enough. 
Roy thought that Marx was right in emphasizing the idea of 
class struggle. Because it was a revolutionary action. Roy called 
him a prophet of revolution. It was Marx, according to Roy, who 
had faith in the creativeness of man. The class struggle was the 
tool of social evolution that brought about the revolutions in 
society. Therefore, Roy called Marx as a humanist.' 
Marx was an advocate of freedom. He stood for the freedom 
of the individual. He also talked of socialism as "the kingdom of 
freedom." In it man will be the master of his social environment. 
Roy was impressed by it and thought that the humanist, libertarian 
and moralist spirit of Marxism will go into the making of a new 
philosophy for our time. 
The basic principles of Marxian philosophy provided for the 
liberation of the human spirit. Roy found a broader horizon in 
Marxism. He thought Marxism to be broad enough to accommodate 
many divergent ideas. Following Marx, Roy believed in the 
essential goodness of man. It was common to both of them that 
man would be ultimately rational and free himself from irrational 
forces. According to him, Marxism is a revolutionary philosophy. 
It sets new task to philosophy. Previously, philosophy had simply 
tried to explain the world. But in future it must point out the way 
to construct it. 
Roy believed with full confidence that Marxism was a 
practical philosophy. It could be used as a set of conditions for the 
future reconstruction of society. It could open a new vision for 
building a rational society. He admired Marxism to such an extent 
that he was prepared to call it independent of lime. But, at the 
same time, Roy had an open mind towards Marxism. He took 
special interest to save Marxism from a long narrow cut routine. 
To him, Marxism was not a closed system of philosophy but a way 
of thinking. 
Roy opposed the idea of making Marxism a religion. 
Marxism was a scientific philosophy. It could not be dogmatic. 
Roy based his understanding of Marxism on reason and critical 
thinking. He was prepared to refute and to go beyond Marxism if 
the conditions and circumstances so required. The scientific 
approach of Marx's philosophy in the realm of social welfare also 
impressed Roy. 
According to Roy, Marx's contribution to the cause of 
human freedom was greater than that of any other thinker, past and 
present. Because he had the advantage of living in an age when 
scientific knowledge could throw light on the old problems of 
philosophy.-" Marx's sympathy towards the labour class 
particularly impressed Roy. He supported Marxian view of social 
justice. Because the exploitation of man by the man was not 
something that could be tolerated. 
Roy's philosophy emerged as a response to the forces of 
revolution that aspired to solve the contemporary socio-cultural 
crisis. It came at a time when the Fascism had consolidated. All 
the reactionary influences and even communism in which Roy had 
faith was found unequal to the task of meeting its challenges. The 
renaissance emerged against the backdrop of an age which was 
dominated by religious faith. And Marxism emerged against 
capitalism. Roy's philosophy, on the other hand, emerged against 
the cult of totalitarianism.^' 
Roy's philosophy has had a long tradition and a rich heritage 
behind it. The main sources of his philosophy are the two major 
revolutionary movements, namely, the renaissance humanism and 
communism. Roy believes that the social philosophy must 
integrate the achievements of these two movements. It should also 
eliminate their inadequacies in order to give an effective guidance 
to the forces of social revolution. 
Roy's philosophy is an endeavour to consolidate the 
progressive legacy of the West. It integrates features of the 
Renaissance Humanism into the purely intellectual and pragmatic 
formulations of the Marxist philosophy. Marx had suggested that 
10 
the new pattern of society must incorporate the technical 
achievements ci[ bourgeoisie. But Roy does not fully agree with 
Marx on this point. He points out that unless a society has 
absorbed the moral and cultural achievements of so called 
bourgeois culture, the ideal of socialism will remain unrealized. 
The basic ideas of the Renaissance Humanism which became 
the hallmark of fifteenth century Europe are reason, individuality 
and freedom. Socialism, on the other hand, attaches primary 
importance to organisational cohesion. But as liberty unconnected 
with organisation has no meaning, organisation without freedom is 
dangerous. In separation both are harmful to the liberty of the 
individual. Therefore. Roy claims that socialism misinterpreted or 
simplified the complicated process of social changes. It has done 
so by reducing it to the dialectics of class conflicts and economic 
contradictions.^' 
I l l Cri t ique of Total i tar ianism 
Roy felt that nationalism has lost its utility. If it is allowed to 
continue, it will only serve the forces of reaction. Nationalism, in 
his view, is a negative force. Political freedom which is the 
concrete object of nationalism made anti-imperialism its main 
goal. But the struggle for freedom of any country can not succeed 
if its basic impulse is characterized by differences. 
11 
Roy calls 'national freedom' an 'abstract idea.' It 
presupposes an identity of interests of a country. National freedom 
does not mean freedom for the entire human community. It is 
meant only for a particular nation. The struggle for national 
liberation must be followed by social liberation. It puts a new 
context in the ideal of freedom. This new conception of freedom 
transcends national boundaries. Because its attainment pre-
supposes efforts and co-operation on a large field.^^ Therefore, the 
most effective method of promoting such freedom is to participate 
in the process of re-making the world as a whole.^'* 
According to Roy, nationalism is a metaphysical concept. It 
suppresses individual freedom for the sake of an abstract ideal that 
is national freedom. Rights here are subordinated to duties which 
must be performed for promoting national greatness. An individual 
is to assert his own individuality against the nation. Feeling 
disgusted with nationalism, he wrote: 
It is a metaphysical concept; yet, human beings, of flesh 
and blood, must sacrifice everything to make the nation 
great and glorious. That is the essence of Nationalism. 
That is, to sacrifice a reality at the altar of a fiction, of an 
illusion. The nation could not claim an undivided loyalty 
unless Nationalism was of the order of monotheistic 
religion: there can be no other God, and nobody can claim 
any share in the sacrifice. A country is supposed to be the 
shrine of the goddess of nation. All the human individuals 
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inhabiting the country cannot have any other loyalty, not 
even to themselves, than to this abstract concept of 
nation—the monopolistic, exacting political goodness 
whose existence cannot be proved. Unless the collectivity 
servilely accepts this fiction as a truth, the nation cannot 
exist/^ 
According to Roy, nationalism, whether Indian or German or 
Japanese, is, by its internal logic, a totalitarian cull. Roy tells that 
India under the banner of nationalism is not only moving towards 
totalitarianism but is well advanced on its way. He states that we 
should look at the reality not only from within the national 
boundaries but also outside of these boundaries. A true human 
outlook does not recognise the existence of separate states that 
provide means for the welfare of particular nations. It rather gives 
a cosmopolitan outlook for all people living anywhere in the 
world. 
Since Roy was against the totalitarian cult, he found fascism 
to be equally dangerous. Fascism denies the sovereignty of the 
individual. It does not give the individual any place in society 
except as "a cog in a vast machine." It also enriches this vast 
machinery with collective ego. On the basis of these arguments, 
Roy calls fascism similar to nationalism. Both have totalitarian 
views. And totalitarianism is against the spirit of human freedom. 
It negates the welfare of human beings in so far as it is the 
ideology of particular race that works for its vested interest. It can 
never be helpful for other human beings while our aim must be 
same for all." 
In his later period, Roy began to express his heretical views 
regarding communism and Marxism. He differed with Marxism 
mainly on the role of ideas in shaping the human history and on 
the primacy of moral values. Roy summarised the philosophy 
which he was propagating in a number of theses. These theses 
came to be known as the 22 Theses of Radical Humanism. 
According to Roy, Marxism could not be the horoscope of 
humanity. It was only a method to study and interpret history. Roy 
attempted to show the inadequacies of the philosophy of Marxism. 
His revisions in the light of his own experiments either repudiate 
or made substantial modifications in the teachings of Karl Marx. 
Roy was an advocate of Marxism till about 1930. In the light 
of new developments, he started rethinking about it. He looked at 
the developments of socialism in the Soviet Union under the 
leadership of Stalin. It made him a critique of communism and 
Marxism. The criticism of communism had its natural effect on 
R.oy's understanding of Marxism. 
He found Marxism as being also a totalitarian cult like 
Fascism and nationalism. He, therefore, began to argue against it, 
too. He said that since Marxism is based on the national interest, it 
is also a totalitarian cult. It prescribed a collective ego. It is not 
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meant for the cnlire society but to a particular class. Therefore, 
Ro"v insists on liie rejection of communism as he insisted on the 
rejection of nationalism as a practical ideology. Both these 
subordinate men before a collective whole. Since men are creators 
of social world, any social organization which denies the 
sovereignty of the individual cannot be wholesome. 
Roy identifies communism with dictatorship. So it is as 
totalitarian as Nationalism. Since the proletariat captures political 
power, it establishes a state which is supposed to express the 
collective ego of the class. The ownership of the means of 
production is transferred from private individuals to that class. 
Ownership becomes collective. But, as Roy argues, it is not 
possible. Ownership is simply transferred from one class to 
another class. So, in that sense, capitalist ownership was also not 
strictly private. It was also collective ownership. The transfer of 
the ownership by itself makes no change. Communists say that the 
ownership of the means of production is nationalized or 
socialized. Roy argues that, in reality, the ownership still remains 
"private' . Because it is vested in one class not the entire society.^' 
Roy became an ardent supporter of cosmopolitanism which 
was not to be found in fascism, nationalism or Marxism. He 
considered human beings to be all of equal value. He said when we 
are talking about the welfare of human being, we should not think 
about the people of India only. All human beings should be 
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considered equal. Humanism is not limited within the boundaries 
of nation or the ideology of Marxism. It is beyond these narrow 
ideologies. Cosmopolitanism should rather be the criterion of 
judging the enrichment and welfare of all human beings living 
anywhere in the v/orld. Roy thus formulated a philosophy of 
humanism that he himself called Radical Humanism by rejecting 
the idea of nationalism, fascism and Marxism. 
IV Characteristics of Roy's Philosophy 
Though Roy's philosophy bears certain similarities to other 
systems of thought in some of its aspects, it is also different from 
them in many other. These differences give it a character of its 
own. We would discuss here some of the aspects which make 
Roy's philosophy peculiar and special. 
The methodology adopted by Roy in his system of thought is 
deduced from a critical consideration of Humanism and Marxism. 
Besides this, it also puts everything in a scientific perspective. 
This scientific perspective had been provided by the theory of 
'relativity' of Einstein. It applies the relativist method. Roy 
rejects the idea of absolute determinism which allows no choice in 
human affairs. 
Though philosophy of Roy is essentially materialistic, it is 
not mechanistic. It considers matter as the ultimate reality. This 
conception of reality is based on the logical implications of 
modern sciences. It holds that reality exists even if we do not 
know it. Thus, it opposes both subjective idealism and empiricism. 
Its perspective can be termed as "pluralistic monism." The 
character of realit}' is monistic in three senses. Firstly, it depends 
on reason as the only dependable instrument of incidents. 
Secondly, it traces some objective pattern of mathematical laws. 
These not only underline knowledge but also the entire space-time 
dichotomy. Lastly, the test of progress is harmonization. But it 
should also be noticed that its monism does not exclude the 
pluralistic phenomena of the world. In other words, il does not 
preclude pluralism in the process of becoming. 
Roy's philosophy is rationalistic. It cannot accept anything 
which does not stand the test of experimentation and analysis. 
Thus everything appeals to reason. But this does not imply that it 
believes that scientific investigation can give absolute knowledge. 
It considers science only to be a process. It, therefore, insists that 
our conception of things must be based on actual investigation and 
experience, 
Roy gives equal importance to ' ideas ' in his materialistic 
philosophy. On this he criticises Marxism. He says that under the 
influence of economic interpretation of history, Marxism failed to 
appreciate the creative role of ideas. Roy, on the other hand, finds 
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autonomous process of interaction and emergence in the growth of 
ideas."' 
There are some tests of values in Roy's philosophy. On the 
one hand, it regards 'freedom' as a value which means full 
opportunity and scope to individual. On the other hand, it stresses 
on the value of progress. Both these tests of values are logically 
related to each other in the realm of personal ethics. Freedom is 
looked upon as a value from the individual point of view while 
progress is justified from the social point of value. 
Roy's philosophy derives the criterion of value judgement 
from the human urge itself. It is because he believes that man is 
born with an urge for freedom, growth, creation etc. Thus, Roy 
considers freedom as the highest ideal. Only a free man can have 
the full joy of living. Freedom is therefore the condition for the 
self-realisation of life. 
The philosophy of Roy integrates science into social 
organisation and individual character. It reconciles individuality 
with institutional life and gives freedom moral, intellectual and 
social contents. It offers a comprehensive theory of social 
progress. Both the logic of structural mutations and the dynamism 
of ideology can find their due recognition in it. It thus deduces 
from the same idea a method and programme of social revolution 
in our time."^ 
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In sum, for Roy, philosophy is a logical coordination of all 
the branches of positive knowledge. It holds in a system of 
thought the endeavour to explain the world rationally and to serve 
as a reliable guide for life. Therefore, Roy tries to define 
philosophy in a secular and modern way.^'^ 
V M. N. Roy and Rabindranatb Tagore 
Before we end this introduction to the philosophy of M. N. Roy. it 
may be interesting lo com.pare his position with that of 
Rabindranatb Tagore. his senior contemporary and compatriot. 
From appearances their systems of ideas are so different from each 
other. But they also share with each other some common and core 
values like that of humanism and cosmopolitanism. They were 
equally antagonistic to the theory of nationalism which was a 
dominant idea in their times. It is in fact quite interesting to see 
how the two thinkers attempt to realize same goals from two 
widely different perspectives - one religious and the other so 
fiercely anti-religious. 
Despite being essentially a man of literature, a poet and an 
artist, Tagore is considered as one of the great philosophers of 
India. He is not a socio-political thinker like Roy, but his 
philosophy of life is of great significance not only in Indian 
perspective but also from the point of viev.' of the philosophy of 
the West. 
19 
Though Tagore does not deviate from the path adopted by 
previous Indian philosophers, he tries to reconcile Indian 
philosophy with the West. Tagore was a deeply religious man. He 
believed in God as a creator and destroyer of this world and also, 
at the same time, gave equal importance to the value and dignity 
of man. 
Tagore as a religious man partly followed the spiritualism of 
Indian tradition. Roy on the other hand is an atheist. His 
philosophical attitude toward life is quite different from the way 
adopted by the traditional Indian philosophers. In spite of having 
opposite approaches to life, we find some similarities between 
these two philosophers. Both are influenced from the Eastern and 
Western philosophies and have humanistic view of life. Both are 
in favour of human freedom and are against the philosophy of 
nationalism. Tagore favours internationalism while Roy tries to 
establish a cosmopolitan society for all men. 
Rabindranath Tagore as a poet-philosopher is an ' idealist ' or 
a 'spiritualist ' . He can also be called a 'monist ' and a ' theist ' . 
Reality, according to him, is one. He identifies Reality with God 
who he says should be conceived as a person. Tagore, therefore, 
accepts the oneness of man with God, of creator with his creation. 
This conception of relationship between man and God is at the 
base of the humanistic idea of Tagore. 
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Tagore, like Roy, was also influenced by the philosophy of 
the West in general and humanism in particular. He accepts the 
V/estern definition of h.umanism that man is the supreme and the 
ultimate reality. If there is God, He must be interpreted in human 
terms. He tries to go far from the mere traditionalism and 
orthodoxy of Hinduism and adapts to the spirituality of Western 
humanism. His philosophy of humanism, therefore, is known as 
universal humanism. Tagore thinks of man as the universal man. 
According to him, truth cannot be understood unless the universal 
man in the individual self is understood. He, thus, recognizes the 
reality of God, nature and the finite individual and considers them 
inseparable. 
Religion, according to Tagore, consists in the synthesis and 
reconciliation of the contradictions in human nature. He says: 
Religion consists in the endeavour of man to cultivate and 
express those qualities which are inherent in the nature of 
Man the Fi^ternai. and to have faith in him."^ '* 
Thus, religion of man consists in the realization that man is 
the ultimate truth and the measure of all things. And, moreover, in 
Tagore's religion, man is necessary to God as God is necessary to 
man. He, thus, considers man as the marker of reality. 
Tagore defines philosophy as 'personal realization.' In his 
seminal work The Religion of Man, he says: 
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I have already made the confession that my religion is a 
poet 's religion. All that I feel about it is from vision and 
not from knowledge. Frankly, I acknowledge that I cannot 
satisfactorily answer any question about evil, or about 
what happens after death. Nevertheless, I am sure that 
there have come moments in my own experience when my 
soul has touched the infinite and has become intensely 
conscious of it through the illumination of joy.'' 
Herein the divergences between the approaches of Tagore 
and Roy become obvious. Roy is a thorough going rationalist who 
would not accept any idea without subjecting to rational scrutiny. 
He would also take notice of what the science has to say on any 
such subjects as the belief in God and immortality of soul. He 
would consider, as a result of his scientific and rationalist 
methodology, such beliefs to be mere superstitions. But Tagore 
accepts such things on the basis of his religious instinct and 
intuition. 
But despite such divergence of opinion, Tagore's thought, 
like that of Roy. moves very close to humanistic perspective. 
According to him. the universe to which we are related through 
our sense perception, reason, or imagination is man's universe.^^ 
The view that the universe as known to or interpreted by man is 
essentially a human universe occurs again and again in Tagore's 
writings. He thus says: 
For our universe is the sum total of what Man feels, 
knows, imagines, reasons to be, and of whatever is 
knowable to him now or in another time. It affects him 
differently in its different aspects, in its beauty, its 
inevitable sequence of happenings, its potentiality; and 
the world proves itself to him only in its varied effects 
upon his senses, imagination and reasoning mind. 
Tagore, as he synthesizes his philosophy with Western 
philosophy, wants a compromise between Western science and 
Indian spiritualism. He does this because he wants to guide the 
human race in order to evolve a common culture and uniform 
ethical standards. It means he tries to establish unity between East 
and West. It also ultimately means the unity of spiritual and 
scientific knowledge. Thus, Tagore argues that scientific truths are 
not independent of the human mind. Because all the scientific 
truths are human truths. Roy, again, would not agree. While he is 
net greatly enamoured of the native philosophical tradition he 
would also reject the relativisation of scientific truths. In his view, 
it is the Western scientific legacy that has to be made guide of 
one's thinking rather than the metaphysical or mystical 
speculation. 
The question in any case arises: if truth is relative to man -
if man is the measure of all things - then how can we speak of 
truth at all? Tagore seeks to escape this skeptical conclusion by 
taking the help of idealistic conception of an Infinite Mind that 
has been propounded in the Upanishads. This mind is referred to 
by him as the Universal human mind. It is also described as 'A 
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Being who is the infinite in man' vor as 'Man the Eternal' or 'Man 
the Divine.' Tagore also uses the expression 'Supreme Person' to 
signify the same idea. Man is raised higher to the status of God. 
Or, in a different way, God is brought down lo the level of man. 
Tagore's God is somehow God and man at the same time. He 
asserts, ' i f this faith be blamed for being anthropomorphic, man is 
to be blamed for being man." 
The humanism of Tagore aims at reducing everything and 
anything to the level of human. It is the human mind that reveals 
the meaning and significance of things. Tagore is idealist and 
theist but both his theism and idealism are expressed in humanistic 
terms. He says: 
It is almost a truism to say that the world is what we 
perceive it to be. We imagine that our mind is a mirror, 
that it is, more or less, accurately reflecting what is 
happening outside us.^^ 
The above quotation shows Tagore's primacy of the human point 
of view. The effort of man's personality is to transform everything 
with which he has any true concern into the human. For instance, 
the description of the beauty of sunrise has its eternal interest in 
us. Because, it is not the sunrise that shows our interest, but the 
fact of sunrise in relation to our interest or aesthetic sense. 
Tagore points out that the outer world is nothing but 'a 
cradle of the human spirit.' This is why, in his view, the notions 
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of 'life", beautv harmony, order, love, delight, music, rhythm etc. 
have become important. All these are human concepts. They 
become meaningful when they are related to human values. 
Tagore's humanistic convictions are, indeed, rooted 
precisely in establishing a personal bond between man and the 
objects. He thus says that he has great faith in humanity. It is like 
the sun that can be clouded, but never extinguished. He says: 
We are waiting for the time when the spirit of age will be 
incarnated in a complete human truth and the meeting of 
men will be translated into the Unity of Man.'*" 
Tagore identifies the Reality with eternal humanity or 
immortal Man. Our life gains value when it represents eternal 
humanity in knowledge, sympathy, deeds, character and creative 
works. From the beginning of history, man has been seeking these 
values, sometimes at the cost of so-called worldly gains and 
successes. This, according to Tagore, means that 'we are trying to 
realize in ourselves the immortal man, so that we may die but not 
perish.' '" The values that man seeks constitute his Reality or 
Truth; they are indeed his God. 
Tagore stands midway between traditional idealism and 
modern humanism. He says that the universe as known to us is a 
human universe. This implies that God we believe in is one 
fashioned by man's own imagination and conceptual faculty. On 
the other hand, Tagore does not get rid of the traditional belief in 
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an ultimate ground or cause of the world. Because he thinks that 
this is necessary for sustaining our faith in the spiritual values. 
Tagore says: 
I believe in a spiritual world-not as anything separate 
from this world-but as its innermost truth. With the 
breath we draw we must always feel this truth that we are 
living in God. Born in this great world, full of the 
m.ystery of the infinite, we cannot accept our existence as 
a momentary outburst of chance drifting on the current of 
matter toward an eternal nowhere. We cannot look upon 
our lives as dreams of a dreamer who has no awakening in 
all time. 
Tagore, like Roy, is a critique of the creed of 'nationalism'. He 
calls it a narrow and selfish idea. He also criticizes the goal of 
materialistic prosperity envisaged by nationalism. For both the 
creeds of material prosperity and the cult of nationalism tend to 
divert men from the pursuit to their real goal and objectives. 
Human goals are the realization of the unity with the higher self of 
humanity or the man eternal, the values of truth, virtue and beauty. 
Nationalism, according to Tagore, leads one to think that the 
country is greater and has greater claim on a people than the ideals 
and the well-being of humanity as a whole. 
Tagore, much like Roy, observes how even a well-meaning 
people like the British were full of narrow self-interest. They did 
injustices of various sorts in lands conquered and ruled by 
them. They pretended to be nationalists. But their nationalism is a 
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cult of their collective self-inieresi. In it the citizens of one 
country do not care about the interests of the other people. They 
love their own people and think that they are better than the 
people who are born in other countries. But love in the eyes of 
Tagore does nor require national boundaries. It does not even 
require to sacrifice or compromise man's noble, humanistic ideal 
of human unity. It also does not lead him to hale the people or 
nations hostile to India. Thus, we find that Tagore's attachment to 
India was not bound by her geographical frontiers. His attachment 
was rather to the ideals and values for which India has stood 
through the centuries. As early as 1912 he wrote: 
I love India, not because I cultivate the idolatry of 
geography, not because I have had the chance to be born 
in her soil, but because she has saved through tumultuous 
ages the living words that have issued from the 
illuminated consciousness of her great sons.''^ 
Thus, we find that Tagore tries to establish universalism and 
uncompromising internationalism. Humanism, according to him, is 
not possible within the national boundaries. Humanism is the 
philosophy which aims at the welfare of all human beings living 
anywhere in the world, It treats equality as one of the most 
important tools for all men. As against this, nationalism stands for 
everything that is base and disgusting in the man. Tagore thus 
contemptuously wrote in his book. Nationalism in the West: 
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Each country is casting its net of espionage into the slimy 
bottom of the others, fishing for their secrets, the 
treacherous secrets which brew in the oozy depths of 
diplomacy. And what is their secret service but the 
nation's underground trade in kidnapping, murder and 
treachery and all the ugly crimes bred in the depth of 
rottenness? Because each nation has its own history of 
thieving and lies and broken faith, therefore they can only 
flourish international suspicion and jealousy, and 
international moral shame becomes anaemic to a degree of 
ludicrousness. 
Disregarding the approach of contemporary nationalists who 
followed the western ideas about nationalism. Tagore likes to side 
with the humanistic message of India for the universal 
brotherhood, peace and prosperity of all mankind irrespective of 
nationality, religion and colour. 
Tagore appreciates the variety of cultures of the different 
nations and their development in different ways. He considers it 
essential that all nations meet at a point of benefit to each other. 
He says: 
It is best for the commerce of the spirit that people 
differently situated should bring their different products 
into the market of humanity each of which is 
complementary and necessary to the other.'*^ 
As a realist, Tagore is of the opinion that national 
differences are essential for the smooth and harmonious 
development of humanity. Such differences should create a desire 
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for greaier understanding of each other's point of view and each 
other's merits. We must have unity, peace and mutual under 
standing, and equal measure of love. Tagore wants to realize the 
ideal of one world on the basis of intellectual cooperation between 
the East and the West. According to him, every nation is part of 
humanity and each must answer the question: what have you to 
give to man, what new v/ays you discovered for his happiness? His 
special emphasis was on a humanitarian approach to all national 
problems. 
We can conclude that both Tagore and Roy valued man 
above everything else. They tried in their respective ways to bring 
man closer to each other. Both talk about the world freedom in 
terms of human welfare. For both of them the question of India's 
freedom was connected with the freedom of the whole world. 
Tagore is a humanist who raises humanity to the level of 
Ultimate Reality and asks people to have faith in man. To mankind 
his message was the necessity of cultivating nobler qualities such 
as beauty and truth. His message of love and universal 
brotherhood, his ideal of universal man and one world are all part 
of his mystical-romantic outlook towards the world. This is 
however not the case with M. N. Roy who too is a universalist but 
in a very different way. For him there is no knowledge other than 
scientific truth. All the sciences, physical, biological and social 
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constitute an inter-related body of knowledge. And even as he is a 
great admirer of scientific advancement, he does his philosophy in 
the same term. So far as his concept of human freedom is 
concerned, he takes it on the biological heritage of man and says 
that man's urge for freedom follows from man's animals ancestry. 
The urge for freedom leads man to search for knowledge and truth. 
This means individual freedom is necessary for the entire 
development of man. 
M. N. Roy's philosophy of Radical Humanism, moreover, is 
enriched and reinforced by scientific knowledge and social 
experience gained by modern civilization. Radical humanism is, 
therefore, itself scientific humanism. It is anti-religious 
philosophy or anti-religious humanism Vv'hich insists on the glory 
of man which consists in being the highest manifestation of the 
evolutionary process of man. Man, according to Roy, derives his 
sovereignty not from any transcendent super-physical being but 
from his own creative achievements. 
Roy, unlike Tagore, was more of a rationalist than 
romanticist. Both however were thorough going moralists and 
great believers in the freedom of man. Radical humanism of Roy 
was based upon three basic values - freedom, reason and morality. 
Freedom was the supreme value from which all human values are 
rationally derived. It is the reasoning facultj' which enables human 
being to attain increasing success in the struggle for freedom. 
Furthermore. Roy's humanism rests its ethics on the 
rationality of man. If a man is conscious about his innate 
rationality, then alone can he be moral.'*' On the basis of this, Roy 
argues that rational and moral society is possible. It is because 
man by nature is rational that he is also moral.''^ 
31 
References 
1. Burton f. Porter. Philosophy-A Literary and Conceptual 
Approach, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Inc, New York, 1974, 
p. 1. 
1. Robert N. Beck (ed.), Perspectives in Philosophy, (II ed.), 
Holt, Rinchart and Winston Inc, New York, 1969, p. 1. 
3. R. J. Hirst, Philosophy—An Outline for the Intending 
Students, Roulledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968, p. 5. 
4. Robert N. Beck, Perspectives in Philosophy, op. cit., p. 2. 
5. Errol Harris, Fundamentals of Philosophy, George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd. London, 1969, p. 7. 
6. M.N.Roy, Materialism—An Outline of the History of 
Scientific Thought, (first reprint of revised ed.), Ajanta 
Publications. Delhi. 1982, p. 1. 
7. Ibid. pp. 1-2. 
8. M.N.Roy, Science and Philosophy, Ajanta Publications, 
Delhi, 1984, pp. 5-6. 
9. Ibid. p. 6. 
10. M. N. Roy. Materialism, op. cit., p. 2. 
11. Ibid, p. 4. 
12. M. N. Roy, Science and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 1. 
32 
13. Ibid, p. 3. 
14. Ibid, p, 28 
15. Ibid, p. 31. 
16. M.N.Roy, Scientific Politics (II ed.), Renaissance 
Publishers, Calcutta, 1947, p. 51. 
17. iM.N.Roy, Memoirs, Allied Publishers, Bombay. 1964, p.59. 
18. M.N.Roy, A'ew Humanisin-A Manifesto, Renaissance 
Publishers. Calcutta. 1947, p. 31. 
19. M.N'.Roy, Scientific Politics, Renaissance Publishers, 
Calctuta, 1947. p. 160. 
20. M.N.Roy, Reason. Romanticism and Revolution (reprint), 
Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1989, p. 418. 
21. M.N.Roy, Radical Humanism, Eastern Economist, Delhi, 
1952, p. 8. 
22. Ibid, pp. 9-10. 
23. M.N.Roy, Nationalism-An Antiquated Cult, Radical 
Democratic Party, Bombay, 1942, p. 13. 
24. M.N.Roy, Nationalism, Democracy and Freedom, Radical 
Democratic Party, Bombay, 1942, p. 28. 
25. Phillip Spratt and M.N.Roy, Beyond Communism, (III 
reprint), Ajanta Publications, Delhi. 1986, p. 83. 
S'J 
26. M.N.Roy, Fascism: Its Philosophy, Profession and Practice, 
D. M. Library, Calcutta, 1938, p. 2. 
27. V. P. Verma, "Marxism and M. N. Roy", Indian Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. XXII, No. 4, 1961, p. 281. 
28. Ibid, pp. 84-5. 
29. Ibid, pp. 85-6. 
30. S. N. Ray, Radicalism, Renaissance Publishers, Calcutta, 
1946, p. 82. 
31. Ibid, p. 83. 
32. Ibid, pp. 83-4. 
33. M.N.Roy. Reason. Romanticism and Revolution (reprint in 
one volume), Ajanta Publications, Delhi, 1989, p. 13. 
34. Rabindranath Tagore, The Religion of Man (III Impression), 
George Allen & Unwin Ltd, London, 1949, p.89. 
35. Ibid, p.107. 
36. Ibid. p.46. 
37. Ibid, p.15. 
38. Ibid, p.114. 
39. Rabindranath Tagore, Personality, (Indian ed.), Macmillan 
and Co., Calcutta, 1948, p.47. 
34 
40. Anthony Scares (ed.), Lectures and Addresses uf Tagore, 
Macmitlan and C'u.. London, i928, p. 146. 
41. Rabindranath Tagore, The Religion of Man, op. cit., p.90. 
42. Amiya Chakrabarti (ed.), A Tagore Reader, The Macmillan 
Co., New York, 1961, p.221. 
4.3. Ibid, p. 181. 
4^. Rabindranath Tagore, Nationalism in the West, Macmillan 
and Co., London, 1924, p.38. 
45. Rabindranath Tagore, Sadhana-The Realisation of Life, 
Macmillan and Co., London, 1954, p.12. 
46. M.N.Roy, New Humanisni-A Manifesto, Renaissance 
Publishers, Calcutta, 1947, pp.36-7. 
47. M.N.R-oy, The Problem of Freedom, Renaissance Publishers, 
Calcutta, 1945, p.61. 
"^5 
:]j ~ \[] 
masuB 
Chapter 2 
Philosophy of 
Materialism 
maaa »4i 
Chapter 2 
PHILOSOPHY OF MATERIALISM 
I Material ism - A General View 
The word 'materialism' designates a philosophy and an entire 
world view according to which the world is composed of material 
things. For the exponents of this view all that exists is material. 
Ail entities and processes which are composed of matter are 
reducible to matter itself. These are only matter, material forces or 
physical processes which are primary source of everything.' 
Thus, materialism is a philosophy which gives primary 
position to matter and keeps spirit as secondary. It insists that 
whatever exists is fully dependent upon matter and there is only 
one fundamental reality that is material. It holds that human 
beings and the rest of the creatures are not qualitatively different 
from each other. Human beings are not composed of material body 
and an immaterial soul, as is ordinarily believed. They are all 
bodily and do not have souls which are claimed to be immaterial.^ 
Materialism opposes ontological dualism that claims that 
there are two kinds of things which are irreducible to each other. 
The most famous kind of dualism comes from Descartes. He said 
That there are material substances and there are psychological 
substances v/hich are non-maierird. These are mind and body as 
are they called in popular terminology. Materialism rejects 
Descartes' ontologica! dualism, ll is monistic in so far as it 
believes that all existing individuals are materia). Thus 
m.aterialism claims that the whole universe, including all life and 
mind, can be reduced to matter in motion. But while materialism is 
ontologically m.onistic, it should also be understood that all 
ontological monists are not materialists. For example, idealism is 
a monistic immaterialism. Because it holds that the world is a 
collection of ideas. This is ontological monistic philosophy but not 
materialist philosophy itself." 
Philosophical materialism is not a new idea. It is as old as 
philosophy itself. Broadly, its history can be divided into six 
different phases. These are ancient materialism, seventeenth-
centu-n' materialism, eighteenth-century materialism, nineteenth 
century materialism, dialectical and historical materialism and 
current stage of materialism. 
The first stage of materialism centered around Greek and 
Indian atomism.'* It was thoroughly mechanistic. Ionian 
philosophers in the tradition of Thales (sixth-century BC) 
attempted to account for the origin and the state of the world in 
materialistic terms. They appealed to change in the states of 
fundamental substances. Parmenides of Elea (fifth-century BC) 
37 
defended not only a monism of substances but also a monism of 
entities. He maintained that the world is one, uniform, 
homogeneous, indivisible and indestructible. 
Leucippus and his pupil Democritus gave the first clear 
conception of matter. Their basic idea was that the fundamental 
stuff was of just one kind and that was matter. The fundamental 
entities were material atoms. They had the characteristics of 
Parmenides' Being and moved in an exterior empty space. Their 
doctrine comprised the following theses: 
1. Nothing exists but atoms and empty space. 
2. Nothing happens by chance but everything occurs for a 
reason and of necessity. This necessity is natural and 
mechanical. It excludes Ideological necessity. 
3. Nothing can arise out of nothing and all changes are new 
combinations or separations of atoms. 
4. The atoms are infinite in number. They are all of the same 
stuff. They act on one another only by pressure or conflict. 
5. I he variety of things is a consequence of the variety in 
nuinber. size, shape and arrangement of the atoms which 
compose them.' 
It is clear that the atomist theory arises as an attempt to give 
an account of change in terms of ultimate elements of the world. 
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According to this theory, the ultimate are indivisible and 
indestructible particles that move about in empty space. Things, 
animals and people of natural world are formed by these particles. 
They disintegrate and form new and different combinations.^ 
The second phase, i.e. seventeenth-century materialism, was 
ibe revival of the first materialism during the 1?"' century. It was, 
in large part. )he result of the work of two seventeenth-century 
philosophers, namely Pierre Gassendi and Thomas Hobbes. They 
crystallized the naturalisiic and skeptical movements of thought of 
their times. It accompanied the rediscovery of antiquity and rise of 
natural science. Gassendi claimed that the atoms are not eternal 
but are created. They are finite, not infinite in number. They are 
organized in our particular world by a providential determination 
of initial conditions. 
Ilobbes' aim was to discover fundamental principles 
expressing the tiuth of everything. The truth of these principles 
v/ould be manifest to right reason and could serve as axioms. From 
it, a comprehensive theory of the nature of the world could be 
derived. This system was almost pure materialism. Hobbes hoped 
to use the new physics as the basis of a final and complete account 
of reality.^ 
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The influence of Gassendi and Hobbes was reduced by Rene 
Descartes. He accepted a materialist and mechanical account of the 
inanimate world and the creation. According to Descartes, there 
are in the world two very different sorts of things. These are 
extended (material) substances and thinking (spiritual) substances. 
These are united in the case of mankind. He thus started the 
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tradition of dualism. 
The third phase of materialism is known as eighteenth-
century materialism. It caused the growth of physiological 
knowledge and gave rise to the hope that a complete doctrine of 
man in purely physiological terms was possible. It presented a 
view of man as a self-moving machine.'^ 
The fourth phase of materialism is called nineteenth-century 
materialism. It is known as scientific materialism. It tried to 
reconcile materialism v/ith science. The pioneers of this period 
were Huxley and Darwin.'° It was developed mainly in Germany 
and England. And it was presented in terms of chemistry and 
biology. In 1859. Charles Darwin published his Origin of Species 
and in 1871 his Descent of Man. T.H. Huxley had produced Man's 
Place in Nature in 1863. These three works provided an empirical 
ground for materialism. They admitted the explanation of the 
world without appeal to immanent or transcendent purposes. And 
they claimed that man is a part and product of the natural world ." 
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The fifth phase of materialism began with the philosophy of 
dialectical materialism or historical materialism. It was mainly 
formulated by Engeis and Marx. It accompanied the socialist 
ideology.'" Marx argued that two basic factors to be found in 
every society are the material forces of production and the 
knowledge necessary for their use. Marx claimed that the mode of 
production in materia! life determines the general character of the 
social, political and economic processes of life. Here we see that 
the dialectical materialism which is considered in terms of 
economic need of men accepts revolutionary process of thesis, 
antithesis and synthesis. According to Marx, world by its nature is 
material. It is constituted by different forms of matter and motion. 
Therefore, the world develops in accordance with the laws of 
movement of matter. This is what Marx called Dialectical 
Materialism.'^ 
Finally, the sixth or current phase is developed mainly by 
Australian and American philosophers. The materialism of this 
stage is academic and nonpartisan. Associated with this kind of 
materialism are the names of physicalists like Otto Neurath, W. V. 
O. Quine and Smart and emergent materialists like Samuel 
Alexander and Roy Wood Sellars. 
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II Roy's View of Materialism 
After giving ft brief sketch of the history of materialist philosophy, 
we discuss Roy's iriteiprelation of maierialist philosophy. Roy 
tried to restate [iie niatci-jalist philosophy keeping in vievv both 
Indian and Western kinds of materialisni. 
As already seen, while Roy ceased to be Marxist at some 
stage, he continued to be a materialist throughout his life. But he 
claimed that his conception of materialism is not like that of 
traditional materialist philosophers. Roy said that materialism is 
the only possible philosophy. It represents the knowledge of world 
as it really exists. According to him, origin of all existence is due 
to matter and nothing exists but the matter. All other appearances 
are the transformation of matter. They are governed by the laws 
inherent in nature. These laws are not mysterious but based upon 
knov^'ledge acquired through observation and investigation of the 
phenomena of nature. 
Roy talks aboui the primitive man who imagined about the 
supernatural forces behind the nature. This was the religious 
consciousness so called, and Roy has no hesitation in calling it a 
crude phenomena. Religion is presented by Roy as "the naive form 
of nascent science."''^ But the scientific advancements weakened 
the primitive faith in gods. It was so because, according to Roy, 
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philosophy is born not as metaphysics but as a physical science. It 
is called the science of all sciences. Therefore, materialism is the 
basic philosophy which is not based on metaphysical speculations. 
It represents a scientific approach to life. There was some 
naturalism in the religion of the Vedas which made the nature as 
the object of worship. But Roy describes it as the religion of the 
tribal society. The development of the religion from polytheism to 
monotheism is influenced by the intensity of the social crisis. 
Hence the philosophy of a modern man should be concentrated on 
scientific advancements and for the betterment of all human 
beings. We should come out from the religious dogmas and 
ignorance of the reality. 
Roy supports the atomist theory propounded by Democritus 
and Epicurus. Its main propositions are summed up by him as 
under: 
1. Out of nothing arises nothing. 
2. All changes are only the combination and separation of 
atoms. 
3. Nothing happens by chance; so everything has a cause and 
happens of necessity. 
4. Nothing exists but atoms and empty space. 
5. The atoms are infinite and endless variety of forms. 
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6. Lastiv, ihe soul consists of the finest and mobile atoms. 
They pass Ihrougli the whole body and thereby produce the 
phenomenon of life.'^ 
The first proposition contains the two basic principles of 
modern physical science. These are the indestructibility of matter 
and the conservation of energy. The second lays down mechanistic 
cosmology. The discovery of the mechanistic laws of nature has 
eradicated the prejudice of a final cause. It has maintained the 
view that nothing happens by chance and every event has its cause. 
According to Roy, knowledge of the changing phenomena makes 
man free from helplessness. It therefore makes a man happy. Every 
pleasure is good because it results form knowledge while pain is 
evil because it is caused by ignorance. Religion is based on 
ignorance, so it is full of pain. Right knowledge is acquired in the 
process of the action of man. It is only possible through scientific 
knowledge. And the materialist conception of the origin and 
evolution of the universe is the mother of science. 
Roy tries to make his conception clear by examining 
materialism in relation to scepticism, agnosticism and positivism. 
Scepticism is described as the ideology of the middle class. Roy 
regards positivism materialistic but not agnosticism. Because 
agnosticism, according to Roy, is the philosophy of ignorance, and 
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ignorance is the mother of faith. Religions are all about the faith 
and therefore are rooted in ignorance. 
Roy, on the other hand, regards materialism as the 
explanation o? the world without the assumption of anything 
supernatural. He tries to establish a monistic view of the universe. 
He accepts the basis of everything—body, mind and soul—as a 
material substance. All these, according to him, are physical 
entities.'^ 
On the question whether materialism is practical idealism, 
Roy's answer is affirmative. He perceives practical idealism in 
materialism, as he says: 
The freedom from metaphysical conception of the 
absolute, immutable, categorical liberates man from the 
fetters of the traditional, of the respect and awe for the 
established order of the world. There is nothing 
sacrosanct, nothing permanent, nothing eternal. To change 
is the nature of everything." 
Thus, Roy points out thai materialist philosophy makes man 
change the world and himself in process. He again insists that the 
philosophical materialist is the greatest practical idealist. The 
ideal of life is the motive force of the life of materialist. 
But while Roy's concept of materialism admits practical 
idealism, it has been accepted without admitting idealist 
philosophy. Even though there is little difference between 
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practical idealism and idealist philosophy, Roy accepts only 
practical idealism and does not find idealist philosophy 
comfortable in so far as idealism is identified with the virtue of 
dedicating life to an Idea. The idealist philosophy is quite 
different from idealism, as it is practiced in life. The two meanings 
are quite distinct. The former is derived from the word ' idea' 
v/hile the latter from the word ' ideal. ' 'Practical idealism' has 
nothing lo do with the 'idealist philosophy.' The former, according 
to Roy, could be accepted by materialists. They could accept it 
because tliey are the greatest practical idealists. 
Roy appreciates practical idealism and says that it is the 
motive force of the life of the materialist. Ideals can not be 
separated from the life of a materialist. In his own words: 
The materialist does not reject practical idealism. He 
alone practices it consistently, sincerely, wholeheartedly. 
With the spiritualist, of any hue or shade, Western or 
Eastern, religious or philosophical, it is sheer 
Philistinism, covering the egoistic essence of his cult. The 
ideal of life is the motive force of the life of the 
materialist. It is inseparable from his life. It grows out of 
his view of life. It is a part of his own self. The 
materialist is a practical idealist, because he cannot 
possibly be otherwise without abandoning his philosophy. 
For him practical idealism is not a virtue to be cultivated 
under duress; it is natural. Without an ideal, life appears 
to him meaningless—not worth living. He lives for an 
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ideal, is "righteous and noble'" like Epicurus, "because it 
is a pleasure to be so.""^ 
I l l In terpre ta t ion of Indian Materialism 
Materialism, in Indian philosophy, is indicated by the Sanskrit 
term Lokayata. It is most common designation for the materialistic 
school of classical Indian philosophy.'^ Materialistic doctrines 
were developed in India in sixth century BC. There are many 
references in the Buddhist scriptures and many other places which 
have described such ideas in early period. There are references to 
naturalism of Charvaka. The term Lokayata is indeed the synonym 
of Charvaka. Therefore, the materialist philosophers of India are 
knovv'n as Lokayatas or Charvakas.'^" 
So far as Indian materialism is concerned, one can find both 
the idealist and materialist schools in it. It regarded mind, life and 
matter as manifestations of a single universal principle. Roy's 
exposition of Indian materialism provided a fresh thinking on the 
subject. His restatement of Indian materialism put Indian thought 
in a proper perspective. He gave a new turn to Indian 
philosophical tradition.^' 
The basic defect in ancient philosophy in the eyes of Roy is 
its 'a priori ' assumption that blocked the way to em.piricism and 
made it degenerate into dogmatic theology. Roy points out that 
except Nyaya, Vaisesika and Sankhya, no other speculative system 
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tried to explain the origin, evolution and phenomena of nature 
independent of supernatural agency. It is this 'a priori ' assumption 
that makes speculative thought theology. It is a dogmatic assertion 
about the supernatural being which by its nature is beyond all 
enquiry or description.^" 
Roy describes Indian philosophy as the most classical 
example of confusion in speculative metaphysical thought in terms 
of material and non-material things. He agues that all things are 
material as they all come from matter. He makes the point clear by 
saying: 
If the immaterial is really immaterial, the material can 
never grow out of it. Two things having nothing in 
common cannot stand in relation of cause and effect. If 
the material comes out of the immaterial, then, the latter 
cannot be what it is supposed to be: it must also be 
material. Thus there is one substance in existence. The 
dualism is only a sophistry, a verbal contrivance to 
defend a useless hypothesis. Should immateriality be 
conceded to the origin of things, the very existence of 
immateriality itself would be denied. For existence, which 
means extension in space, is not compatible with the 
conception of immateriality.^^ 
Here we find that only material things can produce material 
objects. It is absurd l.o say that there are non-material objects too. 
Because, according to Roy, it is not possible that material object 
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has an immaterial cause. Therefore, if the effect is material, its 
cause must also be material. So, only one kind of substance that is 
matter is real while the other kind i.e. what is called immaterial, is 
verbal sophistry. 
Roy finds the presence of materialist thought in ancient 
India in the Charvaka system of philosophy. It is compared by Roy 
with Greek Epicureanism. They (both systems) held that truth can 
never be known without senses. They do not believe in reason 
because every inference depends on observation. It also depends 
upon the assumption that the future would behave like the past. 
Therefore, there is no certainty in it. 
Roy supports the Buddhist philosophy. He says that the 
Buddhist philosophy argued against the basic assumptions of the 
orthodox Hindu philosophy of the Vedantic system. Buddha found 
that belief in God was useless. Because the existence of God as the 
spiritual cause of the universe can be established only upon the 
assumption of the extra-materiality of the human consciousness. 
And the rejection of the doctrine of the soul leads to the denial of 
God. Roy here refers to "Buddhist materialism" as based on 
"Vaisheshik atomism."^^ There are two existences—external 
(material) and internal (mental). But mind presupposes the 
existence of an atomic combination. The external is composed of 
the elements (bhuta) and elemental (bhautika). It receives the 
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outside nature as well as the bodily organs, The former is made of 
elements of earth, water, fire and air. 
The idea of 'Nirvana' encapsulated the nihilism of Buddhist 
philosophy. It was essential to the ideology of social dissolution. 
It was the ideology of those who could not deny the effects of the 
material existence. According to Roy, the patronage of the upper 
classes was responsible for the idealistic deviation of Buddhist 
philosophy. Buddhism was against the Brahmanical dogma of 
eternal truth. This is why Buddhism expounded the doctrine of the 
momentariness of everything. It was the later idealistic deviation 
which affected Buddhism and led to admitting Brahmanical 
influence. Shankaracharya, according to Roy, had preached 
'Nirvana' in a way opposite to the materialistic core of Buddhism. 
The ideology of priest was reasserted after it had been shaken by 
the Buddhist revolution.^^ 
Roy finds the dynamic view of nature in Jainism. Though 
Jainas believed in soul, they did not find any thing divine in it. 
The soul was composed of an infinite number of particles. These 
particles were soul-atoms which gave materialistic colour to 
Jainism. But in spite of this materialism in Jaina Philosophy, Roy 
was not satisfied with Jainism. He criticized the doctrine of self-
mortification in Jainism. Because it blocked all the ways of 
knowing external causes. It prohibited the joy of life and created 
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prejudice against the natural urges of man. It, on the whole, had 
had a harmful effect on the country. The spirit of pessimism made 
India an easy prey to foreign invaders. The idea of conquering the 
external world never entered Indian speculation. Jaina doctrine of 
self-denial represented the victory of the forces of dissatisfaction 
with the order of things. 
Roy accepts ancient materialism which was found in the 
Vaisesika system originally. He also gives Sankhya system of 
Kapila a dominating position. The merit of this whole philosophy, 
according to Roy, is the recognition of the objective reality of the 
physical world. Roy finds Sankhya theory of cognition 
materialistic. The principle of Sankhya theory of Knowledge is 
identical with the modern materialistic principle. According to 
this, consciousness is determined by being.'^ 
Sankhya system rejects teleology that is the basis of doctrine 
of creation. Roy supports this view and says that the origin of the 
physical world is traced to an endless process of causality. This 
piocess is inherent in nature itself. Since it exists by itself, the 
world does not need a creator or creation. There is no beginning 
because the world exists eternally by itself.^^ 
Roy regrets that the rational and naturalistic teachings of 
materialistic thinkers changed character under the Buddhist 
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revolution. Brahrnanical reaction checked spiritual progress very 
successfully. Roy agrees that Buddhism was the revolt of 
Kshatriyas against Brahmanism. He says that the business class 
also entered into this social background of the revolution. It was 
accepted as a reaction against the code of Manu which placed the 
merchants under all kinds of disadvantages. Sea journey was 
prohibited by Manu because it encouraged heretical ideas. These 
are the reasons why Indian speculative thought could not become 
philosophy in its correct sense. 
Roy points out that Kshatriyas were closely associated with 
the monopoly of the priesthood although they should have 
challenged it. The relation between the two classes was 
established in consequence of the civil war as it has been recorded 
in the Mahabharata. The supremacy of Brahmans became absolute 
in the conditions of social dissolution. 
Hindu orthodoxy, according to Roy, was supported by the 
forces of superstition. It tried to resist the march of Buddhist 
revolution. And finally it stopped the Buddhist revolution. Roy 
describes it as the most tragic event in the history of India. But he 
also hopes that as soon as social stagnation is broken, Indian 
philosophy will go ahead. It will go forward from the point at 
which it stopped temporarily. India should be able to learn the true 
message of her ancient philosophy. The correct evolution of that 
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philosophy will be useful to the philosophy of materialism. It v/ill 
also help materialism from the wrong interpretation.^ 
IV Theory of Knowledge 
Roy's materialism is based on scientific theory of knowledge. 
Knowledge is possible because there is a causal connection 
between mind and matter. And ideas, according to him, are 
representatives of reality as they are derived from experience. Roy 
says: 
I must know a thing before I can have an idea of it. But 
ideas are mental pictures; they represent the knowledge of 
things, not things themselves. If I am incorrectly 
informed about a thing, my idea of it will be false. Yet, it 
will be "'representative" of my distorted knowledge. 
Knowledge results from perception, which is organic 
reaction to physical contacts. We know things, not ideas. 
Knowledge is not composed of ideas; on the contrary, 
ideas are derivatives of knowledge. That is how 
ideas can be representative, and scientific ideas are 
representative.•'° 
Roy argues that the ideas are the product of interaction 
between mind and matter. They can not enclose the radius of 
mind's reach. They result from mental activity and the cause is 
never limited by effect. Ideas must correspond with things as they 
are. If the world of experience is characterized by the absence of 
absoluteness, idea about it also must have that character. In other 
53 
words, they must change according to the knowledge of the world. 
The representative character of ideas is relative because it is 
necessary to the accuracy of knowledge. While formulating a 
scientific theory of knowledge, Roy distinguishes the object from 
the thing. The one is epistemological category, the other is 
ontological. An object is a thing perceived. The two are not 
identical ontologically. Objects are always things. They exist and 
are real. But things are not always object of perception or 
knowledge. They exisi without attaining the epistemological state 
of being objects. 
Roy tries to solve the confusion between the objective 
reality and thing. According to him, in completeness of knowledge 
of a thing, it does not affect its objectivity. As objective 
knowledge, it is complete because it covers the parts of the thing 
actually perceived. In regard to the thing, it is not complete but as 
regards the object, it is. Therefore, scientific knowledge is always 
objective. It is objective although ideas which result from it may 
change from time to time.^' 
The central point in Roy's theory of knowledge is that 
cognition is a relation between mind and the world. Knowledge is 
objective and subjective at the same time. Both the knowing self 
and the known world are correlated and are equally vital. To solve 
its problems, epistemology must start from the ontological reality 
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of mind as well as of the external world. Roy argues that there is 
no importance of the question of precedence for epistemology. It 
is indeed irrelevant to talk about priority or posteriority in the 
domain of epistemology though we can talk about it in ontology. 
Roy suggests that epistemology must be guided by the facts that 
mind exists and the world exists. And that knowledge is 
conditional as much on the existence of mind as on matter.' 
P.oy however does not admit psycho-physical parallelism 
either in individual or in the universe. Mind, according to him, is 
real because it is a part of physical world. On the basis of biology, 
Roy regards mind as an empirical category. It contributes to the 
formulation of a correct theory of knowledge. On the basis of 
these arguments, Roy also calls it the objective theory of 
knowledge. It is so because it objectifies the self itself.^'^ 
Knowing, according to Roy, is an act of mind. But it is not 
identical with thought any more than thought is identical with 
being. "Thoughi is mind's property, whereas knowledge is a 
possession.""""* Here we find that Roy's distinction is basic. The 
one is inherent quality while other is acquired from outside. 
Knowledge is not gained by mind independent of the external 
world. Thus, there is nothing immaterial which enters into the 
process of cognition. It is a process which involves two different 
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material entities. It is governed by tlie mechanical laws of physical 
nature. 
Roy makes his point clear by saying that we are integral 
parts of the world of our experience. He says: 
The mind of others belongs to my "external world" just as 
their bodies. And my mind belongs to the "external 
world" of others. Self is always an embodied self. The 
knowing mind can never be conceived as a disembodied 
spirit. The concept of self includes the corporeal being. 
Our bodies, organs of sensation, the nervous system, the 
brain, the entire cognitive apparatus, are parts of the 
physical world."'^ 
On the basis of these, Roy states that we do not watch the 
world as outsiders. Our egos, minds, thoughts and intelligence are 
all interwoven with the physical process of the external world. 
Thought is a function of organic beings on a very high level. 
Thought is conditional upon being. And subjective elements of the 
process of cognition are parts of the physical nature. 
Therefore Roy argues that life is the immediate foundation 
of mind. If there is an absence of life, the existence of mind 
cannot be proved. Since life is a phenomenon of physical nature, 
mind also is a part of nature. The activities of our minds are 
events in the physical world. It is outside of ourselves. Thinking is 
the act of perceiving knowledge; it takes us beyond ourselves. So, 
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according to Roy, even self-contemplation is not purely 
subjective. Even the most intimate mental act has an objective 
reference."''' 
Roy further states that "knowledge is a thing—a peculiar 
kind of thing, but a thing nonetheless." In this way, Roy calls 
knowledge objective. It is self-sufficient and creative. It is a 
product of mental activity that should be distinguished from mind. 
It affects the mind. This could not be held if mental activities were 
limited to mind itself and if ideas were the content of knowledge. 
Ideas transform mind because they result from the knowledge of 
the external world. Mind is the organic faculty to know. Roy tells 
that primitive consciousness is the foundation of mind. At the 
same time, it is the simplest form of knowledge. It is a mechanical 
property of organic matter in a definite chemical state.^' 
Roy makes sensations bodily events. These are causally 
connected with the external world. And there is no interruption in 
the causal chain. Knowledge and perception both take place on the 
plane of direct physical contact simultaneously. The causal chain 
is physical, not psychological. Therefore, the arguments of the 
subjectivist are irrelevant. Roy puts mind in direct contact with 
external world. It is not a contact between two qualitatively 
different entities. Mind itself originates in the organic property of 
reaction to stimulus. So, the cognition also is a physical relation. 
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Cognition is an intelligent reaction while perception is an 
automatic organic reaction. Cognition is an interpretative selective 
act. And knowledge is a characterizing judgment about the nature 
of things. Perception makes conscious that which is gained by 
perceptual data. It thus creates the impressions of environment 
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into a mental picture of physical realixy. 
According to Roy, experience is the foundation of 
knowledge. But he also argues that knowledge is not a purely 
empirical process. It results from the constant and continuous 
reference of percept to their external resources. "The fibers of the 
external world run into our consciousness." The brain is composed 
of our end of the fibers. So, brain processes can be traced back. 
These processes are taken along with the fibers to their physical 
causes. 
Percepts, according to him, are purely empirical entities 
while concepts are synthetic. The former are automatically given. 
The latter are consciously constructed. Knowledge is a conceptual 
scheme. It is born out of the insight into the nature of the things. 
It is also gained through critical examination, rational co-
ordination and logical deduction of perceptual data.^^ 
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V Materialism as Physical Realism 
Roy approaches materialism in terms of "Physical Realism."'**^ He 
considers this term more appropriate to co-ordinate the entire 
modern scientific knowledge into a logical system. Roy does not 
agree with the adjective 'dialectic ' previously used. Because it 
does not serve the purpose of meeting the situation created by the 
revolution in the concept of substance. The philosophical 
significance of modern science is this that it disputes the claim of 
philosophy to an autonomous existence. 
Roy here appreciates modern scientific knowledge for 
solving the philosophical problems. He says that all philosophical 
problems—cosmological. ontological and epistemological—can be 
solved only in the light of scientific knowledge. It is so because 
the function of philosophy is to explain the existence as a whole. 
An explanation of existence requires knowledge of existence. 
Knowledge about the different phases of existence is gained by the 
\arious branches of science. Thus, philosophising should be done 
by taking the help of science. Because the function of science is to 
describe while that of philosophy is to explain. The function of 
philosophy, therefore, is to co-ordinate the entire body of 
scientific knowledge into a comprehensive theory of nature and 
life. Therefore, Roy calls philosophy, science of sciences.'" 
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Roy accepts thai the new physics abolishes the distinction 
between reality and appearances. The world of physics is 
metaphysical because entities which compose it cannot be directly 
experienced. Inspite of this, Roy does not regard them an apriori 
categories. Because the metaphysical foundation of new physics is 
a posteriori deduction. Roy is against dualist doctrine which came 
to be known through modern psychology. For it, psychology was 
helped by physiology. Roy argues that there was no unbridgeable 
gulf between mind and physical world. It is new physics which has 
successfully solved old problem of mind and matter. Now we have 
new physics that is sufficient enough to know the reality. 
Modern theories of physics represent a big advance upon the 
theories of classical physics. Modern science makes clear that the 
world is changing or change is real and that being or what is static 
is not real as it has been taken for granted in old time. He says: 
Becoming is the essence of being. The stuff of the world 
is not static, but dynamic. It is never in an inert state. 
Whatever it is. it is in the state of becoming. In the 
absence of becoming, there is nothing; being becomes real 
in becoming. But, on the other hand, absolute being, that 
is, being abstracted from becoming, is conceivable 
logically, whereas becoming logically presupposed being. 
It can take place only in the background of being.''^ 
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Roy points out that there is no dispute about the reality of 
the external world. The dispute is only about the nature of the 
external world. The world of new physics is built on protons and 
electrons. They are constituents of the material particle that is 
called atom. As constituents, protons and electrons must also be 
material entities. The world of new physics, according to Roy, is 
made of a stuff that remains on the boundary line between matter 
and energy. The material units of this stuff have no simple 
location in space. They also do not have continuity in time. They 
appear to challenge determinism. So, if determinism goes, the 
mechanistic conception must also go. 
Roy here argues that the concepts of space and time have 
undergone a revolutionary change. Because an absolute space and 
the uniform flow of time are gone. Roy says: 
Space is curved. Time has no independent existence. It is 
mixed up with space. Indeed, space, time, matter-all three 
are merged into a four-dimensional continuum, in which 
events take place.''^ 
The theory of Relativity and the Quantum theory constitute 
Roy's new physics. He opposes Bertrand Russell's contention that 
the theory of Relatively rejects materialist philosophy in favour of 
idealism. On the other hand, Roy states that it shows that a 
mechanistic view of the universe results from the technique of 
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physical observation. And that the general principles could be 
deduced through mathematical analysis of the verified data. This 
is the process by which it is obtained. The theory of Relativity is 
claimed by Roy as "a great contribution to the victory of 
materialism." It is theory of Relativity which frees mechanistic 
philosophy of nature from its fallacies. Theory of relativity is 
bound to be positive. Because, as a system of physical theories it 
is not opposed to materialism. It also stands in the relation of 
continuity with classical physical ideas. 
According to Roy, basic concepts of physics such as space, 
time, matter and causality etc. are not objects of speculative 
thought. Right knowledge about their intrinsic nature and inner 
structure is acquired through observation and experiments. 
Einstein said that empty space is meaningless and inconceivable. 
It exists because material objects exist—space is only the distance 
between any two of them. Similarly, there is no absolute time 
which flows in a metaphysical void. The concept of time results 
from the physical fact of becoming. It is what Roy calls interval 
between two events that causes changes in any given object.'*^ 
Roy tries to make new physics appear more relevant than 
what he calls classical physics. For classical physics matter was 
composed of atoms. Atoms were supposed to have internal 
structure. New physics has analyzed atoms into protons and 
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electrons. It aiso has ascertained the quantitative value of these 
units of the physical world. The old physical concept of substance 
is not accessible to experience. It can be measured mathematically. 
Here Roy argues that all mysteries about time and space 
disappeared in consequence of the discovery of relative space-time 
i.e. of the fact that they enter into human experience as relative 
entities. Their absoluteness is an empty concept. Mysticism results 
from the attempt to define absolute. The absolute, if it is really 
absolute, must be indefinable. The theory of relativity solves the 
problem of time and space. It does so by exposing the 
meaninglessness of the absolutist-idealist concept of time's 
categories. 
Roy takes the theory of relativity as being more than a 
theory of physics in the technical sense. He finds a cosmological 
theory in it. Therefore, its epistemological significance is far 
greater. Since it is a comprehensive system of philosophy, it 
ceases to be a closed system of speculative thought. It is held by 
providing an explanation of natural phenomena in the light of 
empirical knowledge.'*^ 
On the other hand the Quantum theory, as Roy points out, 
opens a new field of physical investigation. The basic units of the 
physical world have been discovered to possess the property of 
waves and particles. It is difficult to grasp the new conception of 
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substance that absorbs matter and energy into a dynamic, unitary 
physical being. It constitutes the background of all the phenomena 
of nature. Since being is highly abstract, it cannot be conceived in 
terms of every day experience. Hence, the theories of atomic 
physics appear to be mental constructions expressed in 
mathematical language. 
Roy is against the old problems of philosophy that are 
mainly the problem of perception. He argues that the theories of 
new physics are not derived from direct perception. On the other 
hand, any abstraction contains subjective element. Roy attempts to 
get out of this dilemma by integrating these subjective contacts 
between the two. 
Again, regarding matter and space, Roy states that matter 
does not exist in space. On the other hand, space is a function of 
matter. Matter and energy are the dual manifestation of substance. 
Mind in not different from matter. If the mind was essentially 
different from matter, there could be no possible forms. Matter is 
the only existence which is realized in its transformation into 
different patterns. In the absence of the matter, there will be 
neither space nor time. Matter, according to Roy, is an objective 
category. Self-sufficient objectivity is the ultimate reality. It is 
real ontologically. 
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Thus the basic principle of "Physical Realism", as 
propounded by Roy, is that the world exists objectively. It exists 
objectively, physically as well as biologically. It is self-contained 
and self-explained. Therefore, there is nothing beyond it. And its 
being and becoming are governed by lav/s inherent in itself. 
Here we observe that Roy's "Physical Realism" adopts 
mechanistic cosmology with physical determinism as its 
fundamental principles. Determinism means that "the world is a 
movement which knows no stoppage and permits no reversal.'" ' In 
this way, Roy tries to solve the old problem of psycho-phy.^icai 
parallelism in materialist philosophy. The assertion of human 
creativeness presupposes recognition of the reality of the physical 
world. If the physical world is dismissed as unreal, man's own 
existence ceases to be a reality. Realism becomes the 
philosophical foundation of science. It becomes the same when the 
reality of the physical world is conceived as independent of any 
other existence. 
VI Physical Realism—Philosophical Consequences 
Roy's claim regarding physical realism is that it is tantamount to a 
re-statement of maltriaiism. And, moreover, it has been discussed 
with all ils philosophical consequences. This effort makes Roy 
able to evolve a philosophy of history. He accepts human history 
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like natural history which is a determined process. But it is self-
determined and it is not absolute determinism. There are more than 
one determining factors. They limit their role of operation.''^ 
Roy finds fault in Marx's materialist conception of history in 
so far as it dismisses ideal systems and ideologies as 
superstructures of economic relations. These relations, moreover, 
have been related directly with the material conditions of life. Roy 
tries to modify this view saying that the logical development of 
ideas and the generation of new forces take place simultaneously. 
They provide the motive force of history. An action is always 
motivated by ideas. Therefore, a new idea must be referred to an 
old idea. Philosophy, according to Roy, has a history of its own, 
And it is not illusory appearance. In so far as action is motivated 
by ideas, determinism in history is primarily ideal. Historiciil 
determinism collapses by ignoring the dynamics of ideas. 
In this re-statement of materialism, Roy recognizes the 
importance of ideas in all the process of human evolution. This 
evolution has taken place in historical, social, political and 
cultural processes.'*' He argues that the history is obstructed by the 
requirement to establish social order. This act is done from time to 
time which sets a limit to human creativeness of both types— 
mental and physical. The urge for progress and freedom asserts to 
break down the obstacle. A new social order is visualized by men 
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that embodied the liberating ideas and cultural values which were 
created in the past. 
By this act, Roy claims that a new philosophy is born out of 
the spiritual heritage of mankind to re-organize society. While 
reorganizing the creative role of the environment, Roy does not 
deny the objective reality of ideas. Priority belongs to the physical 
being of matter. But after completing the biologically determined 
process, ideas get their own form. Roy says: 
Once the biologically determined process of ideation is 
complete, ideas are formed, they continue to have 
autonomous existence, an evolutionary process of their 
own, which runs parallel to the physical process of human 
evolution.^° 
There are thus to be found two parallel processes in Roy's 
restatement of materialist philosophy. These processes are ideal 
and physical. These compose the process of social evolution. Both 
these processes are determined by their respective logic and at the 
same time they influence each other. This is how history becomes 
an organic process. 
Roy advocates a synthesis between idealism and materialism. 
By doing this he tries to merge psychology into physiology. This 
is also an act by which he makes a bridge between physics and 
psychology. And thereby he reconciles the dynamics of matter 
with the dynamics of ideas. The matter is indestructible and so are 
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the ideas. The identity of idea and being implies the notion of 
their co-existence, i^oy argues that if thought is identical with 
being; it must admit the consciousness in which thought 
originates. It is however not conditional on the idea that there is 
such a thing as cosmic consciousness which is co-existent with 
physical universe.^ 
The difference between Roy and Marx regarding the ideas 
and matter is quite obvious. Roy's notion of identity leads to 
co-existence of thought with physical being. He also rejects the 
Marxist doctrine that ideological systems are super-structure of 
economic relations. Here Roy's synthesis absorbs idealism and 
goes beyond by tracing the roots of ideas in the rational scheme of 
nature. Thus, idealism moves into materialism. The origin of ideas 
is described by Roy to pre-human biological impulse. The 
biological evolution too takes place in the context of physical 
nature. Roy finds the solution of the problem of dualism in ihe 
discovery of the physical origin of mental phenomena. 
Roy thus synthesizes conceptual thought and empirical 
knowledge. The conceptual thought and empirical knowledge both 
have a common foundation. Conceptual thought is generalization 
of an abstraction from experience. Scientific thinking is product of 
empirical knowledge. This is what enables Roy to remove the 
defects of classical materialism which did not seem to have any 
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connection with ethics. By tracing the rocts of rationality through 
the entire process of biological evolution, Roy turns rationalism 
into physical determinism. 
This is how also the mechanislic cosmology gives birth to 
rationalistic ethics. This re-statement of materialism becomes the 
basis of Roy's philosophy of Radical Humanism. Afier freeing 
from Marxian determinism. Roy proposes a reorganization of 
Indian society. His argument in favour of it is that it can retain the 
values of liberal tradition. And thereafter it can lead to a higher 
material standards depending on rationality and morality. 
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Chapter 3 
THEORY OF HUMAN NATURE 
I General View of Human Nature 
The dictionary meaning of the phrase "Human Nature" is "the 
general characteristics and feelings shared by all people." It is a 
quality or group of qualities which belongs to ail and only 
humans. It expiains the kind of being we are. We are aih for 
example, two footed and featherless. But 'featherless biped' does 
not explain our social characteristics. We are also all both animals 
and rational beings. Rational animals might explain the social 
features v/e have while other kinds of beings, such as angels, do 
not have. 
Moreover, it is to be accepted that man is the most important 
artifact of nature. He is active, creative, imaginative and 
innovative being. He is master of m.usic and best projector of 
dream. He manifests the highest emotion and joy of life. He also 
reflects the feeling of ' love ' and represents the unique capability 
of ' image-making.' 
There is a belief that all natural kinds have essences. 
Acceptance of this position is compatible with many views about 
the specific qualities that constitute human nature. For this, man is 
to be understood primarily from the standpoint of the uniqueness 
of the rational faculty that he possesses. What is unique in man is 
his 'spir i t ' , but primary emphasis lies in the capacity for thought 
and reason.^ In addition to rationality, philosophers have said that 
the self-interest is part of our nature. We are envious and fearful. 
But we are also benevolent, sociable, supportive of others. We are 
able to speak and to laugh and desirous of immortality too."* 
Again, only human being have selves and are persons. The 
basic requirement for being a self is that a person (or a self) be an 
object to itself. A self must be able to conceive of itself and to 
look at itself as it looks at objects. It must be self-conscious. 
We know what it means to say that such things as books, 
stones, tables and atoms are objects. We also believe that they are 
nor aware of their existence. They are not conscious of themselves 
or of other objects; they are not objects to themselves. They have 
no desires, fears or regrets. They also do not remember the past or 
anticipate the future. They are simply objects but not objects to 
themselves. The self emerges in the human organism in the social 
context in which a number of human beings cooperate with each 
other. In addition to social behavior in which there is cooperation, 
there must be a language in order for the human organism to 
socialise. The self becomes aware of itself to be an object to itself 
and thereby also a subject. 
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The self has three basic componenls. These are: (1) the 
bodily or the behavioural component, (2) the social component 
which involves other members of the group and, (3) the subjective 
component, or what we ordinary think as the person, the '1.' It is 
the ' ! ' that is conscious of both the behaviour of the self and the 
social component of the self. 
But it should also be understood that a man has always been 
his own problem. How shall he think of himself? Every 
affirmation which he may make about his stature, virtue or place 
in cosmos become contradictory when fully analysed. If man 
insists that he is a child of nature and that he ought not to pretend 
to be more than animal, he admits that he is a curious kind of 
animal who has both the inclination and the capacity to make such 
pretensions. He insists upon his unique and distinctive place in 
nature and points to his rational faculties as proof of his special 
eminence. This is what makes a note in his acknowledgement of 
uniqueness.'^ 
Furthermore, the effort to estimate the significance of his 
rational faculties implies a degree of transcendence over himself. 
It is not fully defined or explained what is implied by "reason." 
For the man who weighs the importance of his rational faculties is 
in some sense more than "reason." He is also more than his 
capacities which transcend the ability from general concepts. 
76 
I \ 
There may be three ways of analysing--haiman nature 
% -^ ^ _ ^ ' 
corresponding to three different phases of our clvilizaiie^R^r 
development, viz. Classical, Christian and Modern. A brief 
description of these is as follows: 
The classical view of man comprised primarily of Platonic, 
Aristotelian and Stoic conceptions of human nature. It is that man 
is to be understood primarily from the standpoint of the 
uniqueness of his rational faculties. The 'spirit' that is unique in 
all men is nothing but the capacity for thought and reason. In 
Aristotle the 'Spirit' is the vehicle of purely intellectual activity. 
It is also a universal and immortal principle.^ 
In Plato the nous (spirit) is not distinguished from the soul 
as in Aristotle. In both - Plato and Aritotle—"mind" is 
distinguished from the body. It is the unifying and ordering 
principle, the organ of logos. It brings harmony into the life of the 
soul, as logos is the creative and formative principle of the world. 
Greek metaphysical presuppositions are naturally determinative 
for the doctrine of man. 
Plato and Aristotle thus share a common rationalism and also 
a common dualism. The effect of this rationalism and dualism has 
been determinative for the classical doctrine of man and for all 
modern doctrines which are borrowed from it. The consequences 
are: (a) The rationalism identifies rational man with the divine. 
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Reason is the creative principle identical with God. (b) The 
dualism has the consequence of identifying the body with evil. It 
also assumes the essential goodness of mind or spirit. It stands in 
contrast to the Biblical view of man. The Bible knows nothing of a 
good mind and an evil body. 
Stoicism as a monistic and pantheistic philosophy diverges 
from the Aristotelian and Platonic concepts. In many respects, its 
view of human nature discloses more similarities than differences. 
The similarities constitute a part of the general "classical" picture 
of man. The Stoic reason is more immanent in both the world 
process and in the soul. It conceives reason as basically the 
principle of harmony within the body. 
Democritus and Epicurus interpreted man in accordance with 
their naturalism and materialism. Man does not stand outside of 
nature by the quality of his unique reason, but as a part of nature. 
This Greek materialism was not less rationalistic than Platonism or 
Aristotelianism. But it reduced the immaterial reason in the world 
to mechanical necessity. It also tried to seek to understand man' in 
terms of this mechanism. Thereby they expressed man as primarily 
a child of nature. 
The Christian view is distinguished from classical view of 
man. As classical view is determined by Greek metaphysical 
presuppositions, so the Christian view is determined by the 
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ultimate presuppositions of Christian faith. The Christian faith in 
God as creator of the world transcends the canons of rationality. 
God is not merely mind who forms a previously given formless 
stuff. But he is both vitality and form and the source of all 
existence. 
Man, according to the Biblical view, is a created and finite 
existence in both his body and spirit. But unlike Greek thought, 
this distinction does not lead to dualistic consequences. Christian 
view of man is understood primarily from the standpoint of God 
rather than the uniqueness of his rational faculties or his relation 
to nature. He is made in the "image of God!' ' In terms of this 
faith, man can understand himself as a unity of will which finds its 
end in the will of God. To understand himself means to begin with 
a faith that he is to be understood from beyond himself. He is 
known to and loved by God and must find himself in terms of 
obedience to the divine will. This relation of the divine to the 
human will makes it possible for man to relate himself to God 
without pretending to be God.'° 
The modern view of human nature is informed partly by 
classical, partly by Christian and partly and distinctively by 
modern elements. This view is implicate in modern anthropology. 
It begins with the essential Platonism of the early Renaissance and 
incorporates the elements of Stoicism and dualism of Descartes 
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and Spinoza. It also is seen in the naturalism of seventeenth 
century and then in the materialistic and Democritan naturalism of 
the eighteenth century. Modern man starts by seeking to 
understand himself in terms of his relation to nature. Descartes, 
the main source of modern culture, conceives of man purely in 
terms of thought. He also conceives nature in terms of mechanics 
and finds no organic unity between the two." 
Most surprising aspect of the modern man's good conscience 
is that he asserts and justifies it in terms of social philosophies. 
The idealist Hegel and the materialist Marx agree in their 
fundamental confidence in human virtue. The modern man is 
involved in social chaos and political anarchy.'^ 
The modern culture follows Epicurean naturalism. The 
mathematical method impresses man with his own powers of 
reason. It also impresses man with the marvellous coincidence of 
rational and natural process. It prompts a new Stoic identification 
of reason and nature. Nature and reason are thus the two gods of 
man and sometimes the two are one.'^ 
It should also be noticed that philosophers disagree about 
how we are to discover our nature. Some think metaphysical 
insight into eternal forms or truth is required. While others state 
that we can learn it from the observation of biology or behaviour. 
They also disagree on whether human nature determines morality. 
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Some say that by noting our distinctive features we can infer what 
God wills us to do. Others think that our nature shows the limits of 
what morality can require, since it would be pointless to direct us 
to ways of living that our nature makes impossible.'^ 
Some philosophers have argued that human nature is plastic. 
It can be shaped in different ways. Whereas others held that it is 
not helpful to think in these terms. They think that although we 
share certain features as the members of a biological species, our 
other qualities depend upon society. These are socially 
constructed.'"^ 
II Roy's Views on Human Nature 
Roy studies Human Nature from different angles-biological, 
anthropological and psychological. According to Roy, human 
nature is the product of two factors. Firstly, we must realize the 
fact of man's emergence as the highest product of evolutionary 
process. It is mechanical and therefore a part of law-governed 
universe. And secondly, his animal ancestry. His view of human 
nature reveals reason, freedom and truth, and mortality as basic 
traits. The fact that man is part of nature is of basic importance to 
the philosophy of Roy. It adopts a scientific approach to 
understand human nature in the background of man's biological 
evolution. Roy tries to understand what is fundamental and what is 
superficial in human psyche. 
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The main elements of the theory of biological evolution were 
brought out by Charles Darwin in his Origin of Species published 
in 1859. On the basis of certain evidences Darwin showed that the 
different existing varieties of plants and animals were the product 
of natural selection. All forms of life were involved in a struggle 
for existence. Only those forms survived which were adapted to 
their environments. 
Darwin showed how the various existing forms of life 
survived in the struggle for existence. But he did not give an 
adequate explanation of how life reproduced into different forms. 
He did not explain why some of them could survive when the 
others perished. Darwin explained the "survival" of the species, 
but not their "arrival." "* 
Human species is one of the animal species thrown up in the 
course of biological evolution. Human beings are distinguished 
from other animals by the fact that their brain is more weighty as 
compared to the total weight of the body. Their thinking faculty is 
more developed though they still are a part of the biological 
world.''' 
Roy accepts anthropological observations regarding the 
human nature. According to him, it is anthropology which will 
have to dig deep in the subsoil of human nature. Thereby it will 
discover the hidden springs of the mental evolution of the human 
species. 
Roy points out that the history of the infancy and 
adolescence of human species coincides with the process of 
biological evolution. It is therefore subsequent history. And 
history of civilization is to be regarded as an organic evolutionary 
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process that can be rationally explained. 
Roy accepts the anthropological and so called biological 
reality of human being. He therefore rejects the doctrine of 
creation of the man. He says that the knowledge about the descent 
of man rules out the doctrine of creation. According to him: 
The appearance of man on the earth having no other reason 
than the origin of a new biological species, the laws of the 
development of the human race cannot be essentially 
different from the general laws of organic evolution. 
Human nature, therefore, is determined by those laws. ' ' 
Roy, again favouring the anthropological view, argues that 
the brain of the primitive man, in its structure and size, differs 
very little from the anthropoid ape. The one inheres the mental and 
emotional outfit of the other as the basis of humanness. It, 
therefore, is a direct outcome of the process of biological 
evolution that happened in the second phase after the origin of 
organic matter. 
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Roy points out that the doubt about inanimate nature and 
organic world has been abolished by science. Life grows out of the 
background of non-living matter. Therefore, there is a causal 
connection between the two. Roy accepts this scientific view as 
his point of departure. It rules out the doctrine of creation as an 
unnecessary hypothesis. 
Roy supports Charles Darwin who, too, rejects the theory of 
creation. In this connection, Roy also says that the physical 
universe is a cosmos and living nature is a part of that law-
governed system. It then logically follows that the process of 
organic evolution is also determined. The empirical knowledge 
which culminated in the discoveries of Darwin confirmed this 
logical hypothesis. It went into the formulation of the doctrine of 
evolution v/hich represented discovery of reason in living nature. 
Roy states: 
Just as physiology has found no case of interference with 
the order of nature as revealed by physics and chemistry, 
the study of evolution has brought to light no principle 
which cannot be observed in the experience of ordinary 
life and successfully submitted to the analysis of reason.^° 
III Biological Evolution—A Rational Process 
According to Roy, biological evolution is a rational process in the 
context of law-governed physical universe. Life, he states, is not 
an intuition. Intuition is an inexplicable category. Life is also not 
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a mysterious purposive urge. It is, on the other hand, the unfolding 
of reason in nature which is a determined physical process. So 
reason is not a metaphysical category but a biological process.' 
Roy observes physical universe as a harmonious and law-
governed system. According to him, man is a part of this system. 
Because man has grown out of the background of physical nature. 
He is grovv'n as the highest product of evolution. As physical 
nature is harmonious and law-governed, the elements of harmony 
and law-governedness are also inherent in man. They are the 
foundations of special human quality. 
Roy accepts human rationality as only an expression of 
reason in nature. Reason, therefore, is nothing mysterious. The 
roots of reason can be traced in the physical nature. Again, it is 
nothing more mysterious than the coherence of physical existence. 
Since the man is an integral part of law-governed physical 
universe, he derives his rationality from the rationality of physical 
universe. Reason in him is an echo of harmony of the universe.^^ 
Rationality in man is thus secular in character. 
Human mind, according to Roy, is undoubtedly rational in 
essence. And consciousness is the property of life in the 
zoological world. It means to be aware of the environment, Roy 
accepts human nature as the product of biological evolution. He 
finds the growth of the nervous system to serve as the means of 
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inter-relations between the organism and its environment. Roy 
states: 
The growth culminates in the formation of the brain 
which, physiologically, is called the mind. So, mind is the 
highest expression of the property of life called 
consciousness; and thought, that of reaction to simple 
awareness. The mind becomes conscious of the 
environments, ihe radius of which gradually expands until 
the entire nature is embraced. Ii being consciousness of a 
law-governed system, human mind is necessarily rational 
in essence.^^ 
The intellectual and spiritual life of the primitive man was 
conditioned by the instinct of reason, Roy calls it an instinct 
because it is a product of pre-human biological evolution. 
Furthermore, Roy says that the human mind is built upon the 
foundation of primal impulses. This is to say that in all forms of 
human life the instincts are similar to those which shape animal 
behavior. He makes his position clear by saying that: 
Conceptual thought distinguishes the mind of the savage 
from that of anthropoid ape. But let it be repeated that even 
then there is little anatomical or morphological difference. 
Conceptual thought depends on language. So, it can be said 
that man is fully differentiated from his animal ancestry 
only when he coins words for expressing definite ideas.^'* 
Thus, we observe that man differentiates himself from 
animal on the basis of his thought. But it should also be known 
that memory, some very primitive ability of associating things and 
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events and habit of expressing emotions through behavior, are not 
absent in lower animals. Indeed, according to Roy, they too 
communicate feelings through articulate sounds. Roy assumes 
memory as the ultimate basis of conceptual thought. Animals also 
possess memory. This is evident from their observable behavior. 
Language enables the savage to attach labels to the mental 
equipments. It is inherited from the animal ancestry. And 
consequently it becomes easier for him to remember past 
experiences. This is what enables him to differentiate one object 
of experience from another. 
Roy further observes that man distinguishes himself from 
other animals only on the basis of his thought and ideas. It is his 
rationality which makes man superior to lower animal. Though 
animals, too, possess wonderful abilities and skills, they do not 
have the power of judging things rationally. So, man is the only 
animal who possesses rationality along with other abilities and 
skills. 
IV To Enquire is Human Nature 
Roy argues that human nature enquires about things. It is not 
going to believe in anything without enquiring and observing first. 
It is so because the mental and emotional life of the homo sapiens 
rejects the dictum—"human nature is to believe." In other words, 
an uncritical belief in something super-natural, super-human and 
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transcendental as the foundation of human nature has to be 
discounted. Human faith in God and religion is sustained by 
psychological forces. And it is these same forces that sustain the 
faith in the existence of the soul. 
Roy would rather like man not to believe in God and 
religion. He should have faith in himself to do what he wants. If a 
man has faith in God, he lacks faith in himself. A man who wants 
self-reliance will not be persuaded by religious arguments. 
Religions have the rituals like worshiping God with prayers and 
offerings. But nothing can be more illogical than worshipping the 
God. If God really exists, he must be the dispenser of justice 
without partiality or discrimination, but justice is more absent 
than present in the world. 
Even an ordinary mortal judge, according to Roy, is not 
expected to be small-minded. He does not favour a person who 
pleases him or offers gifts to him. He is expected to meet out 
justice strictly in accordance with merit. But Roy argues that God 
does not possesses even this ordinary standard of impartiality. He 
needs prayer and supplication before granting something to a man. 
Faith in a just God is inconsistent with the belief in the prowess of 
man.^^ 
Roy dismisses transcendentalism even as he emphasizes the 
faculty of reasoning behind all forms of human thought. Religion 
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is the refuge of the rationalism of the savage. But with the passage 
of time, experience reinforces reason and man attains intellectual 
adolescence.^^ 
Roy is aware of the danger of dogmatism when man is forced 
to make hypothesis in the absence of positive knowledge. Man 
lends to think any idea as absolute truth. This creates obstacle in 
the way to progress. The remedy lies in making man conscious of 
his innate rationality. 
Roy argues that the study of the original relation between 
man and nature has revealed that primitive man is not given to 
blind faith. It has also been supported by the investigations of 
anthropology. It has even been explained by historians of culture 
that what is known as superstitions and magic are all primitive 
expressions of man's innate rationality. In other words, if there is 
anything constant in human nature, it is not 'to believe', but 'to 
argue.' It is his reasoning capacity which urges him to find 
reasonable explanation of everything. 
Human rationality is only an expression of reason in nature. 
It is nothing mysterious. The roots of reason, according to Roy, 
can be traced in the lifeless physical nature. It is nothing more 
mysterious than the coherence of physical existence. It is also 
coherence of biological, psychological and of the whole of 
existence. Religion itself is supposed to be the evidence for the 
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dictum that human nature is not to believe. It was created by 
man's desire to explain the physical phenomena that surrounded 
man, and on which depended his whole existence. 
According to Roy, primitive man was led lo assume super-
natural forces being behind the natural phenomena because he 
desired to find some laws, some regularities and some coherence 
in phenomena. Ultimately, these assumed forces came to be known 
as gods of natural religion. But the postulation of super-natural 
forces behind natural phenomena was nothing more than a 
primitive scientific hypothesis. 
Roy observes that even today science explains some 
insufficiently known natural phenomena on the basis of certain 
hypotheses. But the hypothesis of today are set up on the strength 
of previous knowledge. In Roy's words: 
In the beginning of the process, primitive men had to make 
their hypothesis more or less arbitrarily, because the store 
of human knowledge at their disposal was limited. Yet, the 
notion that every physical phenomena has some coherence 
in it was the result of previously established human 
existence."^ 
Roy gives some examples of human ignorance. He says that 
man had observed through the ages that the sun rises in the east 
and sets in the west. Rain falls in certain parts of the year but not 
at other times. The day and night follow each other in an order. 
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Observation of all this regularity and order in natural phenomena 
led men to believe that they were caused by some super power. 
They were not simply and arbitrarily happening. Thus, primitive 
man expressed natural phenomena as a galaxy of gods. These gods, 
according to Roy, were made in the image of man. They were 
magnified men. the ideal men. 
Primitive man thought that there are some men with greater 
power than the men who are on earth. They made the rains. They 
caused day and night and the seasons to happen with their clock-
like regularity. They are law governed and have regularities in an 
order. Here it could be said that religion was originally an 
expression of the primitive rationality of man. Roy explains that 
the desire to know and to explain is antecedent to the tendency to 
believe. Belief results from inability to know. But as the store of 
human knowledge increased, the relation between the tendency to 
believe and to know was reversed. Hence, modern man, according 
to Roy, is more inclined to be rational and to search for knowledge 
than to seek solace in blind belief.^^ 
Roy states that the doctrine of a fixed human nature can be 
differently stated. Man is naturally superstitious. Superstition is 
the result of ignorance. The inference to the doctrine would be that 
ignorance is the natural state of man. Anthropology and critical 
history of culture have traced the superstitions of the savage to his 
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instinctive rationality. Nothing comes out of nothing, everything is 
caused by something else. This means that man's rational instincts 
were at work even at primitive stages of his civiiizational growth. 
Therefore, according to Roy, rationality must be called 
instinctive, h was still a matter cf biological mechanism, 
determined by causal connection in the physical universe. In other 
words, instinctive rationality was a vague feeling on the part of 
the primitive man. Such feelings are automatic biological 
reactions. Roy accepts it as an instinctive rationality which rules 
out the belief in anything supernatural. Therefore, Roy says that 
the idea of God is absent in the mind of the savage. 
According to Roy, the remainders of human beliefs have also 
been seen to be biological while yet being based on reason. 
Therefore, it is absurd to say that human nature is to believe; it is, 
in fact, to struggle for freedom, truth and reason. He points out 
again: 
The residue of humanness, therefore, is the biological 
heritage of reason. To put the same thing differently, 
human nature is not to believe, but to struggle for freedom 
and search for truth, the latter aspect manifesting itself in 
homo sapiens. The distinction is fundamental. Belief in 
supernatural beings or mysterious metaphysical forces 
would make submission to the object of belief the essence 
of human nature, if that was the case, man would have 
never emerged from the state of savagery. Because, as 
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soon as the biological form belonging to the human 
species became a thinking being, mind and thought entered 
into the process of organic evolution as its determining 
factors.•'^ 
Roy assumes biological events to be rational events. Because 
all these are grown out of the background of law-governed 
physical universe. Therefore, the entire process of man's 
intellectual and emotional development is also rational. 
Religion, according to Roy, is like magic. It is, therefore, 
nothing but lack of rationality. Both magic and religion assumed 
that man can have the power to free himself from the domination 
of forces of nature. He controls them either directly through 
magical powers or indirectly by the gods. They were conceived 
more powerful than man. 
When experience exposed the limitations of the magician's 
power, the savage looked up to the gods of the natural religion. 
They, then, were not conceived as superhuman immortal beings. 
They rather came to be known as the parts of nature. They were 
originators and controllers of its various phenomena, too. They 
represented the ideal of personification of power and freedom. 
Power was taken as the means to freedom. 
According to Roy, the gods were conceived as great 
magicians. They could make nature bend before their v/ill. 
Magicians were the men who know the laws of nature. This kind of 
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knowledge gave them the power of divination. Roy, therefore, 
conceives religion as the theoretical system. Hence, the age of 
religion was preceded by the age of magic.^^ 
Roy claims that philosophy is older than religion. It has been 
proved to be so by modern historical research. Human nature is 
essentially rational, because rationalism is the guiding principle of 
philosophical thought. To explain natural phenomena, the earliest 
philosophies were the first attempts of human intelligence. These 
were capable enough to explain natural phenomena in physical 
terms without assuming supernatural agencies. 
The point of departure of those attempts was the belief that 
nature was a rational, law-governed, system. The relation between 
philosophy and religion can be traced in the history of western 
world, so it can be the same in terms of reason and faith too. 
Science, according to Roy, is a free enquiry into nature and 
philosophy. It is also a rational plan for attainting the ideal of 
"good life" which was developed to a high level in ancient Greece. 
Natural religions, which preceded scientific enquiry and 
philosophical thought, were pseudo-theological systems. Their 
theology was false, Because the gods of natural religion were 
made by men, after their own image, and lived in nature.^^ 
Thus, finally, Roy argues that the phrase, "human nature is 
to believe" has to be ruled out. Because, to believe in anything 
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supernatural is absurd. Anthropological investigations have led to 
the discovery that the idea of God is imaginary. And the belief in 
an immortal soul or in anything supernatural is absent even among 
primitive human communities. 
V The Change in Human Nature 
According to M.N. Roy, the view that Human Nature is same for 
all the times is not true. It is false to say that human nature never 
changes. Although there is something permanent and stable in 
human nature, it is still not untrue to say that "to change is Human 
Nature." Otherwise it is impossible to explain social progress. And 
there is also no sense in regarding the history of civilization as an 
evolutionary process. The foundation of all understanding of 
sociological theory is to understand all human life. It is also to 
think that no static maintenance of perfection is possible. 
On the basis of the observations of lives and behavior of 
primitive human being, Roy argues that there is no such thing as 
immutable human nature. The recent researches in the field of 
anthropology also dispel the belief that human nature is always the 
same."'^ 
Roy argues that since human nature is essentially rational, 
man naturally wants to know and to explain the world. From this 
point of view, the conclusion is reached that human nature can 
evolve, can be changed. Human nature has changed and will 
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change with increasing knowledge. This continuous change of 
human nature is the manifestation of the unfoldment of the human 
personality. 
Roy claims that the most social philosophies in our times 
maintain thai unless the social atmosphere is changed, human 
nature can not change. He says: 
But if some individual conceived the necessity of changing 
the social atmosphere, that philosophy is disproved, 
because their nature must have changed. Now if the nature 
of a few hundred members of a particular party can 
change, why should we assume that the nature of other 
people cannot change until that particular party comes to 
power and regiments the whole society so as lo shape it 
according to its particular ideas?''^ 
The argument that human nature by itself cannot change 
until the social institutions are changed, is wrong in Roy's 
opinion. This is a wrongly conceived procedure of giving priority 
to institutions and leaving individual men and women to their fate. 
It has been the basic cause of the present crisis. Because it has led 
to a vicious circle. Roy argues that if good institutions alone can 
change human nature for the better, it is also a fact that only good 
men can create good institutions. Therefore, institutions are as 
good as the men who create them. Therefore, priority goes to 
individuals not to the institutions which have been created by men 
themselves. 
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VI Urge for Freedom and Search for Trufh 
Roy's observations about freedom and truth is that man pursues 
freedom and is always in search of truth. This urge for freedom 
follows from man's animal ancestry. Roy points out that the most 
significant impulse among animals is the impulse for existence. 
And as soon as he exists, he begins to look for his freedom. In 
man, though, this urge has a wider meaning. Because he not only 
wants to exist but also aspires to unfold all the potentialities 
hidden in him. For his existence, man struggles on the human 
level. When it is carried on according to a conscious will, it 
becomes the ure;e for freedom.'"^ 
Roy holds that man tries to find out the laws of nature in 
order to realize his freedom. As man's knowledge of his nature 
increases, he can free himself from the tyranny of natural 
phenomena. And this is the act by which he changes the physical 
environment. Thus, urge for freedom leads man to a search for 
knowledge. In this process, he solves another problem, the 
problem of truth. The problem of truth is the content of man's 
knowledge. Roy deduces all values from the supreme value of 
freedom. The human axiology finds expression in quest for 
freedom, knowledge and truth. This explains all aspects of 
existence - material, mental and moral. 
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The above analysis reveals that rationality and will to 
freedom constitute Roy's conception of human nature. One 
supplies dynamism and other gives direction. The urge for freedom 
is essentially a romantic urge. Reason, on the other hand, 
according to Roy, is a moderating force. Because ii is reason 
which shows what is possible under the existing conditions. Roy 
makes his view clear by saying that: 
Romanticism tempered with reason, and rationalism 
enlivened by the romantic spirit of adventure, pave the 
road to successful revolution.'''' 
Thus, we observe that Roy wants to interlink reason and 
freedom. This leads to the expression of co-operative spirit as 
manifested in social relationship. 
VII Man is Moral by Nature 
Roy holds the view that man is moral by nature. He is a moral 
creature because he is a rational being. Morality is a dictate of 
conscience and conscience is a biological function. At the level of 
consciousness, it reflects the law-governedness of the universe. It 
realizes itself through human intelligence and is for that reason 
another name for man's rationality. 
Roy, therefore, considers morality as a rational attribute of 
man. It is not supernatural, mystical or metaphysical attribute of 
human nature."^'' Roy says that a harmonious social order is 
possible because man is rational. Harmony is another name of 
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morality. Morality and rationality are the two sides of the same 
coin. According to him, the belief that is intimately associated 
with religion is noi based on historical research. The savage even 
without having the notion of God has a strong sense of good and 
bad. It was instinctive with him. Roy again says that his sense of 
morality was not prompted by any inner voice. It was also not 
dictated by the fear of God. Therefore, he insists that morality is 
essentially rational and is an inherent attribute of man which goes 
alongwith his rationality. One knows from experience what is good 
for him and what is bad for him. From it, he generalizes what is 
bad for him is also bad for all. This is what Roy calls the origin of 
morality."'' 
Roy argues that there are some wrong understandings about 
the nature of man. Some people who do not know the reality, 
believe that man can not be moral by himself. According to them, 
ordinary men and women can be moral only under spiritual or 
temporal compulsion. The moral conscience must be derived from 
something super-human. Therefore, morality is linked with 
religion. It remains somewhat same even today. 
Roy here suggests that if this conception prevails, it will 
never be possible to put man as m.oral being on his own strength. 
So, R.oy insists that moral regeneration is possible only by the 
spread of knowledge among all human beings. Because the spread 
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of knowledge will destroy faith in something higher than man. If 
the morality is delinked with such kind of faith, the expansion of 
knowledge will mean the expansion and affirmation of morality. 
The urge for moral responsibilities is natural and essential in 
man. Because it is generally admitted that laws cannot make men 
moral. It is an experience of history that religion by itself also 
cannot make men moral. Man cannot be moral unless to be moral 
is inherent in him. And it is so because this desire results from 
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man's innate rationality.' 
So what Roy wants to say is that we require the values of 
morality to have a rational justification. To be moral is human. 
Therefore, it is not necessary to go in search of divine or mystic or 
metaphysical sanctions. The principles of ethics must be in 
consonance with anything that is considered as true, good and 
beautiful in this world. As Roy says, "Morality will be a soul-
killing virtue, if it cannot cohabit with the pleasant, the enjoyable 
and the beautiful"/"' 
VIII Man as a Moral Animal (Critique of Marx) 
According to M. N. Roy ethical foundations of Marxism are weak 
because they are relativistic and dogmatic and because their 
psychological basis is untenable. Marx expounds the radical 
behaviouristic doctrine. He says that in the process of struggle 
with nature, man changes his own nature. There is nothing stable 
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in human nature. He, thus, accepts the total changeability of 
human nature. 
Roy follows the view of the eighteenth century materialism. 
According to that while both the individual and society change 
there is something constant in human nature. The negation of a 
permanent element in human nature would imply the negation of 
ethics. No ethics can be built without the acceptance of some 
constant elements in human nature which makes essential 
realization of some permanent values. 
In opposition to Marxism, Roy believes that there is 
something stable and permanent in human nature which is the 
basis of duties and rights. The subordination of man to the 
dominance of the forces of production is a neutralization of his 
autonomy and creativity. Moral consciousness is not a product of 
economic forces. Roy has put forward a humanistic ethics. This 
humani.'^tic ethics reestablishes the sovereignty of man and 
believes in the axiological hierarchy of freedom and justice. 
Therefore, in place of Marxian thesis which interprets ethical 
norms in terms of class struggle, Roy accepts that there is 
something permanent in ethical values.'^'* 
According to Roy, Marx rejected the individualist approach 
to moral problems under the influence of Hegel. Ethical relativism 
of utilitarians was rational. While the approach of Marxian 
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relativism was dogmatic. It was so because it was a projection in 
the future of the Hegelian moral positivism. In order to establish 
the dictum "might is right", Hegel rationalised immorality. There 
is no moral standard in his positivist ethical doctrine. 
Roy finds no distinction between the Hegelian positivist 
doctrine of morality and Marxist relativism. One believes in 
"might is right." The other declared that coming might is also 
right. Therefore, Roy says if today might is right, it must be so 
tomorrow as well. So future of Marxism has become the present of 
communism in power. The Marxist attitude to moral question, too, 
has become positivistic.''^ 
Thus, Roy states that Marxian philosophy does not have 
ethics. The problem of a secular rationalist morality with an 
objective criterion for its value is still to be solved. The Marxian 
dialectical materialism dehumanised humanity by subordinating its 
entire history to the tyranny of economic forces. The humanist 
conception of the individual as a sovereign moral entity is 
critically analysed by Marx in the Theses on Feuerbach. In these 
theses, Marx rejected Feuerbach's humanism in favour of his 
dialectical materialism. 
Roy points out that Marx did not analyse mental phenomena. 
Therefore, on the one hand, his materialism is dogmatic and 
unscientific and, on the other, it is the negation of constant 
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element in human nature. Therefore, it leads to the negation of 
morality. Without the recognition of some permanent values, no 
ethics is possible. If they are not to be found in human nature, 
morality must have a transcendental sanction. 
Roy argues that history cannot be interpreted unless we have 
certain values. The orthodox Marxist tradition interpreted history 
without having ethical principles and moral values. But history 
shows that ethical principles and moral values have been enriched 
in course of human experience. Therefore, there are certain things 
which can be called basic human values. These human values can 
be traced back to biological evolution prior to the appearance of 
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nomo-sapiens. 
Roy gives an important place to ethics in social philosophy. 
He tells that his philosophical point of departure from Karl Marx 
is Marx's eleventh thesis on Feuerbach. He says: 
My approach to the problem of ethics is also materialistic. 
I believe that not only is a materialist ethics possible, but 
that materialist morality is the noblest form of morality, 
because it enables man to be moral without debasing 
himself before imaginary super-human powers."^^ 
Therefore, Roy assumes that ethical concepts and moral 
values originated with homo sapiens. They have no super-human 
origin. They also do not have any divine transcendental sanction. 
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All human urges can be traced back to pre-human biological 
evolution. Thus, morality also must be derived from that source. 
According to Roy, there was no class struggle in the pre-
human world. Ethical behaviour has pre-human biological origin. 
Therefore, moral values of the human world are universal. Roy 
calls it humanist philosophy. It enables one to conceive of 
universal human values. Therefore, Roy places ethics in the 
context of the rational scheme of the physical universe. A rational 
ethics is possible only as a part of materialist philosophy.'*^ 
IX Eclipse of Man in Marxian Philosophy 
Marx rejected the liberal concept of individualism under the 
influence of Hegelian thesis of moral positivism. Roy writes: 
Marxian relativism, notwithstanding its appearance, is 
dogmatic, being a projection in the future of the Hegelian 
moral positivism. In order to establish the dictum that 
might is right, Hegel rationalised immorality. His positive 
ethical doctrine, that there is no moral standard, but that 
what exists is rational and therefore good, is moral 
nihilism. There is no difference between the Hegelian 
positivist doctrine of morality and Marxist relativism in 
that respect. According to one, the present might is right; 
projecting the Hegelian doctrine into the future, the other 
declared coming might to be also right. Hegel said; what is, 
is rational and therefore good. Marx added: the future, as I 
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visualise it, will result inevitably from the present: hence it 
will also be rational and good.''^ 
Furthermore, moral positivism exalts the society or the class 
as the given of norms. This also results in the minimization of the 
role of individual. The Marxist conception of freedom means 
slavery for the individual and a society composed of voluntary 
slaves can never be free.^° 
In his neglect of the value of individual autonomy, Marx 
proved himself disloyal to his humanist Feuerbachian antecedents. 
By rejecting the liberal and utilitarian concept of the individual, 
Marx betrayed his earlier humanism. The moral degeneration of 
the movement of international communism results from upholding 
the relativism of ethical criteria. It also exalts the Hegelian type of 
moral positivism. 
Roy does not like the Marxian idea of merging the individual 
in the collective. He placed the individual above everything else. 
He refuses to accept the individual as means to an end which is the 
state and the society. His view is that society exists only to enable 
"the human being to conduct the struggle for existence with 
greater efficiency." He differs from Marx and emphasizes the 
moral, intellectual and social freedom that makes man the maker 
of his destiny and realize his potential and express himself in a 
rational way. He declares that individual, in order to be free, must 
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not only be able lo enjoy economic freedom and security but must 
also live in a socially and psychologically conducive atmosphere 
free from all kinds of cultural and intellectual regimentation. 
Roy's view is that Marx made a deliberate attempt to enslave the 
individual. He made the community primary and the individuals 
secondary. According to Marx, a good society is necessary to have 
good individuals while Roy asserts that it is important to first have 
good individuals in order to have good society. Man is not only an 
object of all social institutions bui also the principal agent 
responsible for all social progress. It is man who creates society, 
state and other institutions and values for his own welfare. Man 
has power to change them for his greater welfare and 
convenience.^' 
Thus, Roy considers the idea of withering away of the state 
as given by Marx as absurd. The state would never disappear 
unless human society reverted to the state of savagery. 
Finally, Roy is against the view that individual is the 
antithesis of society. If it was the case, there would be no social 
progress. If the existence of an individual cannot be harmonised in 
the context of society, the entire human history will be a failure. 
The assumption that the individuals are antithesis of the society 
has been there since the days of Plato. The problem of relation 
between the state and individual has been a fundamental problem. 
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But then assumptions in this regard of both Plato and Marx was 
not a genuine one, Roy, therefore, suggests to reconsider the 
problem of the relation between society and the individual, the 
individual and the state.^" 
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Chapter 4 
FROM HUMANISM TO RADICAL HUMANISM 
I What is Humanism? 
Humanism is the philosophical and literary movement which 
originated in Italy in the second half of the fourteenth century.' 
Although the word 'humanism' came into general use only in the 
nineteenth century, it was applied to some intellectual and cultural 
developments in previous eras too. As we know, in ancient Greece, 
one of the leading sophists, Protagoras asserted "Man is the 
measure of all things," It was the beginning of humanism. 
Protagoras, therefore, may be considered as the first humanist.'^ 
In Renaissance Italy a teacher of classical languages and 
literatures was described as Umanista (contrasted with legista, 
teacher of law). And what we today call "the humanities," was, in 
the fifteenth century, called studio humanities. It stood for 
grammar, rhetoric, history, literature and moral philosophy. The 
inspiration for these studies came from the rediscovery of ancient 
Greek and Latin texts. Plato's complete works were translated for 
the first time and Aristotle's philosophy was studied in more 
accurate versions than those available during the Middle Ages.'' 
The contribution of the Greeks lies in the understanding of 
man and nature through reason. Sophists represent the transition 
from the physicists to the humanists. The Sophists destroyed the 
faith "in the gods and goddesses of Olympus." They also did same 
in moral codes that had taken its sanction so largely from the fear 
man had for these innumerable deities.'' 
Plato and Aristotle argued against the contention of Sophists 
that morality is simply social convention. According to them, there 
are certain universal and absolute principles of goodness and 
justice that can be discovered by man through his reason. 
In its historical meaning, humanism is a basic aspect of the 
Renaissance. Renaissance thinkers sought to reintegrate man into 
the world of nature and history. The term humanism in this sense 
derives from humanitas meaning the education of man as such. 
Therefore, the central theme of Renaissance civilization is 
humanism which is an attitude attaching prime importance to man 
and his values. 
A therapeutic view of man was taken by Stoics and 
Epicureans. They had agreed in saying that man had his cure in his 
own hands. The purpose of Epicurean school was to produce in its 
students a state of self-sufficiency. Stoicism, on the other hand, 
113 
not only exalted the life of reason but also emphasised the 
essentia! equaliiy of all men. 
It was through Stoicism rather than Platonism that Greek 
philosophy was introduced into the Roman v/orld. The Stoic 
conception of the universal community in which all men are 
brothers v/as given spiritual content. This happened due to the 
influence of the Christian conception of the kingdom of God.^ 
Humanism as "return to antiquity" did not consist in a simple 
repetition of the ancient past. It rather consisted in the revival and 
development of capacities and powers that the ancients possessed 
and exercised and that had been lost in the middle ages. The 
humanists rejected the medieval heritage and chose instead the 
classical world. They accorded to the humanities prime of place. 
Their conviction was that these disciplines alone educate man and 
put him in a position whereby he can exercise his freedom.'' 
Thus, from historical perspective, we see that the "return to 
antiquity" was the watchword of humanism. The middle ages knew 
and utilized classical culture but utilized it by assimilating it and 
making it contemporary.^ 
Humanism, in fact, is not a new ideal. It is perhaps as old as 
philosophy itself and has its historical roots in human civilization. 
It is rather a technical term which denotes an intellectual or moral 
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conception. It is also a philosopiiy which recognizes the value and 
dignity of man. It represents a system of thought concerned with 
human affairs in general. Furthermore, it is an attitude which 
attaches primary importance to man, his faculties, aspirations, 
growth, fulfilment, freedom and creativity. 
The philosophy of humanism has had to pass through a 
process of development and change. But its main idea that man 
must remain the supreme being and he must be the center of 
attention in all walks of life has remained constant throughout. We 
can therefore say that humanism recognizes the value and dignity 
of man and makes him "the measure of all things" as Protagoras 
asserted. In this sense, humanism can be said to be quite simply a 
study of man. 
Humanism, on its critical side, is essentially a protest 
against the dehumanizing and depersonalizing procedure. It 
involves a critique of the modern scientific and technological 
outlook. However, given the wide diversity of views among its 
exponents, it should be clear that humanism is not a dogma or 
creed. It shares a general point of view about man and his place in 
the universe. Humanism is critical of supernaturalistic religion or 
ideological dogma. It has a moral commitment to free thought, to 
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the fulfillment of human potentialities and the democratic ideal of 
humanity as a whole.^ 
Humanism is committed to the method of reason as the chief 
means of solving problems. It expresses the belief that mankind 
can survive and humans can enjoy a significant life. This 
conviction can be realized only if men continue to have confidence 
in their own natural powers and abilities. They also must have the 
courage to use them.'*' 
In the modern context humanism can mean two things: first, 
that man is the sovereign value and an end by himself. Second, 
that the man is all the time outside himself. It is in projecting 
himself and losing himself beyond himself that he exists. There is 
no other universe except the human universe. The real problem for 
man is to understand himself again and again, to understand that 
nothing can save him except himself. There exists no insuperable 
barrier to the progress of human civilization. Man must be able to 
realize the heaven of comfort and happiness here in this world ." 
Man is his own rule and his own end. Human life is in human 
hands. 
It is already mentioned that the humanism came in general 
use in 19 century while the humanistic approaches were found in 
medieval and Greek periods too. Some of the humanists whose 
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names deserve to be mentioned are French philosophers like 
Voltaire, Diderot and Rousseau. Some other European and 
American figures are Bentham, Hume, Lessing, Kant, Franklin and 
Jefferson. There are some names of twentieth century humanists 
like Jean Paul Sartre, Gilbert Murray, John Dewey, Bertrand 
Russell and Erich Fromni. Though these humanists did not always 
agree with one another, Ihey formed a family united in support of 
such values as freedom, equality, tolerance, secularism and 
cosmopolitanism.'^ 
There have been many versions of humanism, such as 
religious humanism, scientific humanism, rationalist humanism, 
ethical humanism and Marxist Humanism etc. Each of these is, 
surely, a legitimate and valuable type of humanism. A brief 
account of some of them is given here. 
a. Religious Humanism 
The religious humanists believe in the existence of a supernatural 
power and its active role in human affairs. They believe that the 
conscious subordination of man to divine will does not affect bis 
commitment to the value of freedom. They also accept the value of 
rationalism but to a limited extent. Because they believe that there 
is, besides reason, a supra-rational way of acquiring knowledge. 
According to them, morality is derived not from biological 
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impulses and guided by man's reason, but from divine will that is 
expressed in religious texts. 
Religious humanism is cosmopolitan. It does not believe in 
any organised religion. Religious humanists also regard all 
religions including their own as different ways of reaching God. 
They are all part of a human brotherhood and they cherish the 
ideal of freedom with sincerity.'^ 
b. Scientific Humanism 
Scientific Humanism arose through the thinking of John Dewey, 
Julian Huxley and others. But it can be traced to Bacon's Novum 
Organum. Bacon's formula was that "pursue science in order that 
the human state may be enhanced."' ' ' According to these 
humanists, science has emancipated man from the bondage of 
dogmatic religious mythology. It has provided him with the 
instruments for remaking and reordering his life.'^ 
Moreover, Renaissance humanism can be considered one of 
the conditions that contributed to the birth of modern science. 
Scientific humanism is called naturalistic humanism. It is 
because it rejects all forms of supernaturalism, pantheism and 
metaphysical idealism. It considers man's supreme ethical aim as 
working for the welfare of all humanity in this one and only life. 
It uses the methods of reason, science and democracy for the 
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solution of problems. And there is no need for a God or gods to 
solve human problems.'^ 
c. Marxist Humanism 
Marx's humanism begins with the proclamation that "man is 
alienated", while "he is the root of mankind." Its roots go back to 
the Enlightenment. Marx was influenced by Feuerbach. But he felt 
that Feuerbach neglected social history. Marxian concept of 
humanism is socialist. He pointed out that the religion is opium of 
the people which brought temporary relief and satisfaction to man. 
Religions are too harmful to the society in so far as they do not 
allow man to use his potentialities for the welfare of humankind.'^ 
Marx's contention was that private property had to be 
abolished. Because it was the manifestation of the exploitation of 
man by man through the instrumentality of the machine. 
According to him, the individual is the social entity. Where 
there is no freedom for the individual, there is no freedom in the 
society.'^ 
Marx proposed that in place of the profit motive of 
capitalism or the substitution of state for private ownership, the 
principle of the new society should be the freedom of man. This 
will help in the development of man's innate talents. The unity of 
mental and manual labour had been fragmented by the exploitative 
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society. It alienated from man not only the product of his labour 
but also the very activity of labour. 
Marx said "religion is the opium of the people."^° He also 
wrote: 
Man makes religion: religion does not make man. 
Religion is indeed man's self-consciousness and self-
awareness so long as he has not found himself or has lost 
himself again. But man is not an abstract being, squatting 
outside the world. Man is the human world, state, 
society.,.. Religion is the sign of the oppressed creature, 
the sentiment of a heartless world and the soul of soulless 
conditions. It is the opium of the people. The abolition of 
the religion as the illusory happiness of the men, is a 
demand for their real happiness.... Religion is only the 
illusory sun about which man revolves so long as he does 
not revolve about himself.... 
Marx suggested man to be engaged with what he called the 
human world. The human world is primarily concerned with 
material production. Marx meant by 'material' the basic and 
primary conditions of human existence. The legal property 
relations of men as well as their philosophical concepts were 
rooted in material production. 
Though Marx declared that the Hegelian dialectic is the 
source of all dialectic, it seemed to limit itself to thought. The 
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thoughts were sonieihing outside the human being. Marx claimed 
to humanize the Hegelian dialectic."'^ 
Marx claimed that his materialist concept of history was a 
scientific philosophy. In contrast to Utopian socialism and to 
mechanical materialism, Marx's view was that there is nothing 
automatic. AH depended on the human subject. And also on the 
revolutionary compulsions of the proletariat to transform reality. 
It was about undermining the existing order and creating the new 
one.^^ 
According to Marx, reason and revolution both are 
compulsory for the transformation of reality. They are the 
inseparables for the same struggles decided the fate of men. .Tust 
as it was men who made religion, not religion men, so it was they 
who developed science not science them. The human being, not 
science, was the stuff of revolution." 
I! Radical Humanism of M. N. Roy 
The basic framework of the philosophy of Radical Humanism was 
prepared by Roy in 1946. It was published in the form of twenty 
two theses. Roy was requested by some of his colleagues to 
prepare a manifesto on his newly formulated philosophy. Roy 
prepared it under the title New Humanism-A Manifesto. The 
manifesto deals with the inadequacy of current ideologies and the 
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degeneration of communist theory and practice. It presents an 
outline of the philosophy of New Humanism, later designated as 
Radical Humanism. 
Roy's humanism is variously called New, Scientific, Radical 
and Integral Humanism. He argues that his humanism is 'New' 
because it is enriched and reinforced by scientific knowledge and 
social experience gained by modern civilization. It is 'scientific' 
because it conceives human reality as a byproduct - the highest 
one though - of the mechanistic process of nature. It can also be 
called 'Radical' because it goes to the root of the problem of the 
origin of the human being. 
Roy claims that he has taken human being not only in the 
context of society but also of the entire universe. An integrated 
picture of modern science leads to an integral scientific 
humanism."^ 
Roy's integral humanism is distinguished from the older 
forms of humanism. The older forms were poetic and romantic, 
having no scientific knowledge of man and his nature. But radical 
humanism explains man on the basis of an integral picture of the 
knowledge of modern science that leads to an integral scientific 
humanism.."^ 
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According to Roy, humanism was confounded by the wrong 
ideas of human nature in earlier times. It usually failed to take 
into account the real urges of human nature. But today, scientific 
knowledge as well as careful reading of history enable humanists 
to challenge the wrong notions about human nature. Therefore, 
new humanism frees itself from all contradictions and fallacies. 
Roy argues that since its newness is derived from modern 
scientific knowledge, the more appropriate name is 'Scientific 
Humanism.' ^^  
According to Roy, the need of the hour is a philosophy 
which will restore confidence in the creativity of man. It is only 
when man's faith in himself is restored, he can start to remake his 
world. 
Roy's humanism is strictly based on scientific knowledge of 
man and his nature. This humanism can explain man because man, 
previously, did not have faith in his own creative abilities. He was 
made a slave of the supernatural powers and was made to work 
accordingly in middle ages. Therefore, unless we can find a way 
by which man can regain faith in himself, there will be no freedom 
and no future for him. 
Roy states that his humanism revolves around man. It 
considers him not only as the object of all social institutions but 
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also the principal agent responsible for all social progress. 
According to Roy, if is the man who creates society, state and 
other institutions, and values for his own welfare. Man has the 
power to change for his greater welfare and advancement. 
Roy's humanism rejects all theories which consider the 
evolution of human history as an inevitable and automatic process. 
Roy also rejects the theory which is determined either by God's 
will or by economic forces. He is also a non-believer in mystical 
or mythical phenomena. He admits, like Protagoras, only man as 
the measure of all things. 
Roy bases his philosophy of radical humanism on a set of 
principles. According to him, these principles have relevance to 
all branches of man's life and social existence. These also show a 
way towards their reorganisation. On the basis of these principles. 
Roy argues that his philosophy of humanism is not an abstract 
philosophy. It is also not merely a social philosophy or a political 
or economic theory. It is rather a kind of philosophy which can 
inspire mankind to take things in its own hand. It shapes the social 
world according to reason and human needs.^^ 
New humanism is not a closed system. Being based on 
experience and science, it will evolve as experience grows and 
science develops. It can be elaborated and improved considerably. 
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It is a new approach thai promises to lead to better result than any 
other previously known. Therefore, the ideas and principles of new 
humanism appeal to the best in man. And there must be enough 
men and women in the world who will respond to an appeal to all 
that is best in them. 
The inspiration for radical humanism is drawn from the 
thinkers of Renaissance and from the humanistic thinkers of 
eighteenth century. But in those days, as Roy claims, the 
humanists were not able to trace the relationship of man to nature. 
Now radical humanism has removed that difficulty with the help of 
modern sciences. The glory of man now consists in being the 
highest manifestation of the evolutionary process of nature. 
The question is why has humanism failed to affect the 
conduct of large number of people? The reason, according to Roy, 
is that though the philosophers of the renaissance declared man to 
be sovereign, they kept the concept of man in mystery. 
How could they do it? There was no scientific explanation of 
man. Therefore this view of man was bound to degenerate into 
some form of mysticism and even religion. Roy points out that 
even today some who want a revival of humanism incline towards 
a religious point of view. They believe that a restatement of 
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religion can take the world out of the present crises and give man 
back his moral sanity. 
I l l The Basic Values in Radical Humanism 
There are three basic elements in Radical Humanism. These are 
Freedom, Rationality and Morality. These values arise from 
certain mental attributes acquired by man in the course of physico-
biological evolution. These mental attributes are converted and 
developed into values by man's reason which is the part of man's 
biological heritage. These are not speculative or a priori 
categories but are crystallizations of the experience gained in 
historical evolution. 
a. Freedom 
Freedom means absence of restraint. Freedom can be defined as 
the progressive disappearance of all restrictions. It is realized 
through the unfolding of the potentialities of individuals as human 
being. 
According to Roy, when the above statement regarding 
freedom is made, it means our standard of reference is a rational 
human individual. It is he who appreciates that he must develop 
his potentialities in harmony with similar efforts of other 
individuals. He would voluntarily accept reasonable restrictions 
imposed in the general public interest. Freedom can be enjoyed by 
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a rational individual. Since freedom is the basic value, the 
freedom of one individual cannot be restricted for safeguarding the 
freedom of others. Because there might be equal freedom for all 
and that is why freedom of an individual can be subjected to 
reasonable restriction in the interests of equality.^° 
Roy states that like other biological entities, man has been 
constantly engaged in the struggle for existence. In the initial 
stages, man had to fight against hostile nature to safeguard his 
life. It was to acquire food and to continue to survive. He then 
began to try to live on a higher plane than other biological species. 
This plane was of intelligence, emotion and self-awareness. It was 
this plane that signified the struggle for freedom. 
In a different form, man is now engaged in the same struggle 
after the transition from savagery to civilization. Man's struggle 
for freedom is a continuation on the higher level of intelligence, 
emotion and self-awareness of the biological struggle for 
existence. Struggle for existence is the basic urge of the entire 
biological world, struggle for freedom is the basic urge of human 
beings.'" 
Freedom is basic value in the philosophy of radical 
humanism. It is the supreme value from which all human values 
are rationally derived. In this sense freedom is the value of all 
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values. Roy describes the origin and status of freedom in the 
foil owing way: 
The function of life is to live. The basic incentive of 
organic becoming is the struggle for survival. It goes on 
throughout the long process of biological evolution until 
in man it becomes the conscious urge for freedom as the 
supreme human value.•^" 
Man's struggle for existence is eternal. Therefore, his urge 
for freedom is also eternal. The struggle for existence on human 
level, carried on according to a conscious will and intelligence, 
becomes the urge for freedom.•^•' This urge enables man to acquire 
knowledge because he conquers his environment by knowing. 
Quest for freedom and search for truth constitute the basic 
motives of human progress. Freedom originated as a byproduct of 
the biological evolution of man, not as the transcendent essence of 
an abstract spirit. It is the supreme value of life because the urge 
for freedom is the essence of human existence. It is also the basic 
value because the existence of human beings as human beings is 
the basis of all values. It can be traced all the way down the entire 
process of biological evolution, as all ethical values are derived 
from the biological heritage of man. The biological struggle for 
self-preservation and self-reproduction is the basis of the concept 
of freedom.""* 
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b. Rationality 
The 22 theses already referred to in which the principles of radical 
humanism were first formulated by Roy and his colleagues, thesis 
two runs as follows: 
Quest for freedom and search for truth constitute the 
basic urge of human progress. The quest for freedom is 
the continuation, on a higher level—of intelligence and 
emotion—of the biological struggle for existence. The 
search for truth is a corollary thereof. Increasing 
knowledge of nature enables man to be progressively free 
from the tyranny of natural phenomena, and physical and 
social environments. Truth is the content of knowledge. 
Roy argues that man's struggle for a better life is the essence 
of man's struggle for freedom. It has been aided by the knowledge 
which man has acquired through the ages. This knowledge was 
acquired by synthesising sense-experience with the aid of reason. 
Reason, being the basis of knowledge, is the main instrument of 
human progress. 
Apart from its use for gaining scientific knowledge, reason 
helps human progress in other ways. The rationality of human 
being is the basis of their gradual moral development. There is 
another consideration why rationality is of vital importance in the 
philosophy of radical humanism. Only an individual who is 
mentally free can achieve political, economic and social freedom. 
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Mental freedom is the precondition and starting point of an 
individual's struggle for freedom. 
Mental freedom implies absence of blind faith on the one 
hand and self-reliance on the other. It was reason which freed man 
from blind faith and made him self-reliant. Man is mentally free to 
the extent to which he can be his own guide. And the only faculty 
which can provide this self-guidance is the reasoning faculty. 
Reason makes an individual mentally free. It enables him to 
develop his morals as well. It also helps thereby to live 
harmoniously in an organised society. 
M. N. Roy's philosophy of radical humanism is an optimistic 
philosophy. It asserts that reason is the main instrument of human 
progress. It is an inherent part of human nature. Reason is also a 
biological property. Thus, thesis 4 says: 
Rising out of the background of the law-governed 
physical nature, the human being is essentially rational. 
Reason being a biological property, it is not the antithesis 
of will. Intelligence and emotion can be reduced to a 
common biological denominator.^'^ 
Rationality in man is not implanted by a divine being. It is 
the product of biological evolution. Radical Humanism is built on 
the foundations of this natural rationality of man. 
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The human brain, like the brain of other animals, developed 
in the course of biological evolution by the ways of adaptation to 
nature. The reasoning faculty of man is a property and not an 
independent creation. Hence, there is nothing mysterious in the 
origin of reason. It is a biological attribute of the animal world 
and is not confined to man. Man's obvious superiority to the rest 
of animal world arises solely from the fact that the instinctive 
thinking faculty which is common to the animal world is far more 
developed in the human species. Knowledge acquired by 
synthesising experience of reason is the source of power and 
power guided by reason makes freedom possible. 
Rationality is thus as essential as the concept of freedom to 
the philosophy of radical humanism. It is the reasoning faculty 
which enables human beings to attain increasing success in the 
struggle for freedom. 
c. Morality 
It is the third element of Radical Humanism. Roy bases it not on 
metaphysical speculation but on the analytical foundations of 
reason. Therefore, Roy's humanism rests its ethics on the 
rationality of man. If a man is conscious about his innate 
rationality, he, as man, can be moral. 
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Man v/itb his intelligence and will remains an integral part 
of the physical universe. The latter is a cosmos, a law-governed 
system. Therefore, man's being and becoming, his emotions, will 
and ideas are determined. But in a deterministic world, can the 
human will be free? Can an individual determine the direction and 
force of his will? Is the direction and force of man determined by 
factors over which he has no control? 
This problem is vitally connected with the concept of both 
freedom and secular morality. If a person has no power whatever 
to influence his will, the ideal of freedom loses most of its value. 
A person who cannot control his will cannot be the maker of his 
future. Similarly, a person cannot be held responsible for his 
moral lapses if he is not free to make choice between moral and 
immoral alternatives. In the absence of freedom of the will, a 
human being can be regarded as a responsible moral entity. 
Therefore, human will is free because it can be determined to a 
considerable extent by the individual himself.'*'^ 
Moral values are as permanent as human society itself. 
Compassion, kindness, truthfulness, fellow feeling and other moral 
values will exist as long as human beings continue to live in social 
groups. These values are not merely a matter of convenience. 
Moral values have became a part of man's nature. Since he regards 
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these values as really valuable, he can not switch them on and 
switch thenri off as the situation may warrant. To regard moral 
values as relative is to deny them as values. That is why relativist 
morality amounts to moral nihilism. All moral values for Roy are 
absolute.'*' 
It is sometimes said that there is no logical relation between 
values and the world of science. Moral philosophy was foiled by 
the problem of deducing values from facts. On the authority of 
modern science, radical humanism maintains that a rational and 
moral society is possible. Because man by nature is rational and 
therefore, can be moral. It similarly proclaims the sovereignty of 
man on the authority of modern science.''^ 
According to M. N. Roy, reason and morality are 
complementary to each other. Man is moral because he is rational. 
Morality grows as rationality develops. It is not necessary to go to 
any external or transcendental authority to trace the growth of man 
from a primitive human being to a civilized citizen. Man created 
society in order to be able to wage successfully his struggle for 
existence. 
The aim of ethics is to actualize the collective good of 
mankind. Roy challenges the assumptions of supra-rational 
metaphysics and the ethics which is also based on the materialistic 
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cosmology."•' Thus, human nature for Roy is mainly determined by 
physical and biological factors and not by the supremacy of the 
social environment over the nature of man. 
IV Radical Humanism is Scientific Humanism 
Roy's Radical humanism is scientific humanism with a radical 
outlook. Its conclusions are derived by adopting the approach of 
science to the understanding of man. It also tries to understand 
man's relations with other human beings and his place in the 
world. 
The postulates which constitute the approach of science are 
also the postulates of the philosophy which is known as 
materialism or monistic naturalism. It is the philosophical base of 
radical humanism. 
The scientific humanism that is new humanism goes into the 
genesis of man. The study of science establishes that there is 
nothing extra-natural in man. Whatever we call as human nature, 
man's attributes and potentialities can be deduced from the 
background of the evolving physical universe. Therefore, new 
humanism is distinct from older humanisms which took man as 
being fundamentally indefinable. It shifted man's blind belief from 
God to man. Man was no longer a mystery, a matter of faith.'*'' 
According to Roy, modern science has acquired a good deal 
of knowledge about man. It is therefore possible to dispense with 
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many assumptions and prejudices. It also iielps us to have a 
rational, scientific understanding of human nature. 
Roy's claim is that a radical humanist begins from himself. 
The practice of new humanism starts from the action and behavior 
of individuals. That has been the experience of the contemporary 
world. New humanism, being a materialist philosophy, rejects the 
idealist point of view. With new humanism, there is a unity of 
means and ends. There is no difference between means and ends.''^ 
Roy criticises the religious humanists' version of humanism. 
He goes against the thinkers of medieval period who made man 
incapable of realizing his creative potentialities. He points out that 
man derives his sovereignty not from any transcendental super-
physical being but from his own creative achievements and 
abilities."*^ 
Roy states that we should break the tradition accepted by 
earlier humanists. Because, if man is by nature subject to 
supernatural and superhuman powers beyond his comprehension, 
all attempts of placing him in the centre is meaningless. 
Furthermore, spiritual point of view is only a sublimation of 
slavery. It has been the evil genius of human history throughout. 
Radical humanism rejects the view that the affairs of the 
world are determined or influenced by any supernatural power. It 
believes that the future of man is determined not by divine will but 
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by natural forces. The most important of which is the force of the 
human will. Radical humanism also insists that man is an end in 
himself. He can not be required to merge into or sacrifice himself 
for any imaginary collective ego such as a nation, community or a 
class. It rejects the existence of any supernatural powers and 
traces all the mental attributes of man, including his will, reason 
and emotions to the millions of years of physico-biological 
evolution. 
Roy says that the modern age started with the renaissance 
which was a revolt of man against God. It came to a dead end 
because a God was made of man in the absence of a more 
scientific explanation of man. He says: 
What the world needs to-day is a new Renaissance, a 
revolt against those new mystic gods which man, or some 
men, or men in the mass, are supposed to be. Man has 
been made into gods, into kings and leaders and 
supermen. But never yet has man been satisfied and proud 
to be just man. When men will be content and proud that 
they are men, and that man is rational and has endless 
potentialities in him, then only shall we experience a 
reconstruction of society into an order of freedom as we 
want it to be."^ 
Roy is against religion and religious superstitions. In the 
past, humanism proclaimed the sovereignty of man but man 
remained unexplained. The speculations about the essence of man 
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led to mysticism and tlie revival of religion. Thus, humanism 
defeated itself. The view of Roy is that unless the chains of 
religion and superstitions are broken, there would be no chance for 
real humanism. Religion of any type, with God or without God, is 
against the very spirit of humanism. Religion represents an 
attitude of surrender which is undesirable for a happy growth of 
humanism. Each and every religion by necessity must assume some 
superhuman existence. Humanism which primarily assumes and 
emphasizes the primacy of man can not be based on the notion that 
there is something or someone higher than man himself.'*^ 
According to M. N. Roy, humanism must be an ethical 
philosophy. It must insist that man alone is responsible for what 
he is. Therefore, all values, in the last analysis, must be human. 
V Radical Humanism as a Post-Marxian Philosophy 
Although, Roy was influenced by Marxism in his early period, 
later on he became critical of it. According to him, Marxism could 
not be the horoscope of humanity. It was only a method to study 
and interpret history. From this point of view the radical 
humanism of Roy is a post-Marxian philosophy. Regarding its 
connection with Marxism, Roy himself said: 
The positive elements of Marxism, freed from its fallacies 
and clarified in the light of greater scientific knowledge, 
are consistent with a more comprehensive philosophy, 
which can be called integral or radical Humanism; a 
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philosophy which combines mechanistic cosmology, 
materialist metaphysics. secular rationalism and 
rationalist ethics to satisfy man's urge for freedom and 
quest for truth, and also to guide his future action in 
pursuit of the ideals.'''^ 
Furthermore, Roy points out that communism was no longer 
an unrealized Utopia. It has been experienced in what was 
happening in Soviet Russia. If a liberating revolution can not take 
place under the leadership of communism, and if we still want to 
work for a higher ideal that is the ideal of achieving human 
freedom, we should keep away from communism. 
Roy advocates the view that the degeneration of communist 
theory and practice is the result of its failure to understand the 
supreme importance of ideas in human progress. He insisted that 
materialism was not inconsistent with the role of ideas in human 
history as Marx thought. For ideas have their origin in the physical 
existence of man. 
Roy supports Protagorian view that man is the measure of all 
things. He says that though Protagoras said this more than 2500 
years ago, mankind seems to have forgotten it. The same, 
according to Roy, was repeated by Karl Marx, who is remembered 
as the prophet of proletarian dictatorship. Marx's theory, however, 
demands sacrifice of the individual at the altar of an imaginary 
collective ego. Roy says: 
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Karl Marx said: "Man is the root of mankind." That was 
even more explicit than what Protagoras had demanded as 
the criterion of all values. Karl Marx could improve upon 
the ancient sage, because he had greater scientific 
knowledge at his disposal. What does the principle mean? 
First comes man. then mankind; the individual is 
antecedent to society, which is the means for the 
unfolding of his potentialities in continuation of 
the process of pre-human biological evolution. The end 
should not be sacrificed for the means; the position of 
the individual is the measure of social progress. 
That is the philosophical essence of Marxian, the 
collectivist interpretation of which has become a form of 
totalitarianism.^' 
Marxian philosophy of humanism, according to Roy, is 
fallacious. It could not convince thinking people. Marx accepted 
collective ego. Society was to be recognised to promote collective 
progress. This libertarian philosophy of Marx provided sanction 
for the negation of the concept of freedom. It was done by denying 
the very existence of men and women as individuals. 
According to Roy, his own humanism is universal. He insists 
that the society depends upon the individual's bad or good. If the 
individuals are good, society will be good and vice-versa. He 
points out: 
New Humanism is a scientific integral philosophy. The 
human being is taken not only in the context of society, 
but of the whole Universe. It is not an anarchic 
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individualism, because a point has no existence 
except in space. Similarly, while individuals cannot exist 
independent of society, yet society is no more than an 
integration of individuals, and if you want a good society, 
you must have good individuals. Until now, we have put 
the cart before the horse, and said that we must have a 
good society in order to have good man. That led to the 
theory that in order to reconstruct society, we must 
capture power first, and tha^ this end justifies all means. 
At that point all "goodness" goes by the board. To make a 
good society even bad means are justified. But bad means 
spoil good men. In the process, good men become bad. 
And bad men cannot make a good society." 
Thus, Roy argues, Marx wants the sacrifice of individuals 
for the sake of society. According to Marx social progress is 
necessary for man otherwise mankind can not move forward. But 
what does all that mean? The individuals sacrificed for a 
collective ego can not be humanism. The philosophy of Marx, 
therefore, in which individual is sacrificed for the society is not 
humanism. Humanism must needs be all about man. Man is higher 
than anything else. Society is the creation of individuals. 
Therefore, the individual comes first. He is prior to society. 
Society is the means for attaining an end which is freedom and 
progress of the individual.^"^ 
Between individual and society Roy gives primacy to 
individual. This is because an individual is a biological being 
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while society is not. Tiie individual has consciousness and can 
experience pleasure or pain, progress or regress. He has cells in 
his brain. He also has an apparatus for thought and feeling which 
society does not posses. Society as an entity can not experience 
happiness or progress. Social happiness or social progress can 
have no meaning except as the sum total of the happiness or 
progress of the individuals who compose the society.^^ 
Roy argues that this consideration justifies the basic 
humanist principle that man is the measure of everything. The 
measure of things must be the individual who alone possesses the 
biological property of consciousness, and not any collectivity. 
According to Roy, this is not to underrate the importance of 
society. Because living in society is essential for the very survival 
of the individual. Apart from survival, society gives to the 
individual the gift of language. It enables him to be a co-
participant in the social heritage of knowledge and culture. 
Society is valuable to the extent to which it promotes the interests 
of the individuals. The value of the society is thus instrumental. 
Society is the means while the individual is the end. 
Roy, again, states that when it is said that society is for 
individual, it is not implied that society is for one individual or 
only some individuals. Society is for all individuals who compose 
it. The concept of equality is essential to social existence. If one 
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individual is an end in himself, and not the means to any higher 
end, every other individual will also be an end in himself. Society 
implies cooperative living, [t also involves duties as well as 
rights. But they must contribute equally to the good of all the 
individuals."^ 
It was assumed that individual consciousness was entirely 
created by society. Roy argues that if it is the case that individual 
consciousness is controlled by social norms, every society would 
be a closed system and there would be no scope for social norms. 
Roy gives the example of feudal and early capitalist 
societies. It was the time when social norms were rigid and 
families were under paternal domination. He says that several 
individuals revolted against the established tradition and became 
the pioneers of social reforms. Therefore, the view that individual 
consciousness is the creation of society is untenable in most of the 
liberal societies of today.^'' 
Roy is against collectivism. According to him, when the 
individual surrenders himself to the collectivity he becomes a 
storm trooper for the greater glory of the collectivity. That was 
how in Hitler's Germany the bulk of people surrendered to the 
fascist sate. They sacrificed themselves in trying to make it the 
most powerful state in the world. It caused death, destruction and 
untold suffering to millions of innocent people. 
142 
Furthermore, Roy states that the psychologies of religions 
and collectivism are similar. Because religion also demands the 
complete surrender of the individual to God. But the God of one 
religion must be more powerful than the God of another. It is 
collectivist rivalries which have led to religious v/ars in history.^^ 
The alternative to collectivism is not individual isolation. 
An isolated individual can achieve very little in the complex 
society of today. He has to associate with others for the 
satisfaction of his wants and the fulfilment of his aspirations. If he 
loves freedom and freethinking, his association with others takes a 
cooperative form. The cooperative form is not collective form. 
Cooperation involves both individual freedom and self-imposed 
discipline. 
The difference between collectivism and cooperation is basic 
to every form of social organisation. A social organisation is 
collectivist to the extent to which the constituent individuals 
retain their spirit of self-reliance. They also associate with others 
for the fulfilment of common objectives. While cooperation is 
consistent with the freedom and dignity of the individual, 
collectivism implies servility and self-surrender.^^ 
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VI Radical Humanism is Cosmopolitan 
Roy claims that his philosophy of humanism is cosmopolitan. 
Because the solution of the world crisis cannot be found within the 
boundaries of National States. He says: 
Therefore, we say that our philosophy is cosmopolitan 
Humanism; we say that the Indians cannot be free if the 
French or the Germans or the Russians remain enslaved. 
Our ideal can be realised only in a World State, 
in a Universal Brotherhood of Man in a co-operative 
commonwealth embracing the whole human race.^ *^ 
Thus, according to Roy, the whole world should be 
considered as a single state. If we shall have two or more than two 
kinds of it, we shall be moving towards the destruction of 
civilization and of humanity as whole. 
Roy rejects the capitalist as well as socialist nationalism as 
they both sacrifice the individual at the altar of collective ego. We 
must go back. A free society must be a brotherhood of free 
individuals. It should be based on the sovereignty of the 
individual. A cosmopolitan commonwealth of spiritually free men 
will not be limited by the boundaries of national states. Capitalist, 
fascist, socialist, communist or any other kind of nationalist 
revolution or theories will gradually disappear under the impact of 
the twentieth century Renaissance of Man.^' 
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Nationalism, according to Roy, is not the final stage in 
social philosophy. Nationalism is based on racial animosity. It is 
also reactionary to the extent that it neglects social question. 
Hence, in place of nationalism, world brotherhood is needed 
because a free man is not to be limited by the boundaries of the 
national states.^^ Roy makes a distinction between 
cosmopolitanism and internationalism. He pleads for a universal 
community or a cosmopolitan humanism. Internationalism 
postulates the existence of separate national states. But a true 
world order is possible only through the neutralization of nation 
s t a t e . " 
Roy opposes national state and supports internationalism. 
But, in the end, his internationalism merges into cosmopolitanism. 
It considers that the continuation of national states as 
incompatible with the ideal of one world. Roy insists that free men 
and women need no boundary of national states. Because 
nationalism is full of self-interest which is harmful for entire 
humanity that is not confined with any boundary. 
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Chapter 5 
A NEW PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 
I Marx's Dialectical Materialism 
'Dialectic ' is a process of reasoning based upon the analysis of 
opposing propositions. It regards the world as a complex of 
process in which things arise, exist and pass away. Socrates used 
the dialectical method of teaching by distinguishing between 
opinion and knowledge. Hegel and Marx developed dialectical 
conceptions of history. For Hegel opposing ideas were the key to 
understand the movement of history while Marx explained history 
in terms of the conflict of material forces. 
According to Dialectical Materialism of Marx, everything is 
in motion and interdependent. What causes motion is the self-
motivating capacity of matter. The law of inner contradictions 
prevails as a result of struggle between opposite forces. Changes 
take places quantitatively. These assume a qualitative form at a 
particular stage. Every stage of change is called revolution. It 
shows both a form of synthesis and a form of higher development. 
It leads to the recreation of the forces of inner conflict.^ 
Marx denied the possibility of any knowledge of the world 
that is not based on sense-experience. Hence, Marx's view of the 
world was naturalistic and opposed to any form of religion or 
supernaturalism. Again, Marx held that men are not immaterial 
souls. They are united with material bodies. ' 
According to Dialectical Materialism, reality is a process 
which moves according to the dialectical law of thesis, antithesis 
and synthesis. It espouses the view that causes produce effects and 
parts produce whole. They inter-react in such a manner that they 
modify and determine their natures. Theses and antitheses are both 
the cause and the effect of each other. And syntheses are the new 
situations created by them and creating their interplay. 
Though Marx takes his dialectical concept from Hegel, he 
rejects Hegel's dialectical process in terms of ideas. According to 
Hegelian idealism the world was the embodiment of an absolute 
idea. While Marx's philosophical materialism holds that the world 
is by its very nature material. The multiple phenomena of the 
world constitute different forms of matter and motion. The world 
develops in accordance with laws of movement of matter. 
Therefore, there is no need of a universal spirit. But, according to 
Hegel, mind really exists and material world exists only in our 
mind. In dialectical materialism of Marx, matter is an objective 
reality. It exists outside and independent of our mind. Matter is 
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primary and mind is secondary. Thought is a product of matter, 
and brain is the organ of thought. 
Marx's dialectical method attempted to explain the 
oppositions in the forces of history in its own terms. In the current 
politico-economic situation, the dictatorship of the capitalist 
bourgeoisie will give way to the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
The capitalist wealth will pass into the hands of many. But this 
can be accomplished only if private property is abolished and if all 
properly becomes public property. This end can be achieved by a 
world revolution. The proletariat throughout the world will have to 
make conscious efforts and revolt against the present system to 
achieve the socialist goal. 
The capitalist bourgeoisie possessing capital is the thesis. 
The destruction of the capitalist bourgeoisie is the antithesis. A 
classless society will be the new synthesis. Its emergence will be a 
long and painful process filled with privation and suffering and 
bloodshed.^ 
II Dialectics Contradicts Materialism 
Roy rejects dialectics because, according to him, it contradicts the 
philosophy of materialism. Dialectics implies that change in the 
process of nature takes place through contradiction. In other 
words, the concept of dialectics leads to the proposition that 
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"movement is contradiction." This is absurd. The absurdity 
becomes evident when we ask: 'contradiction of what?' 
Roy says that the modern physical science has proved that 
matter in motion is a m.etaphysical concept. He, therefore, 
contends that dialectics bases itself on the metaphysical concept. 
It is again based on a hypothesis of motion. Therefore, dialectics, 
whether as logic or as ontology, was bound to be a myth. 
Materialistic logic is a contradiction in terms. Logic is the law of 
thought and thought is not material thing. It is idealistic by its 
nature.^ 
Roy argues that Marxism is not true to its philosophical 
tradition. It vulgarises materialism to the extent of denying basic 
moral values. Marx introduced teleology in history with the 
impersonal concept of the forces of production. He contradicted 
his own belief that man is the maker of history. Marxian 
materialism admitted the fallacies which Marx inherited from 
Hegel. Although the dialectic may give valuable insights into the 
history of human development it is not scientific at all. 
Marx is also mistaken in his belief in the theory of 
mechanistic naturalism. The dialectical approach to unfolding 
reality gave Marxism a semblance of nominal materialism. As Roy 
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said, "the point of departure of the Marxist historiology was the 
mistake of confounding physical urge with economic urge." ' 
Roy argues that Marx and Engeis took over from Hegel much 
more than the evolutionary side of his philosophy. But the 
dialectical process of history can never be independent of the 
dynamics of thought. Marx inherited from Hegel a considerable 
element of Idealism together with the dialectical method. Roy 
criticises Marx by saying: 
The feat of having reversed Hegelian dialectics so as to 
manufacture Materialism out of Idealism was a figment of 
imagination. As a matter of fact, there is little of essential 
difference between Hegel's idealistic conception of the 
revolutionary process of history and the Marxist doctrine 
of historical determinism.* 
It was Hegel who first expounded the doctrine of the identity 
of thought and being. It was taken over by Marx and Engeis as one 
of the fundamental principles of their dialectical materialism. It is 
an essentially Hegelian dialectical doctrine. 
Marx found in Hegelian dialectics philosophical support for 
his theory of revolution. Therefore, dialectics become his sole 
criterion for judging all other philosophies. Dialectics is an 
idealistic conception. Revolutions are not brought about by men. 
They are predetermined. Dialectical materialism of Marx, 
according to Roy, is materialistic in name only. Dialectic being its 
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cornerstone, it remains an idealistic system. Therefore, Marx's 
conception of Dialectical Materialism does not seem appropriate.^ 
Roy points out that Marxism was not a new philosophy. 
Dialectical Materialism which Marx proclaimed as a new 
philosophy was not new at all. Because it was Ludwig Feuerbach 
(a 19"' century German philosopher) who first revolted against 
Hegelian idealism. He is generally recognized in the history of 
philosophy as the pioneer of 19"^ century materialist revival. 
Therefore, Feuerbach was the first who rejected the Hegelian 
conception of the dialectical process of history as the self-
realization of ideas. Searching for the origin of idea was the 
motive power of history. Feuerbach located it in social 
anthropology. Thus, Feuerbach's book entitled Philosophy of the 
Future came to be known as Dialectical Materialism as against the 
dialectical idealism of Hegel. Marx borrowed his philosophy from 
both Hegel and Feuerbach. From Hegel he borrowed the dialectical 
view of history and from Feuerbach the conception of materialism. 
He used it as an ideology of the rising proletariat.'^ 
Roy mentions that the ideas have their autonomy and a logic 
of their own which is not dialectical but dynamic. Marxism was 
not a negation of the older ideas. Without those ideas there could 
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be no Marxism. The laws of the dynamics of ideas cannot be 
called dialectical." 
According to Roy, Marxism was not the product of mind of 
one individual. It drew the totality of human thought and human 
activity of the three to four hundred years. It preceded the time of 
Karl Marx. Since then, the human knowledge has advanced. The 
discoveries of modern physics appear to have undermined the 
foundation of materialist philosophy. Some hypotheses of the 
nineteenth century physics have proved to be false and new facts 
have been discovered. Roy suggests that Marxist materialism must 
be accordingly revised. There is nothing in the teachings of Karl 
Marx that prohibits such a revision. Such indeed was the need of 
the advanced state of knowledge.'^ 
Marx gave a solution of the problem of dualism. The 
significance of Marx's contribution to philosophical thought is 
clear. Scientifically, mind presupposes the existence of life. 
Therefore, the world of mind cannot be independent of the world 
of matter. They are but two aspects of the same world. Roy says: 
Matter, as a conceptual metaphysical category is the 
ultimate reality, capable of producing life. Consciousness, 
cognition, mind, ideas follow in course of biological 
evolution. The world of experience as a whole is real; 
transcendental reality is a figment of imagination. Mind as 
well as matter, the physical world as well as the world of 
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thought and ideas, are equally real. But philosophy must 
have a realistic scientific understanding of their relation.'^ 
Roy insists that philosophy must be monistic. Because 
monistic metaphysics does not preclude pluralism in the process of 
becoming. Only a materialist metaphysics can be strictly monistic. 
Marx's proposition that consciousness is determined by 
materialist metaphysics is based on a sound scientific foundation. 
Marx rejected eighteenth century materialism as mechanical. It 
was done by Marx under the influence of Hegelian dialectics. 
Therefore, Marx himself was not sufficiently aware of his spiritual 
ancestry.''' 
Ill Rejection of the Historical Determinism of Marx 
According to historical materialism, the structure of society and 
its historical development are determined by "the material 
conditions of life." In other words it can be said that the structure 
of society and its historical development are determined by "the 
mode of production of the material means of existence." 
Marx wrote in the Preface to the first edition of Das Capital 
that he conceived "the development of the economic structure of 
society to be a natural process." This is the main force of the 
adjective "materialist" in the phrase "materialistic conception of 
history." Marx used the word "materialist" to make a contrast with 
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what is supernatural, metaphysical or speculative. He believed that 
general science of human society could be worked out only by 
describing and explaining society in empirical terms. Therefore, 
Marx gave the writing of history a materialist basis. 
Thus, the materialist conception of history is intended to be 
a naturalistic, empirical and scientific account. It explains 
historical events which takes industrial and economic factors as 
basic. It would seem that nothing could be more consonant with 
scientific common sense, nothing less metaphysical or speculative. 
Historical materialism has been regarded as a method of 
investigating the facts of history. It is an established historical 
hypothesis of great generality and a deduction from materialism, 
specially from dialectical materialism. Thus the doctrine of class 
struggle is regarded by Marxists as a vital feature of historical 
materialism. Change in the means of production provide the clue 
to class struggles and social revolutions. From it, new forms of 
life and thought are born.'^ 
For Roy, almost all the major shortcomings and failures of 
Marxism can be traced to the theory of economic determinism (or 
the so-called materialist interpretation of history). It is the corner-
stone of Marxian philosophy that says that the economic structure 
of society is characterised by the ownership of the means of 
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production. And the class relations arise from there. It constitutes 
the basic reality. Moral principles and cultural values are the 
reflections of that basic economic reality. They have little 
independent force of their own. Men and women act according to 
their economic (class) interests. Consequently, the history of 
civilization has been the history of class struggles. A revolution 
takes place as a historical necessity when the existing property 
relations act lo stop the growth of productive forces. 
According to Roy, it is necessary to point out that economic 
interpretation of history was not a logical deduction from 
materialist philosophy. Materialism (which is referred to as 
monistic naturalism) does not accept the duality of matter and 
ideas. Roy states that materialism recognises ideas as the product 
of the human brain. Ideas, therefore, are as materialistic (i.e. 
naturalistic) as any other part of the total physical reality. 
Furthermore, Roy insists that materialism does not require 
that the role of ideas in the course of history should be under-
rated. Ideas should not be regarded as mere superstructure. They 
are reared on the basic economic reality and have independent 
force of their own. In fact, with the growth of language and 
literature and with the increase in the cultural exchanges, the role 
of ideas in the shaping of history is increasing.'^ 
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Historical determinism which is derived from dialectical 
materialism is a teleological concept. Historical necessity has 
always a teleological implication. The concept of force which is 
implicit in the idea of economic determinism has turned out to be 
metaphysical. The conceptual picture of the physical universe does 
not make room for the hypothetical category of force.'^ 
According to Roy, the purpose of applying dialectics to 
history is to prove that everything is permissible for bringing 
about revolutionary change. History should not be looked merely 
from economic point of view. Because from economic point of 
view, only one aspect of history is seen. It must be studied as the 
process of integral human evolution - mental, intellectual and 
social. Roy insists to trace the parallel currents of ideal and 
physical events. New ideas inspire action for the destruction of 
established economic relations and the creation of new ones. Karl 
Marx, according to Roy, himself could not deny that. A new 
system of ideas grows out of older system. That is to say that ideas 
have a history of their own. The relation between the growth of a 
new ideology and the rise of a new social class is not causal, it is 
accidental.'^ 
Roy, disagreeing with orthodox Marxists view, claims that 
materialism cannot be identified with economic determinism. It 
162 
does not explain every aspeci of social evolution. It is only 
applicable to society. Roy makes his materialist philosophy a 
cosmological conception, capable of explaining the entire scheme 
of nature. It also includes the entire society. Roy says: 
Now I can only add that, unless some or any of you would 
or could still not see that difference and insist that a 
partially true method of interpreting history should be 
considered to be the whole of materialist philosophy, no 
fundamental fault could be found in the Theses.' ' 
Roy argues that he studied the history of ideas critically and 
carefully. He studied it since the earliest founders of philosophy 
upto Karl Marx. But he claims that he does not find any 
justification to deny the history of ideas. It can stand by itself 
without any reference to social and political history as its 
incentive. On the contrary, Hegel was nearer to the truth than Karl 
Marx when he said that the history of philosophy is the history of 
civilization. 
Roy insists that philosophy is the most powerful instrument 
in the writing of history as a science. Philosophy is the history of 
language and the history of language is the history of thought. 
History of thought is history of ideas. Therefore, Roy argues that 
we can write history only when we know the history of ideas.^° 
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Roy does not think that materialist philosophy justifies the 
economic interpretation of history. The most important part of 
materialist philosophy is monism. While economic determinism of 
Marx is a dualist conception. Therefore, it cannot be deduced from 
materialism. The conception of causality must be freed from the 
fallacy of dualism. Causality must be conceived as a function of 
the physical and social processes and proved to be so. If it implies 
two things, one acting upon the other, there is no escape from the 
unreasonable empiricism of Bertrand Russell, for instance Roy 
calls it pan-empiricism and says: 
We can defend the proposition against pan-empiricism only 
by proving that a certain biological organism, by virtue of 
its own structure, produces black feathers. So long as a 
bird is constructed as a crow is constructed, it must be 
black. Causality is not an empirical, but a logical concept. 
Economic determinism cannot be established either 
empirically or logically. 
Marx's theory of economic determinism leads to an absurd 
conclusion. In practice, it becomes a negation of the Marxist 
Utopia. The state did not wither away under communism. The 
economic interpretation of history is proved to be false. This 
scheme of political practice and social reconstruction can not 
serve the purpose of the struggle for freedom for a long time.^^ 
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Roy points out that previously everything in this world was 
traced to some super-human power. Marx traced it into the means 
of production. But, according to him, man came into the world 
with another means of production that was most powerful one. 
That was his brain which was a creation neither of social-
economic forces nor of God. The brain is the most powerful means 
of production. 
The human brain is the most basic and powerful means of 
production by birth. It was not produced by man himself but 
inherited from his animal ancestry. Man produced the first non-
biological means of production with the help of that weapon. But 
for setting the fate of humanity, man takes into calculation 
everything except man. Roy tells it the defect of Marxism, as of 
all other forms of philosophy. It is the defect that the world has 
come to its being on itself.'^ ^ 
Marx determined everything economically. But if it is so, 
Roy asks, how man can make a revolution at all? Events will 
follow, one after another. Man will have nothing to do with them. 
He is a mere puppet in the hand of economic providence. But 
recognition of the sovereignty of man is inherent in the very idea 
of revolution. If capitalism breaks down and socialism grows in its 
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place, Marx must admit the sovereignty of man in the causal 
process of history. 
The first means of production was created in the monkey's 
brain. It was neither of super-human origin nor was economically 
determined. Man is not an economic being. Even today the 
"economic man" is a fiction. The origin of the human species was 
undoubtedly physically determined but economic determinism 
should not be confounded with physical determinism.^'* 
What is emphasised by Roy here is that economic 
determinism does not follow the basic philosophy of materialism 
or monistic naturalism. It is derived from a misinterpretation of 
that philosophy and from the unjustified assumption that what is 
physical is the genuine reality and what is mental is merely its 
"reflection." But the fact, according to Roy, is that ideas are the 
creation of matter. 
Marx identified the primitive man's intelligent effort to earn 
a livelihood with the biological struggle for existence. He came to 
the conclusion that the origin of society and human development 
were economically motivated. Roy tells it is the mistake of 
confounding physical urge with economic motive. It was also the 
point of Roy's departure from the Marxist historiology. 
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Roy states that after the origin of the species, homo sapiens 
were not moved by any economic motive. They were moved by the 
biological urge of self-preservation. Man earned the means of 
subsistence. He devised primitive tools out of sheer physical 
necessity. Roy again argues that anthropological research does not 
show any economic motive in human struggle for existence in the 
earlier stages of social evolution. What it does show is that the 
struggle for physical existence encourages mental development. 
Consciousness and other rudiments of mind are a biological 
heritage. They are antecedent to the appearance of homo sapiens. 
Thus, further evolution is determined by the physical conditions of 
the being and becoming of man. 
Roy, therefore, argues that economic determinism of history 
from the origin of society can not be logically deduced from that 
fact. In other words, economic determinism is not a corollary to 
materialism. Moreover, it is opposite to humanism. Because it 
subordinates man to the operation of the impersonal forces of 
production. In an economically determined society man is not a 
producer but a means of production. 
IV Place of Ideas in Materialist Philosophy 
M. N. Roy's materialism or monistic naturalism postulates that life 
has evolved from lifeless matter. Materialism gives primacy to 
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matter. Matter existed before consciousness emerged. Idealism, on 
the other hand, gives primacy to mind or ideas. In its monistic 
form, idealism denies the separate existence of matter. 
Roy argues that Marx gave primacy to matter over mind in 
his materialist philosophy. It led Marx to the conclusion that 
ideologies prevailing in a society are the super-structure of the 
basic economic system. But, according to Roy, materialist 
philosophy does not lead to that conclusion. The primacy given by 
materialism to matter over mind is only a primacy in time. It is not 
primacy in terms of relative importance. Like lifeless matter, the 
human mind and the ideas which it conceives are also a part of the 
total reality. There is nothing in materialist philosophy which 
justifies the conclusion that one part of reality is more important 
than the other.^^ 
Roy rejects the view that the human mind reflects the 
external physical reality. If the role of the mind was merely to act 
as a mirror of the rest of nature, there would be no quantitative 
difference between the mental capacity of human beings and other 
animals. The human mind has superior thinking power. It also 
plays a creative role. It not only observes but also formulates 
hypotheses and tries them out. Therefore, it is man's creative 
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reason, his ideas, which have led to the accumulation of 
knowledge and the power which goes with it. 
Roy claims that the super-structure theory of Marx is also 
based on another fallacy. The theory assumes that the system of 
ideas current in any society at a given time is the reflection of 
only the economic system which prevails at the time. Roy says 
that this assumption is equally unjustified. Because ideas are not 
only influenced by the current situation but also by previous ideas. 
There is a logical connection between ideas of the past and 
present. So the entire history of philosophy can be traced by 
showing how former philosophers and scientists have influenced 
the ideas of their successors. However, ideas are referred back to 
the contemporary social and natural surroundings. They are 
modified when any modification is required. But they are not 
wholly derived from or influenced by those surroundings. 
Thus, Roy observes that even the ideas of Marx disprove the 
super-structure theory. They, in the first place, were not a mere 
super-structure. Because they were in conflict with the prevailing 
capitalist system. Secondly, they were derived to a considerable 
extent from the ideas of previous thinkers. 
Roy further observes that the super-structure theory suffers 
from yet another fallacy. It assumes that while the super-structure 
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is ideological or mental, the basic economic system is physical. 
That is not the case. The economic system, even according to 
Marxism, does not merely consist of the means of production. It 
consists of the ownership of these means. Now, the ownership is 
social convention. It is based on ideas which are translated into 
laws. The concept of ownership and the laws on which it is based 
are also ideological. There is no reason why the ideas which result 
in the ownership of the means of production should have a greater 
primacy over the value systems that call for a change in the 
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pattern of ownership. 
Roy points out that to give primacy to the means of 
production over ideas created by human mind is clearly 
unhistorical. Who after all created the means of production? 
Clearly, it is the human brain that is the main instrument of 
production. Because it produces ideas which enable man to satisfy 
his needs and to achieve success in life. 
Thus, we see that Roy gives equal importance to the ideas 
while upholding the doctrine of materialism. Ideas have certainly 
their own history and their own importance. He says: 
If we agree that ideas cannot be simply dismissed as the 
super-structure raised, from time to time, on the shifting 
foundation of changing economic relations, we cannot 
come to a common conclusion on all other points. That is 
170 
the point of departure of our philosophy, and in that it 
differs from orthodox Marxism. 
Roy, therefore, says that materialism does not deny the 
objective reality of ideas. If the ideas are not mere byproducts of 
ever changing economic relations, they must have a history of 
their own. Roy calls it dynamics of ideas. Throughout the history, 
new ideas are found to inspire actions. 
Roy writes against the prejudices of the previous materialist 
philosophy. He says that the materialist philosophy does not 
warrant the contention that ideas do not have an independent 
existence of their own. The development of ideas is a logical 
process from the birth of humanity until present days. It is so 
without referring causally to social movements. Roy points out: 
I categorically reject the view that ethical values, cultural 
patterns, movements of ideas, are mere ideological super-
structures raised to justify established economic relations. 
It has been asserted that causal relations between ideas and 
historical events can be established. Yes, but in the reverse 
direction, not in Marxist sense. If you mean that sort of 
causal connection, where ideas have the causative force, 
then you throw away the economic interpretation of 
history...in that sense, there is a relation between the 
movement of ideas and what we call social dynamics.^' 
Roy says that he is a confirmed and unmitigated materialist. 
He is of the opinion that materialism is the only philosophy that is 
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possible and that is plausible. Any other philosophy takes the 
physical universe into the wilderness of a mystical metaphysics. 
It prescribes God and speaks of a created world. It does 
not make any difference whether the creation is understood 
anthropomorphically or pantheistically. 
Roy argues that all systems of philosophy other than 
materialism are dishonest religion. Philosophy ultimately reaches 
a point where it must yield place to faith. Therefore, materialism 
must be raised above the level of the vulgarity of dogmatic 
orthodoxy.•'^ 
Roy's philosophy of materialism traces the origin of human 
evolution to the material forces of physical universe. But he 
differentiates it from Marxist materialist determinism. He 
recognises the autonomy of mental world in the context of 
physical nature. Roy says: 
In building up a social philosophy on the basis of 
materialism, we do not allot a subsidiary role to ideas. 
Originating in the pre-human stage of biological evolution, 
emotion and intelligence are decisive factors of social and 
historical progress. The behaviour of human being is 
determined by the autonomous movement of ideas as well 
as the dynamics of social evolution. They influence each 
other continuously; history can be regarded as an organic 
process only in that sense."^' 
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Roy, therefore, calls history a rational process because it is made 
by man. If man can never know how he will behave in a given 
situation, he cannot make a science of history. 
Since Roy rejects the view that historical events are 
determined only by economic relations, he does not apply that 
standard to the realm of ideas. Roy also rejects the Marxian 
doctrine that moral values, cultural patterns, aesthetic tastes are 
all ideological super-structure of economic relations. If these were 
super-structures of the economic relations of the bourgeois 
society, they are the outcome of capitalism. But what is the fact? 
The so called bourgeois philosophy, i.e. the modern Idealism rose 
before the establishment of the capitalist social order. Roy claims 
that Karl Marx may have put Hegel on his feet, but he has placed 
himself on the head.^^ 
Roy insists that ideas have a logical dynamics of their own. 
They have been influenced in social experience and social and 
historical events. They, therefore, have their own roots. They are 
also the structures that stand by themselves. Roy relates these to 
the material process of history and life. He says: 
If we cannot trace the dynamics of ideas somewhere within 
the limits of the physical universe, then we land in 
Idealism. If they cannot be related to the material process 
of history and life, then they must be traced to some super-
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natural or metaphysical origin, and we relapse into 
religion. Therefore, we point out how ideation takes place, 
how ideas are born. Epistemologically, we reject Idealism, 
and Idealism can stand only epistemologically. Any other 
sanction for it is very shaky. Idealist epistemology could 
hold its ground until recently because of the backwardness 
of biological knowledge. 
Ideas, according to Roy, are not simply given. The physical 
structure of man grows out of the background of inanimate nature. 
Similarly, man's reason and his emotions can also be traced to the 
process of pre-human biological evolution and to the common 
foundation of the physical universe. 
According to Roy, the creation of the first extra-organic 
means of production was accomplished by an animal with highly 
developed brain. It was capable of thought. Therefore, an idea 
preceded the creation of the first means of production. The process 
of economic determinism cannot be traced beyond this stage. The 
foundation of economic life was just being laid. Therefore, the 
origin of ideas is to be discovered outside that process. Thus, Roy 
holds that it was an idea in the brain of the ancestor of man that 
started the process of the structuring of economic relations and not 
the other way round. 
Roy interprets history without teleology. By doing that, Roy 
does not leave the ground of materialism to fall into metaphysical 
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idealism. On the contrary, Roy claims that by doing that he solves 
one of the baffling problems of philosophy. That is the problem of 
dualism. There is no difference between the living and the non-
living world. Roy reduces everything to one unity.'''* 
V Sociology of Class-Struggle 
Roy casts doubts on the sociology of class struggle. There have 
been different social classes in history. But besides the force of 
social tension and struggle there has also been operative a social 
cohesive bond. Furthermore, the failure of contemporary society to 
get divided into antithetical sectors as prophesied in the 
Communist Manifesto also raised doubts upon the Marxist thesis. 
Roy regards socialism as an ideology conceived by middle-
class intellectuals. The decay of capitalism economically relieved 
the middle classes. It quickened in their minds a desire for a new 
social order. There is no proof of an inevitable connection between 
the rise of the middle classes and their perception of the need for 
social revolution. The pre-Marxian socialists who formulated the 
fundamental theses of socialism were not members of middle 
class. 
Marx has also been proved to be a false prophet in his 
statement regarding the disappearance of the middle class. As a 
matter of fact, the expansion of the economic process also leads to 
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the increase in the numbers of the middle class. The cultural and 
political leadership of the middle class is a patent fact of post 
1919 world history.^^ 
The middle class, moreover, has been improving not only in 
numbers and economically but also socially, culturally and 
politically. After the World War I, the role of middle class has 
become more important socially and politically in different 
countries of the world in comparison to before. He says: 
The prophesy that the middle class would disappear in the 
course of time has been not borne out by history. On the 
contrary, the intellectual and political importance of the 
middle class proved to be decisive in the critical period 
ushered in by the first world war. The concentration of the 
ownership of the means of production in fewer hands 
necessarily enlarged the middle class. But all those who are 
deprived of the privileges of capitalist exploitation are not 
proletarianised.^^ 
Roy describes socialism as a middle class ideology. The 
middle class was prepared to join the proletariat in the fight for 
socialism. By which they did not mean state capitalism but a more 
equitable social order. They were not culturally proletarianised. 
They were capable of appreciating cultural and moral values as the 
positive outcome of human civilization. And they would not 
sacrifice that precious heritage in the name of economic 
determinism. 
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According to economic determinism, the proletariat must be 
the most backward class intellectually and culturally. Marx said 
that the establishment of socialism could improve the possibility 
of intellectual and cultural development of proletariat. Roy argues 
against this claim. According to him, Marxism gives to the 
proletariat the role of leading society towards a higher 
civilization. This is a palpable contradiction. It is also compelling 
middle class intellectual to sink to the intellectual and cultural 
level of the proletariat.''^ 
According to Roy, other classes are being guided by middle 
classes in the society. It is the only class which is able to rule. The 
leadership of the society comes naturally to this class. Because 
middle class is the backbone of the revolutionary work.''^ 
Roy was critical of the Marxian principle of class struggle 
because he admitted the existence of classes with diverse interests. 
He argues that the cohesive forces are also as much inherent in 
society as the forces of conflict. The centrifugal tendency is 
counteracted by the centripetal tendency. In the history of social 
evolution, an equilibrium between the two creates stability. The 
disagreement and disharmony led either to the establishment of 
dictatorship or other autocratic forms of government or to social 
disintegration. If there were no cohesive force in society, mankind 
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would have been rather governed by the law of the jungle. Roy 
here claims that the entire history of society shows that the 
cohesive force has always been more or less in operation. 
Otherwise, there could be no history of civilization. Ancient 
civilization broke down because the forces of social cohesion and 
harmony were overwhelmed by strong centrifugal tendencies. 
Roy denounced the theory of dictatorship of the proletariat. 
In fact, he laid emphasis on the individual more than the class 
whether it be the working class or middle class. His view was that 
the conflict of present age was between totalitarianism and 
democracy, between class and individual struggling for freedom. 
He, in fact, gave pride of place to the middle class rather than the 
proletariat. 
Roy criticised Marxian emphasis on revolution. It led to the 
dictatorship of proletariat. The revolution itself was an act that led 
to totalitarianism. In his opinion, revolutions could not bring 
miracles. However, he did not discard revolutions altogether. As a 
radical humanist, he himself believed that a revolution should be 
brought about not through class struggle or armed violence but 
through education which included all modes of persuasion of the 
masses. His view was that there is an element of voluntary 
romanticism in revolutions. Revolutions represent collective 
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emotions. They are exaltation of human efforts to remake the 
world. 
Economic crises predicted by Marx for bourgeois society did 
not happen. Moreover, Roy claims that the communist prophecy of 
a classless and stateless society did not come true in the first 
communist state, i.e. Soviet Russia. The bourgeois society 
survived all changes and state socialism turned oppressive and 
tyrannical in Russia. Instead of the state disappearing or even 
restructuring itself in terms of diffusion of political power, it had 
become strong. Power had been concentrated in the state.^^ 
M. N. Roy says that the central issue of bourgeoisie versus 
the proletariat, capital versus labour should not be our main 
concern. Because the oppositions have never been the same. The 
issue that has to be settled is different. It is so because the Marxist 
analysis ignored the attitudinal changes that occur in the middle 
class in capitalist society. The middle class loses its faith in 
capitalism in the period of decay. It is not proletarianised in the 
intellectual and cultural sense at any rate. It remains loyal to the 
values of bourgeois culture. It remains same even when it is losing 
faith in capitalist economy. It feels the necessity of a social 
revolution but not like the proletarian type. This change in the 
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attitudes of the middle class is the conclusive evidence of 
decomposition of the capitalist order. 
Roy thinks that Marxism cannot move the middle class 
towards the ideal of social reconstruction. The cultural tradition of 
modern mankind and universal ethical values must be given 
importance in the philosophy of revolution.''^ 
Roy claims that on the basis of fallacious interpretation of 
history, Marx set up the theory of class struggle. It became the 
cardinal article of faith in Marxism. The history of the civilized 
world is the history of class struggle. It develops into the struggle 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Marx claims the later 
will overthrow the former and establish a classless society. But a 
classless society will be stagnant. Because, according to Marxism, 
class struggle is the lever of all progress. Roy here argues that: 
In a classless society, the dialectics of history will cease to 
operate; progress will come to a standstill; humanity will 
die. Marxism, as understood and expounded by its dogmatic 
apostles as the last word of wisdom, the final truth, is thus 
not the philosophy of freedom, but a sentence of death for 
mankind.*' 
Roy claims that Marx's idea of class struggle contains wrong 
words to express his great ideal of power. Because if a class 
captured power to suppress other classes, it can never be deprived 
of power. Therefore, dictatorship of the proletariat was an 
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inappropriate term to express Marx's idea. It was bound to defeat 
its end. His general view of Communist Party as well as of 
communism is as follows: 
The communist party did not rise as an association of 
philosophers, acting as instruments of philosophy remaking 
the world; to reconstruct the world rationally as a 
commonwealth of free moral men replacing the greedy 
economic men of the modern fable. Instead of becoming an 
association of spiritually free men striving to make others 
conscious of the urge for freedom inherent in themselves, 
the Communist Party was fascinated by the prospect of 
capturing power and wielding it dictatorially in the name of 
the proletariat.'*^ 
Marxian concept of classless society and economic 
reconstruction always involves talk about independence and 
freedom of nation. But Roy asks why should men sacrifice so 
much for national independence. Socialism or communism can 
never create heaven on the earth. The transfer of the ownership of 
the means of production from individuals to a National State or 
Class State cannot solve the problems of men. Roy, therefore, calls 
class struggle as a vulgar struggle for power. As a movement for 
social reconstruction, it suffered defeats after defeats.'*^ 
Roy claims that in Marxian theory of economic determinism 
it is forgotten that the struggle for economic betterment is part of 
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the struggle for freedom. Men are treated as economic beings and 
not as the whole human beings that they really are/'* 
The Marxian historiology consists of the theory of two 
elements, one subjective and the other objective. The subjective 
element is expressed in the famous statement in the Communist 
Manifesto that "the history of all hitherto existing society is the 
history of class struggle." The objective element is expressed in 
the dialectical view. It is that every economic system generates 
forces which overthrow it and give birth to a higher economic 
order."^ 
First of these elements i.e. the theory of class struggle 
assumes that all persons are only actuated by the economic motive. 
In a capitalist society, the working class as well as the capitalist 
class act according to their respective interests. They are, 
therefore, engaged in class struggle. The determining factor there 
is the economic motive. Therefore, Roy claims, that both the 
subjective and objective elements in Marxian historiology assume 
that man is an economic animal. 
But Marxian historiology is only a half truth. Man is 
influenced by the economic motive, but that is not his sole 
motivation. Man requires bread for his existence, but he does not 
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live by bread alone. The humanness of man, if properly 
understood, would lead to a different historiology. 
Marxian statement that human history is the history of class 
struggle is only partially true. Because, according to Roy, the 
entire development of scientific knowledge falls outside the 
history of class struggle. It is so from the discovery of how to 
make fire to the latest discoveries relating to inter-planetary 
flights. This is also true of the history of literature and all other 
cultural and ethical pursuits. Roy finds again that even in 
economic affairs, man's motives are not always selfish. Because 
several employers treat workers as human beings. In the relation 
between employers and employees, there is an element of 
cooperation as well as antagonism. 
Roy rejects the view that whole human history is the history 
of class struggle. He says that human history is the history of 
man's struggle for freedom. The struggle for freedom is a 
continuation on the human plane of the biological struggle for 
existence. Because struggle for existence is the basic urge of all 
biological species and man is a part of the biological world. Such 
a view of history, according to Roy, covers man's struggle for 
physical existence. It also covers man's intellectual, artistic and 
ethical pursuits.'*^ 
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VI Criticism of the Dictatorship of Proletariat 
Marx visualised the establishment of the dictatorship of proletariat 
after the end of capitalist system. But present scenario, according 
to Roy, is absolutely opposite. The power of labour class is 
nothing before the power of capital. Moreover, if the power and 
dictatorship of proletariats was established, will it ensure the 
freedom and personal dignity of man? 
Roy says that the victory of the proletariat is not inevitable. 
Because a proletarian revolution as visualised by Marx did not 
occur in any industrially advanced country. And non-proletarian 
revolutions under communist leadership did take place in 
industrially underdeveloped countries like Russia in 1917 and 
China in 1947. 
Roy claims that the Russian Revolution was not a proletarian 
revolution. The Chinese Revolution was even more clearly a 
peasant revolt, the proletariat having been wholly out of the 
picture. In both cases, the most revolutionaries came from a 
section of the middle class who formed the communist parties. 
Therefore, the whole communist movement has always been a 
predominately middle class movement. It consisted of persons who 
cared little for economic gain for themselves. Therefore, they 
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disproved by their own motivation the theory of economic 
determinism/^ 
According to Marx, the state is a coercive machinery in the 
hands of the dominant economic class. The function of the 
proletariat will be only to use the minimum necessary force. It will 
be necessary force required to liquidate the capitalist class and, 
subsequently, to establish a classless society.'** 
Marx postulated proletarian dictatorship. It was supposed to 
work as the instrument for breaking down the resistance of the 
bourgeoisie. But what would happen thereafter? How the post-
revolutionary society would be politically organised? And how 
will it be administered? It again was all left to the operation of the 
determined and yet incalculable forces of history. Marx evaded the 
political issue by setting up the Utopia of a state that he said 
would wither away.'*' 
In Roy's opinion the non-proletarian periphery was 
alienated. It seriously weakened the communist movement that 
became completely subservient to the pragmatism of the Soviet 
State. Its function was no longer to promote world revolution. It 
rather aimed to achieve whatever was necessary for the 
opportunist policy of the new Russian National State, which 
claimed to be socialist. 
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The interest of the state established by the first proletarian 
revolution acted against the possibility of world revolution. 
Socialism in one country prevented the realisation of the ideal of 
international communism,^° 
Roy opposes Marxian way which declassed individuals. Men 
coming from the bourgeois class have been broken away from that 
class and made to join another class that is proletariat. But Roy 
argues that it is not the process in which men are declassed. 
Because men still attach themselves to a new class. Roy criticizes 
Marx saying that he could not elaborate the idea. The idea of 
declassed individuals can be traced back to Plato. Plato was the 
first philosopher who realised that a society could be ideal if it 
had completely detached individuals from their social boundary. ^' 
According to Roy, Marxian scheme of proletarian 
dictatorship had a striking resemblance with the Platonic Utopia. 
Karl Marx proposed the communist party to function as the 
philosophers of the proletariat. In this regard, Roy states that 
proletariat may capture power in a country. But there is no 
guarantee that the proletarians will be freed. Because when the 
proletariat captures power and its dictatorship is established, the 
class delegates power to an organised wilful minority which calls 
itself the party. In the name of class, the party becomes the new 
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ruler. The proletarian state becomes its vested interest. Therefore, 
the state does not wither away as visualised in the scheme of the 
proletarian revolution. That minority rule becomes permanent. 
Roy does not identify Marxism with communism. Marxism is 
a philosophy whereas communism is only a political practice. It is 
the means to an end. Socialism or communism means common 
ownership of the means of production. It becomes a practical 
possibility only upon the socialization of the process of production 
itself. Consequently, Roy examines the question of private 
property. Roy finds its origin in "individually performed labour." 
But when industrial development attains a stage where labour is no 
longer performed individually, the idea of private property loses 
all its meaning. Private property as a moral right and socially 
useful institution is never abolished. 
At a certain stage of economic development, private property 
simply disappears. As elaborated by Roy, "The abolition of the 
private property does not take place subjectively. It is the outcome 
of an objective process of social evolution." It is so because when 
labour is performed collectively, its products must be collectively 
owned. 
Roy, thus, rejects the dictatorship of the proletariat as the 
necessary means to bring about revolution. A revolution cannot be 
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made to order if at certain level of development, the established 
system of capitalist production becomes an obstruction to social 
progress. This system should be abolished by the socialist form of 
society. 
Roy is opposed to the dogma of the proletarian dictatorship. 
Socialism provides greater measure of democracy. In the highly 
industrialised country, the rule of the proletariat would be real 
rule of majority. It would not be dictatorship at all. When the 
proletariat grew, the necessity for it to establish dictatorship may 
disappear. Proletarian dictatorship does not happen in this kind of 
development. Roy's exposition of socialism, thus, does not lead to 
a communistic view.^ 
Roy argues that capitalism grows out of the exploitation of 
labour. But, at the same time, capitalist society raises the entire 
society on higher level. The working class is a part of society. In 
spite of exploitation, its interest is identical with the capitalists in 
the beginning.^^ 
VII Value Base of Social Revolutions 
Roy observes that the communist revolutions in Russia, China and 
elsewhere were preceded by an ideological movement. These were 
generated by Marx, Engels and Lenin. This ideology did not arise 
from the proletariat. Neither Marx nor Engels and Lenin came 
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from the working class. Their ideas were derived from previous 
thinkers and from the economic situation of their time. The 
difference was that they excluded moral and cultural values from 
their ideology. As a result, the ideology of communism emerged as 
a purely economic system. It had no cultural counterpart. The 
communist revolutions, therefore, did not have a value-vase. 
According to Roy, ideas have effective role in revolutionary 
transformation of society. The socialist values are a super-
structure that are based on a socialist economy. They can not 
emerge before a socialist revolution takes place and a socialist 
economy is created. According to Marxian theory, cultural values 
appropriate to a post-revolutionary society that will succeed and 
that cannot precede the socio-economic revolution. The driving 
force of a revolution will not be the cultural value of the future 
society. 
What then is the driving force of a revolution according to 
Marxism? The driving force is the development of the means of 
production. Capitalist accumulation leads to more and better 
capitalist goods and this development of means of production 
increases the productivity of labour. This power in society, 
however, remains restricted. It remains the same on account of 
worker's wages. These are kept at the subsistence level. A 
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contradiction then arises between the force of production and 
capitalist property.^* 
Roy argues that Marxism does not visualise any value system 
that is suitable to the success of a socialist economy. These are 
created prior to the proletarian revolution. Marxism does not deal 
with socialist values at all. According to Marxian theory of super-
structure, such values will emerge after and not before a 
successful socialist revolution. But Roy asks whether a socialist 
society can ever be established unless, as pre-condition, a 
substantial section of the people have come to cherish the new 
values. These values are necessary for the successful functioning 
of socialist economy.^ 
Furthermore, Roy insists that Marxism is not a philosophy 
but a theory of revolution. It gained support finally to become the 
ideology of a world movement. Marx proposed to make a science 
of socialism. Hegelian dialectics was useful for this purpose. As a 
philosophy, Marxism was a branch of the Hegelian system. As a 
theory of revolution it drew upon the doctrines and experiences of 
the 'bourgeois' French Revolution. The most important part of 
Marxism is its economic analysis. In that respect its fundamental 
principles were taken over from the British political economists. 
They were characterised by Marx as ideologists of capitalism. So 
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Marxism, according to Roy, contradicts itself in its doctrine that 
ideologies are created by the economic necessities of particular 
classes with the object of promoting and defending their respective 
interests/" 
Marx called his forerunners "Utopian romanticists." But, Roy 
says, Marx himself advocated the most extravagant form of 
romanticism. It had brought the great revolution to grief. 
Romanticism, as represented by its emphasis on human action, 
makes Marxism a revolutionary doctrine. But at the same time, 
romanticism contradicts philosophical principle that was inherited 
from Hegel. It was rationalism. Roy says: 
Dialectics is a rationalist notion; dialectical materialism, 
therefore, is a rationalist notion and a rationalist 
philosophy. On the other hand, the appeal to violence, 
being an echo of the last phase of the Great Revolution, is 
a romantic extravagance. The two aspects of Marxism thus 
stand in the relation of thesis and antithesis. The synthesis 
is the statement that "by changing the world, man changes 
himself." In other words, man's ability to change the world, 
to expedite revolution through evolution, and the moral 
right to do so, result from the fact that man is a part of 
nature, which is a ceaseless process of change, a dialectic 
process, in the Hegelian language. But the world is greater 
than the greatest of men; and will always be so. Therefore, 
man's ability to change it is limited by the axiom that the 
whole is greater than its part.^' 
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Roy, therefore, suggests that the revolutionary should not be 
excessive. He should not aspire to make miracles. His philosophy 
of life should be a synthesis of rationalism and romanticism. The 
Marxian gives too much emphasis on revolutionary action and that 
takes him on the side of irrationalism. At the same time, Marxian 
theory of revolution is cynical, according to Roy. It is so because 
its basic dogma is that human beings are never motivated by moral 
impulses. It rejects the belief that human nature by itself is 
sufficient cause for the endless progress of mankind. Moreover, it 
declared that revolutionary action by determined minorities was 
the decisive factor of history. 
Roy again argues that the Marxian interpretation of the 
history and theory of revolution create the cult of superman. It is 
the revolutionary part of the proletariat organised in the party. 
Therefore, it opens the perspective of dictatorship as the 
alternative to democracy. 
Roy assumes that the labour theory of value logically led to 
the theory of surplus value. It was expounded by the British 
theoretical Communists. They were followers of the classical 
political economist Ricardo. Philosophically, they all professed 
radical liberalism. It was the ideology of bourgeoisie. Therefore, 
the fundamental principles of Marxist economics were worked out 
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before Marx. It was in the form of social and philosophical 
atmosphere of "bourgeois liberalism." Thus, according to Roy, the 
entire heritage of Marxism contradicts Marxist historiology.^^ 
The theory that production of surplus value is the specific 
feature of capitalism represents exploitation of the working class. 
It is the fundamental fallacy not only of Marxist economics but of 
the entire philosophy of revolution. Roy argues that the producer 
is not receiving the full value of his labour. It is not a peculiarity 
of the capitalist system. Therefore, what is called surplus value in 
Marxist economic language is the surplus produced under 
capitalism. 
Roy calls Marx as an extraordinary student of economic 
history. He could not dispute the necessity and progressive social 
significance of surplus production. Economically, a demand for 
the abolition of surplus value will be impractical and suicidal. Roy 
says that the social surplus will disappear if production of surplus 
value is ever stopped. And with disappearance of progress, society 
will stagnate and eventually break down. 
Marx held that under capitalist production surplus value 
represented exploitation of labour. Because it is appropriated by 
one class. Roy demanded that the class appropriation of social 
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surplus should stop. Expropriation of the expropriators was the 
condition for the end of exploitation of man by man. 
Marx demanded the establishment of socialism. It would be 
based on the expectation that the expropriator would be 
expropriated by the proletariat. It means the social surplus will be 
appropriated by the new ruling class—the proletariat. 
Roy states that if production of surplus value represents 
exploitation of labour, labour is exploited also under socialism. 
And it should be admitted that under the socialist economy of 
Russia labour is even more exploited because in this system the 
strategy was to produce larger surplus value to be accumulated 
into the capital. 
Roy thus comes to the conclusion that Capitalism and 
Communism both can not guarantee that labour would not be 
exploited. So socialism is nothing better than state capitalism. Its 
pragmatic practice of reconstruction was logically deduced by 
Lenin from the theoretical presuppositions of Marxism as he 
interpreted them. It has unfolded itself according to the dogmas of 
orthodox neo-Marxism of Lenin and Stalin.^^ 
Roy insists that the inspiration for a new philosophy of 
revolution should be drawn from humanism and moral radicalism. 
Because humanist principle of individualism realised the 
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possibility of a secular rationalism and a rationalist ethics. They 
applied to the study of man and society the principles and methods 
of the physical sciences. The application of moral values is 
necessary for replacing the corrupt systems. Revolution must bring 
out a new order of democratic freedom. 
The moral order will result from a rationally organised 
society. Because man is essentially a rational being. Since man is 
rational, he is moral. Rationality and morality of man go together. 
Morality emanates from the rational desire for harmonious and 
beneficial social relations. 
Roy insists on a reorganisation of society that begins from 
the individual units of society. He develops his philosophy of 
revolution on the basis of entire stock of human heritage. He then 
elaborates the theory and formulates the principles of the practical 
economic reconstruction. 
Roy differentiates his radical philosophy from Marxian 
concepts of nation or class. Its concern is man. It conceives 
freedom as freedom of the individual, not of any particular class. 
Therefore, Roy also calls it new humanism.^'* 
According to Roy, for creating a new world of freedom, 
revolution must go beyond the economic re-organisation of 
society. Freedom does not follow from the capture of political 
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power in the name of the oppressed and exploited class. It also 
does not follow from the abolition of private property in the means 
of production.^^ 
Roy argues that the method and programme of social 
revolution must be based on the basic principle of social progress. 
A social renaissance is only possible by determined efforts to 
educate the people about the principles of freedom and rational co-
operation. Furthermore, Roy states that social revolution requires 
increasing number of men of the new renaissance. Revolution will 
be based on the principles of freedom, reason and social harmony. 
It will mean elimination of every form of monopoly and vested 
interest in the regulation of social life.^^ 
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CONCLUSION 
There has been a general perception about Roy'^ philosophy that 
it is nothing but an attempt to explain the history of philosophy, 
both Indian and Western. This observation may have partial truth 
in so far we can see that a large part of his writings is devoted to 
give a critical exposition of the views of philosophers gone 
before. It is also true that his philosophy receives its inspiration 
from Western humanism, Marxism and socialism. But that only 
shows that he is faithful to philosophy and tries his best to justify 
his ideas on rational basis and in the context of history of 
philosophy especially as it unfolded in the West. 
Even if it is to be conceded that Roy borrows heavily from 
western thinkers, both Marxist and anti-Marxist, it should still be 
recognised that he brings about a beautiful synthesis between the 
'individualism' of the later and the 'socialism' of the former. He 
tries to protect the individuality of man without agreeing to the 
capitalist conception of individuality. According to him, the 
trouble of mankind lies in the fact that man has lost faith in 
himself. 
We also find that unlike most other Indian thinkers of the 
20'^ century, Roy tries to make a clear distinction between 
philosophy and religion in his thought. On the basis of this 
attempt he should be recognised as the foremost secular and 
rationalist philosopher of modern India. 
Roy distinguished philosophy from religion by arguing that 
in the presence of religion no philosophical advancement is 
possible. For philosophical advancement, we will have to get rid 
of orthodox religious ideas and theological dogmas. Detaching it 
from religion, philosophy should rather be brought closer to 
science. No knowledge, according to Roy, is acceptable without 
testing it on the scientific standards. The doctrines which are 
based upon faith cannot be tested by the standard of scientific 
knowledge. Religions are based upon faith and are, therefore, 
unphilosophical and unscientific. Faith may also have its logic 
but that is rationally unacceptable. Roy gives an example of God. 
He says that God has been believed in because it was thought that 
there must be a creator behind the creation. But Roy says that the 
doctrine of creation has been exploded by the new physical 
research. The same may also be said about the beliefs in the soul 
and its immortality. 
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Regarding the argument that God is the cause of 
everything, the question may be aslced what is the cause of God? 
The believers respond that God is eternal and self-caused. He is 
the final cause. But Roy argues that once it is admitted that 
something may be self-caused, there can not be any logical 
objection to the view that the world is self-caused. It was never 
created, it is eternal. By finding causes of the natural phenomena 
in nature, science reinforced this logically tenable position.' 
Roy tries to draw his philosophical conclusions mostly 
from modern scientific theories. He finds that modern scientific 
research does not lead to a mystic or spiritual view of nature. 
Religious philosophy, therefore, is unacceptable and should be 
rejected. Faith in super-natural, moreover, does not permit the 
search for the cause of natural phenomena. It is the emergence 
and growth of the natural sciences that has enabled modern 
Western philosophers to develop a rational account of a reality 
free from the superstitious creeds of religion and theological 
dogmas. Roy said: 
To perform its function, philosophy must break away 
from religion, start from the reality of the physical 
Universe, and consequently head towards Materialism. 
Therefore, a mystic view of the world is negation of 
philosophy. It liquidates philosophy and resurrects 
faith. ^  
203 
Philosophy is older than religion. It is as old as man 
himself. In the process of the intellectual evolutions of man, 
reason appears earlier than faith. Instinct is the primitive form of 
reason which itself is the biological property of higher 
organism.'* It is the rational and scientific instinct that made man 
aware of the laws of nature. As a result, even the primitive man 
conceives and explains the universe as a self-caused and self-
contained order. The gods he believes in are sublimated natural 
beings. But Roy suggests that finally there is no need to assume 
super-natural forces for the purpose of explaining the order of 
nature. 
The more important question is, why the world is what it 
is? Philosophy can answer this question only in the light of 
scientific knowledge. The knowledge of how things happen in the 
world can be gained by philosophy with the help of modern 
scientific knowledge. The religious arguments cannot solve the 
philosophical problems. It is only philosophy which is based on 
modern scientific knowledge that can answer and solve the 
riddles of life.^ 
Roy thus tries to give a secular and modern definition of 
philosophy. The function of philosophy is to explain reality as a 
whole. The knowledge of reality in its different aspects is gained 
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by the various branches of science. It is science which helps 
philosophy to explain the entire existence which religion can 
never do. Therefore, the function of philosophy is to coordinate 
the entire body of scientific knowledge into a comprehensive 
theory of nature and life.^ It is a system of thought which 
explains the world rationally and serves as a reliable guide for all 
men in their lives.^ Mystical or religious view of life is the 
expression of man's loss of faith in himself. This, according to 
Roy, is the central feature of the crisis of out time. To come out 
of it, mankind must have a philosophy which places man in the 
centre of the universe. This is radical humanism which celebrate 
the final triumph of science over religion. 
Roy's world-view is dominated by his admiration for 
science, scientific attitude and outlook. This is not to say that he 
is insensitive to the limitations of science. He knows as well as 
anybody else that theories and principles formulated by science 
are not final. These are subject to revision in the light of the 
growing body of experimental data. Nevertheless, he equates 
knowledge with scientific truth. 
According to him, there is no knowledge other than 
scientific. All the sciences, physical, biological and social, 
constitute an inter-related body of knowledge. Roy's belief in 
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scientific theories leads him to emphasize the fact that the 
universe is law-governed. It lends itself to scientific treatment. 
Under the influence of Hegel and Marx, Roy also thinks that the 
universe is rational. 
Hegel looked upon the universe as an expression of the 
Absolute Idea. But in Roy's materialist philosophical world-
view, it is man who may be properly called rational or irrational. 
Though it is also true that the rationality of man is derived from 
the rationality of the universe. The faith or belief that the 
universe is law-governed and rational has a crucial role in Roy's 
philosophy of man. His philosophy is deduced entirely from the 
above belief. The principle of the rational order of universe taken 
together with the theory of evolution constitutes, in metaphysical 
term, Roy's view of the unfolding of reason in nature. 
Roy is a monist. According to him, ancient thinkers 
abandoned physical enquiry for metaphysical speculation. As a 
result, the philosophy suffered with the fallacy of dualism. 
Modern science enables man to understand materialism as a 
naturalistic system of ideas. It admits a monistic picture of the 
world. Since the universe is a unity of cosmos, it is arbitrary to 
break it into matter and mind.^ 
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But the question is: how can life emerge from dead matter? 
Roy answers the question by saying that life appearing as a 
novelty out of dead matter has to be recognised as an empirical 
fact. It also confirms the logic of monistic materialism. It 
happened through the entire process of evolution - organic as 
well as inorganic. Man is to be regarded as a biological 
phenomenon. No human trait or behavior, therefore, needs to be 
referred to any extra-physical source for explanation. 
Materialism as re-stated by Roy constitutes the basis of his 
philosophy of radical humanism. Roy argues that his philosophy 
of materialism is based on rational and scientific considerations. 
It is not a dogmatic faith. Materialism can successfully answer all 
the questions of epistemology and of cosmology. It can even 
offer a logically deduced system of ethics. Materialist philosophy 
can indicate the way out of the moral crisis of our time even 
without recourse to religious or mystical concepts. He says: 
But I submit that a secular, rationalist system of ethics 
can be logically deduced from a materialistist 
cosmology. A moral philosophy which can do without a 
transcendental and super-sensual sanction is the crying 
need of our time.^ 
Instincts and intuition are indeed not mystic categories. The 
soul, according to Roy, is not a spark of the divine light. Roy 
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calls it as the sum total of intellectual and emotional excellence 
of man. It may rather be called the torch of humanity. An 
axiology built on the foundation of the exact knowledge of 
biological phenomena called man deduces all values from one 
supreme value. It is materialist monism which alone can make a 
new mankind. Applied to the problems of social existence, it can 
be called new humanism. 
The question arises, what is the supreme value? For Roy the 
answer is 'Freedom.' It is the value of freedom from which all 
other human values are derived. Freedom is the supreme value 
because the urge for freedom is the essence of human existence. 
It can never be mystified because it can be traced all the way 
down the process of biological evolution. 
Ethical values, as Roy observes, are derived from the 
soulless animal-heritage of man. They, too, need no sanction 
which transcends human existence. Morality, therefore, is a 
human attribute of animal heritage. To be moral, one needs to be 
only human. So it is not necessary to go in search of a mystic or 
divine sanction. Man, according to Roy, does not need to be a 
slave of God or of his own prejudice to be moral. We need a 
humanist morality which is evolutionary, naturalistic and 
rational.'° Since man is essentially rational, he is moral too. Roy 
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thus claims that he saves rationalism and ethics from the harmful 
consequences of skepticism. Moral values are provided with a 
solid foundation since they are referred back to innate rationality 
of man. 
Roy also claims that he has saved man's dignity, 
personality, sovereignty and creativity by giving a new 
perspective before the modern world. It was previously thought 
that man could be moral under the compulsion of supernatural 
forces. Roy's ethics frees man from this kinds of belief. The self-
realization of man about himself restores man's confidence in 
himself. It consequently gives a better solution of moral crisis of 
our time. 
Roy explicates his conception of reason. According to him, 
every object of experience is connected with some or other object 
or objects, that may or may not have been already experienced. 
Consciousness as a property of life in the zoological world, 
means awareness of the environment. The mind becomes 
conscious of the environment. There is the subjective reality of 
mind and its possibility of knowing the objective world. The 
knowledge is an event that happens through the contact of mental 
subject with the material object. One must recognize the 
subjective elements in human knowledge. But, at the same time. 
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Roy rejects the idealist theory of knowledge which denies the 
objective existence of the "external world" and the possibility of 
knowing it. He insists that our conception of things must be 
based on experience. It also must be tested in the light of modern 
scientific theories. 
Roy started as a materialist and remained a materialist all 
through the different phases of his thought. He changed his 
political positions but not the metaphysical and methodological 
mindset. Firstly, he was a nationalist. In the second stage he 
became Marxist after reading literature on Marxian socialism. He 
however soon deviated from orthodox Marxism claiming that 
Marxian philosophy can not be applied to practical life. After 
that he started his own philosophy - the philosophy of radical 
humanism. He argued that radical humanism is not only an 
academic exercise but it was also to be a philosophy of action 
which should be practiced in daily life. Roy accordingly called 
his philosophy of radical humanism as post-Marxian philosophy. 
Roy distinguished himself both as a man of action and a 
man of thought. As a man of action he devoted himself to the 
cause of revolution and freedom not only in India but the world 
over. But his political action was always based on his 
revolutionary ideas and his concern for human freedom. 
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He indeed always believed in the unity of thought and 
action. About his philosophical concerns he wrote: 
These are not abstract intellectual problems; I came to 
think about them as problems of my own active political 
life. I began, like so many, as a believing man, believing 
in something supernatural, superhuman, but at the same 
time felt that the old religious idea would not do, and 
that we must rationalize religion, conceive God 
scientifically. I was a nationalist. The experience of the 
nationalist movement made me doubtful about its 
possibilities, its methods as well as its "spiritualist" 
ideology. Marxism appeared to indicate a more realistic 
and effective approach to problems which had puzzled 
the nationalist. The acceptance of Marxism as a 
philosophy of life implied breaking away from the old 
moorings of a rationalised religion. 
But I have never been an orthodox Marxist. My attitude 
to Marxism was critical from the very beginning. That 
experience again, the attempt to solve the problems of 
life with the help of Marxism, brought me to the 
conclusion that communism also was not a cure-all. I 
came to the conclusion that until the intellectual, 
cultural, spiritual atmosphere of the country was 
changed, it was not possible to bring about a political 
and economic reconstruction of the country, such as 
211 
would promote popular welfare, establish democratic 
freedom and social jus t ice ." 
Roy thus makes his deviation from Marxism as based on 
ideological differences. It is of both kinds - practical and 
theorical. Roy tells about his experience in following words: 
I may tell you that ever since I began to think for 
myself, I have been looking out for something which 
would make politics worth while. In the beginning, I 
thought that I found it in Marxism. I followed the 
Marxian path for quite a long time. But it was not a faith 
with me. It was only a guide to show me the way. I 
accepted Marxism critically. While behaving as a 
Marxist, I was continuously subjecting Marxism to my 
critical faculties, examining it in the light of experience 
of our time.'^ 
Roy defines ideology as a system of ideas. In other words, 
an ideology is the ideal sanction for social and political 
practices. When a man talks of ideology, he does not act 
according to economic determinism. Social behavior is not 
determined only by economic relations, but also by systems of 
ideas and values. Men profess an ideology according to which 
they act. That means men have a philosophy. 
Roy finds Marxism, on the whole, to be not true to its own 
philosophical tradition. In socialism, it vulgarizes materialism. It 
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denies the basic moral values. Moreover, with the impersonal 
concept of the forces of production, it introduces teleology in 
history. It also contradicts its own belief that man is the maker of 
his destiny. The economic determinism of its historiology beaks 
the foundation of human freedom. Because it precludes the 
possibility of man ever becoming free as an individual. 
Contemporary sociological thinking has been influenced by the 
fallacious and erroneous doctrines of Marxism. But these do not 
logically follow from its essential philosophy.'^ 
Roy further believes that Marxism inherited the liberating 
tradition of humanism. Mechanistic naturalism and romantic 
humanism as two conflicting trends were harmonized in the 
writings of Feuerbach. Feuerbach threw off the Hegelian 
influence in a better way than Marx. Therefore, in Feuerbach's 
materialist humanism, man remains a mystery. He also remains 
an elementary, indefinable category as simply given and to be 
taken for granted. Roy says: 
The fiery prophet of social justice in Marx was more a 
Humanist than a Hegelian. But his critical mind did not 
miss the weakness of Feuerbach's Humanism and 
realized the necessity of explaining the being and 
becoming of man, if his sovereignty as the maker of his 
destiny was to be empirically established. It was in 
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search of a rational foundation of the humanist view of 
life that Marx undertook his analytical study of history. 
At the same time, anthropology had discovered that the 
struggle for physical existence was the basic human urge 
- a biological heritage.' 
Marxian effort to place Feuerbach's materialist humanism 
on a rational foundation led to the contrary consequence. He 
replaced Feuerbach's mystic abstraction by an economic 
automation. Therefore, the abstract conception was transferred 
from the man to society which was supposedly endowed with a 
collective ego.'^ 
Since Marx was the prophet of revolution, he was called 
romanticist by Roy. A romanticist and a humanist, Marx 
proclaimed his faith in the creativeness of man. Creativity 
accelerates the process of evolution and finally leads to bring 
about revolutions. It was because Marx was a humanist that the 
force of his theory of revolution had its moral appeal. 
Roy calls Marx a great moralist but in the tradition of the 
ancient prophets of his race. His merciless exposition of the 
essence of capitalism was a severe moral condemnation of the 
system. In the last analysis, critique of capitalism is a treatise on 
social ethics. It may be presumed that Marx abstained from 
214 
making the moral appeal of his economic theories explicit. 
Nevertheless, it was as a moralist that he influenced history. 
Roy states that Marx talked of socialism as "the kingdom of 
freedom." In it, man will be the master of his social environment. 
Roy argues that one who preached such humanist doctrine could 
not be a worshipper of collective ego, even of the proletariat. 
According to him, materialist philosophy can have an ethics 
whose values require no other sanction than man's innate 
rationality. 
Roy accepts materialism as the only possible monistic 
philosophy. He argues that Marxism has two sides. It is 
materialist and also teleological. Those who claim a monopoly of 
Marxism emphasise its teleology. But Roy prefers humanism over 
Marxist teleology. Marx celebrated man as the maker of his world 
before introducing the teleological idea in his system. Marxism 
became reductive when it sacrificed man at the altar of the 
collective ego of society. Roy's humanism was an attempt to 
rehabilitate and rescue man from the clutches of collective 
tyranny. 
For Roy, Marxian method also did does not stand the test of 
history. Marx claimed that he could predict the general course of 
human history with certainty. But this claim was falsified by the 
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developments that took place in Europe and elsewhere. Marx 
projected experience of the past into the future irrespective of 
changes in circumstances and alteration of ethical standards. In 
denouncing the value judgement of his contemporaries and 
former generations, Marx expressed value judgement of his own. 
It was both negative and positive. Marx did not follow the rules 
of historical method as it is now understood. 
In Roy's philosophy of history, we observe that he believes 
that history is an evolutionary process and man is the maker of 
his history. Marx also regarded history as an evolutionary 
process, but he gave an economic interpretation of it. Marx also 
did not accept the role of ideas in the process of making history. 
Marx regarded ideas as a mere reflection of matter having no 
creativity of their own. In it freedom could have no value as it 
becomes the freedom of class. Morality had no meaning except as 
the economically determined behavior of the group. 
As distinguished from the philosophy of Marx, Roy realized 
the creative power of ideas though they had a material origin. 
They originated in the human mind, which itself is a part of the 
physical human body. He regarded ideas as the result of 
evolution of matter and the only creative power which makes 
freedom possible. 
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Moreover, Roy regarded the history of man as the history of 
man's struggle for freedom in which environment and ideas acted 
on each other. Thus, Roy's exposition of philosophy of history 
seems valuable because he is the philosopher who recognizes the 
creative role of ideas in materialist philosophy. Roy's 
historiology offers a comprehensive theory of social change in 
which both the economic forces and dynamics of ideas find their 
recognition. 
By tracing the double process, mental and physical, of the 
biological world, Roy's philosophy of history solves the problem 
of explaining the origin of ideas. It explains the origin of ideas 
without going outside the physical world. It makes an objective 
reality of ideas. This is really a significant contribution of Roy to 
the history of philosophy. His philosophy explains both aspects 
of existence - material and mental. It, therefore, reconciles 
idealism with materialism, humanism with naturalism, freedom 
with determinism, will with reason and romanticism with 
rationalism. All this has its moral consequences for entire 
humanity. 
This study, as objective as possible, has led us to certain 
definite conclusions. These may be enumerated point wise as 
under: 
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• 
• Roy is a monist, rationalist, moralist, and has a 
cosmopolitan outlook in his philosophy. 
• His philosophical approach is influenced by the scientific 
advancement of modern science as well as the ideologies of 
Marxism, socialism and humanism. 
As an atheist Roy makes himself distinguished and a unique 
figure in Indian philosophical tradition. He separated 
philosophy from religion and gave it a scientific colour. His 
position is therefore comparable to Tagore's. The two 
thinkers, despite having divergent approaches towards life 
and world, have yet similar results in terms of the 
philosophy of humanism and Internationalism. 
• Roy also secured an important place among other great 
philosophers of India by synthesizing the values of 
freedom, rationality and morality. 
• Roy regards freedom as the supreme value or rather the 
value of all other values. As no humanistic philosophy, 
whether theistic or atheistic, can deny man's right to 
freedom, Roy, too, makes a firm commitment to the 
freedom of man. He even makes it a basis of his philosophy 
of radical humanism. 
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In regard to his methodology, Roy's position is that the 
knowledge of things can be gained by philosophy with the 
help of modern scientific knowledge. It is the scientific 
methodology rather than the religious argument that can 
solve the problems of life and world. 
The function of philosophy is to coordinate the entire body 
of scientific knowledge into a comprehensive theory of 
nature and life. Therefore, the solution of all kinds of 
problems - cosmological, ontological and epistemological -
can be found in the light of scientific knowledge. 
The universe in Roy's philosophy is law-governed. The 
general principle of its emergence and growth can be 
understood in terms of the laws of natural development 
together with the theory of biological evolution. In 
metaphysical terms, it is the unfolding of reason in nature. 
Roy is a monist. He argues that ancient thinkers gave up 
physical enquiry for metaphysical speculation. 
Consequently, philosophy suffered with the fallacy of 
dualism. Modern science enabled man to understand 
materialism as a naturalistic system of ideas. It conceives a 
monistic picture of the world. Since universe is a unitary 
cosmos, it is arbitrary to break it into matter and mind. 
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• Materialism of Roy incorporates the ethical foundation of 
life within its system. It therefore integrates the philosophy 
of nature and moral philosophy. 
• Roy approaches materialism in terms of "Physical 
Realism." He considers this term more appropriate to 
coordinate the entire modern scientific knowledge into a 
logical system. 
• lie rc-statcs the materialist philosophy by recognizing the 
importance of ideas in all the processes of human 
evolution. This idea constitutes the basis of his philosophy 
of radical humanism. 
• Roy describes Indian philosophy as the most classical 
example of confusion in speculative metaphysical thought 
in so far as it splits the reality in terms of material and non-
material components. 
• Along with his physical realist ontology, Roy's 
epistemology is also based on the findings of physical and 
social sciences. Modern science, according to Roy, has 
solved the problem of epistemology. His materialism is 
based on scientific theory of knowledge. Knowledge is 
possible because there is a causal connection between mind 
and matter. Ideas, according to Roy, are representatives of 
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reality as they are derived from experience. Therefore, 
ideas are the production of interaction between mind and 
matter. Regarding human nature, Roy believes that since 
everything in the world is governed by the law of 
evolution, human nature cannot be an immutable category. 
Human nature is composed of various elements. These are 
the urge for freedom and the search for truth. 
• Roy's philosophy merges psychology into biology when it 
argues about the biological evolution of man. Mind is taken 
as material entity which develops through biological 
evolution. 
• Roy's philosophy combines mechanistic cosmology, 
materialist metaphysics, secular rationality and rationalist 
ethics. Moreover, it satisfies man's urge for freedom and 
quest for truth as well as guides man's future action in the 
pursuit of human ideals. 
• Radical humanism is to coordinate the philosophy of nature 
with social philosophy and ethics in a monistic system. It 
gives recognition to human brotherhood and emphasises 
that it is scientific humanism with a radical approach to all 
human problems. The main task of this humanism is to 
educate the people in the democratic values of freedom, 
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equality, rationality and morality. Although it gives 
centrality to man, there is no discord between its personal 
and social aspects. Therefore, radical humanism is both a 
personal and social philosophy. It is precisely for this 
reason that Roy's attempts to develop a synthetic ideal 
must be paid serious attention. 
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